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 Daniela Cammack
Abstract
	
 Conventional accounts of classical Athenian democracy represent the assembly as 
the primary democratic institution in the Athenian political system. This looks reasonable 
in the light of modern democracy, which has typically developed through the 
democratization of legislative assemblies. Yet it conflicts with the evidence at our 
disposal. Our ancient sources suggest that the most significant and distinctively 
democratic institution in Athens was the courts, where decisions were made by large 
panels of randomly selected ordinary citizens with no possibility of appeal. 
	
 This dissertation reinterprets Athenian democracy as “dikastic democracy” (from 
the Greek dikastēs, “judge”), defined as a mode of government in which ordinary citizens 
rule principally through their control of the administration of justice. It begins by casting 
doubt on two major planks in the modern interpretation of Athenian democracy: first, that 
it rested on a conception of the “wisdom of the multitude” akin to that advanced by 
epistemic democrats today, and second that it was “deliberative,” meaning that mass 
discussion of political matters played a defining role. The first plank rests largely on an 
argument made by Aristotle in support of mass political participation, which I show has 
been comprehensively misunderstood. The second rests on the interpretation of the verb 
“bouleuomai” as indicating speech, but I suggest that it meant internal reflection in both 
the courts and the assembly. The third chapter begins the constructive part of the project 
by comparing the assembly and courts as instruments of democracy in Athens, and the 
iii
fourth shows how a focus on the courts reveals the deep political dimensions of Plato’s 
work, which in turn suggests one reason why modern democratic ideology and practice 
have moved so far from the Athenians’ on this score. 
	
 Throughout, the dissertation combines textual, philological and conceptual 
analysis with attention to institutional detail and the wider historical context. The 
resulting account makes a strong case for the relevance of classical Athens today, both as 
a source of potentially useful procedural mechanisms and as the point of origin of some 
of the philosophical presuppositions on which the modern conception of democracy and 
its limits depends.
iv
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EPIGRAPHS
“To strip the magistrates of all their judicial power, except that of imposing a small fine, 
and the Areopagus of all its jurisdiction except in cases of homicide--providing popular, 
numerous, and salaried dikasts to decide all the judicial business of Athens as well as to 
repeal and enact laws--this was the consummation of the Athenian democracy.”
George Grote, History of Greece 5:511 (London, 1849)
“A farmer shall be a farmer and not a judge also.” 
Plato, Republic 397e
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INTRODUCTION
Reasons to Rethink Athenian Democracy
On Monday, January 19th, 1891, a short article appeared in the London Times 
announcing the discovery of a papyrus manuscript of a lost work of Aristotle. Over the 
previous fifty years, the reporter explained, archaeologists in Egypt had unearthed many 
treasures of classical antiquity, including first-ever examples of work by the Athenian 
orator Hypereides, new fragments of Euripides and the lyric poet Alkmaion, and early 
copies of Homer, Thucydides, Plato, Isokrates, Demosthenes and other greats among the 
Greeks. But the present discovery might “fairly claim to rank above all of these in 
importance.” It was a work “well known in name,” from which “more quotations are 
found in the writers of the early centuries of the Christian era than from any other of the 
many lost writings of its author.” Plutarch had drawn on it extensively, as had all the early 
Greek grammarians and lexicographers. A few years earlier, there had been “great 
excitement” when two scraps of papyrus in the Berlin Museum had turned out to contain 
some sentences from it; and now almost the whole text had been discovered on four rolls 
of papyri bought by the British Museum and was on the point of being published.1
	
 The promised volume appeared a few days later, and the identity of the 
manuscript was rapidly confirmed. It was indeed a copy of a fourth-century account of 
the Athenian political system, traditionally attributed to Aristotle (though as many later 
1
1 “A Lost Work of Aristotle,” The Times, January 19, 1891, 9, cols. d-e.
scholars would agree, most likely written by one of his students).2 The original treatise 
had been written in the late 330s BC; the copy found in Egypt dated to around 100 AD 
and was severely mutilated towards the beginning and end, but it was nonetheless easily 
recognizable. At the end of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle had referred to a collection 
of treatises on different poleis on which his more theoretical political writings were to be 
based, and Diogenes Laertios and other ancient cataloguers had mentioned a set of 158 
such accounts among his extant works.3 Now, finally, one of this collection had been 
found--and that of the most famed polis of all.
	
 The manuscript, known today as the Athēnaiōn Politeia (“Constitution of the 
Athenians” or “Athenian Constitution”), comprised two sections. The first, consisting of 
forty-one chapters, gave an account of Athens’ political development to the end of the 
fifth century BC: specifically, to the archonship of Pythodoros, or 403 BC by our 
reckoning.4 The second section, of twenty-eight chapters, outlined the political system of 
Athens in the writer’s own day. According to the initial report in the Times, the first 
section threw “some interesting light on certain dark places in Athenian history” and 
seemed altogether “a most valuable authority for the period for which it deals.” But the 
second section was deemed rather less interesting, both “on account of its own nature” 
Reasons to Rethink Athenian Democracy
2
2 On authorship and dating, see P. J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Athēnaiōn Politeia (rev. ed., Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993), 37-63. See also G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, “The Athenaiōn Politeia and Early 
Athenian History,” in Athenian Democratic Origins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 253-325, 
with the afterword by P. J. Rhodes, 325-7.
3 Arist. NE 1181b18; Diog. Laert. 5.1.27. See also Rhodes, Commentary, 1-2. 
4 On the Athenian calendar, see M. H. Hansen, Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Norman, 
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 135-6. 
and because it had been “freely excerpted by later lexicographers,” such that much of its 
contents was already known.5
	
 As the twentieth century progressed, however, doubts began to arise concerning 
the manuscript’s first, historical section. Some of the information it contained was almost 
certainly spurious, such as the “constitution of Draco,” a seventh-century lawgiver, that 
featured in the fourth chapter.6 Various other oddities also appeared: for example, the 
author’s description of Kimon, in Chapter 26, as “rather young” around 460, when he 
was in fact “about fifty years old, had been active for twenty years and had recently been 
ostracized,” and the ascription of Themistokles and Aristides to the same side in politics 
in Chapter 23, but opposite sides in Chapter 28.7 Evidently some of the sources on which 
the author had relied had been inconsistent or inaccurate or both. 
	
 While opinions of the first section fell, however, estimates of the second section, 
which was to all appearances based on first-hand research, rose. By the early 1980s, the 
initial assessment of the Times had been reversed. According to the author of the standard 
modern commentary on the text, Peter Rhodes, it was clear that although the manuscript 
contained “a great deal of valuable information which we do not find anywhere else,” it 
Reasons to Rethink Athenian Democracy
3
5 “Lost Work of Aristotle,” col. d.
6 Rhodes, Commentary, 84-8. 
7 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, ed. and trans. P. J. Rhodes (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2002), 12. 
also contained “a certain amount of rubbish,” especially in the historical section.8 The 
contemporary section, by contrast, was deemed both significant and generally reliable.9
	
 On one important point, however, scholars have remained skeptical of the 
author’s account of Athens in his own time, and this will serve as the jumping-off point 
for this dissertation. At issue is the author’s characterization of the development of 
democracy (dēmokratia) in the fourth century, from the archonship of Pythodoros down 
to Athens’ final defeat by the Macedonians in 322. The significant claim appears in 
Chapter 41, in the course of a summary of the eleven revolutions (metastaseis) that had 
occurred in Athens by the end of the fifth century. The major theme of this passage is the 
continually increasing degree of democracy in the politeia over time, give or take a few 
setbacks. The great lawgiver Solon is described as the first to establish the roots of 
democracy, early in the sixth century. There had followed a period of tyranny, after which 
Kleisthenes created a system that was “more democratic” (dēmotikōtera) than Solon’s. 
During the wars with Persia, the Areopagos, the aristocratic council that had in an earlier 
era been the primary governing body in the city regained some of its former power, but 
the reforms of Perikles and Ephialtes in the mid-fifth century stripped it of almost all of 
its functions and created a politeia that was more democratic than ever. An oligarchical 
Reasons to Rethink Athenian Democracy
4
8 Rhodes, Athenian Constitution, 12, 33-4.
9 Cf. C. A. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), 27-9: 
“the historical survey in the Ath. Pol. resembles a careful essay written by a modern research student who 
brings to his task much industry but no judgment.” See also S. C. Todd and P. Millett, in Nomos: Essays in 
Athenian Law, Politics and Society, ed. P. Cartledge, P. Millett and S. C. Todd (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 13-14: while the first part of the text is “derivative” and combines “in a fairly 
random fashion some important new information with gross errors of fact,” the second is “probably the 
author’s own work, and is generally reliable and of considerable historical value.” 
coup in 411 disrupted the trend, but dēmokratia was speedily restored; a second, bloodier 
coup in 404 proved harder to overcome, but after a period of civil war dēmokratia was 
restored for a second time. 
	
 Thus far, the fourth-century author’s account was uncontroversial. The same story 
had been established long before the rediscovery of the Athēnaiōn Politeia, and remains 
standard today.10 The contentious claim appeared in the following line. According to the 
ancient author, the second democratic restoration had established the “now existing 
constitution” (tēn nun ousan politeian), and ever since, the system had “continued down 
to its present form, constantly taking on additions to the power (tēn exousian) of the 
multitude (tō plēthei).” 11 This last claim has been rejected by modern scholars. The 
ancient author evidently believed that the long-running democratizing trend in Athens 
had continued into the fourth century, but no recent author accepts this. In the words of 
Peter Rhodes, while democracy certainly “persisted” in Athens after 403, the ancient 
commentator was simply “wrong” to believe that it had “continually become ever more 
extreme.” 12
	
 Rhodes laid out the evidence for this judgment in an article of 1980.13 Three kinds 
of change had taken place in the Athenian political system after 403, but few if any, he 
Reasons to Rethink Athenian Democracy
5
10 See e.g. G. Grote, History of Greece (London: J. Murray, 1846-56); J. Ober, Mass and Elite in 
Democratic Athens (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 53-103; Hansen, Athenian 
Democracy, 23-54.
11 Ps-Arist. Ath. Pol. 41.2.
12 Rhodes, Athenian Constitution, 18; cf. 85. 
13 P. J. Rhodes, “Athenian Democracy after 403 BC,” Classical Journal 75 (1980): 305-23.
argued, had had the effect of increasing the power of the dēmos.14 The first set of changes 
concerned legislation and legislative processes. At the very end of the fifth century, the 
Athenians had recodified and republished their entire body of laws, established a new 
distinction between laws and decrees, transferred the power to make law from the 
assembly to a newly created body of legislators (nomothetai) drawn from the same group 
of citizens that heard cases in the courts, and created a new criminal charge against the 
proposers of disadvantageous laws. The second set concerned what might be called the 
division of political labor. In a move away from the thoroughgoing amateurism of the 
fifth century, specialization and professionalization increased in the military, treasury, and 
other public bodies. The third set involved judicial activity. The selection procedure for 
judges15 was progressively tightened, and the Areopagos council, whose sole function 
since the mid-fifth century had been to judge cases of homicide, gained a more significant 
political role.16
Reasons to Rethink Athenian Democracy
6
14 Plēthos, “multitude” or “majority,” was frequently used interchangeably with “dēmos,” “people,” in 
ancient Greek. Rhodes adopted this practice, as do I in what follows. 
15 Actually, Rhodes referred to “jurors” rather than “judges.” The Greek dikastai (sing. dikastēs) can with 
equal accuracy be translated either way: see the discussion at pp. 43-4 below. In what follows, I will use the 
translation “judge,” since I regard the dikastēs’ function of judging both fact and law as more significant 
than the fact that he normally acted as one of a large panel (especially since dikastai did not confer). For a 
variety of perspectives on this issue, see M. I. Finley, Democracy Ancient and Modern (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1985), 117; R. Sealey, The Athenian Republic: Democracy or the Rule of 
Law? (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987) 54; S. C. Todd, The Shape of 
Athenian Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 82-3; M. Christ, The Litigious Athenian 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 20; E. M. Harris and L. Rubenstein, The Law and 
the Courts in Ancient Greece (London: Duckworth, 2004), 18; A. Lanni, Law and Justice in the Courts of 
Classical Athens (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 38.
16 This was through the procedure of apophasis, discussed at p. 226 below.
	
 To be sure, not all these changes were unambiguously anti-democratic, as Rhodes 
himself made clear. Most important, anything relating to the political powers of the courts 
called for careful interpretation, since Athens’ courts were themselves highly democratic 
bodies. They consisted of panels of hundreds, sometimes thousands of ordinary citizens, 
chosen by lot from whoever among those listed on the judicial roll turned up at the courts 
on any given day.17 The judicial roll was constructed annually, also by lot, from all 
citizens in good standing over the age of thirty who wished to be included on it. Those 
selected were required to take the judicial oath, which bound them to judge in accordance 
with the laws and decrees of Athens, or if these seemed unclear, then in accordance with 
their own best judgment.18 In the fifth century, six thousand citizens were chosen 
annually to go on the roll; we lack evidence for the fourth century, but there is no reason 
to think that the number decreased. The courts, then, were a remarkably democratic 
institution, and Rhodes accepted that this complicated his assessment of the level of 
democracy in Athens. Nonetheless, he maintained that the author of the Athēnaiōn 
Politeia was “mistaken” in his view that the power of the multitude increased during the 
fourth century. By the end of the period, Rhodes wrote, members of the dēmos19 were 
“still willing to work the machine”: there were still important decisions to be made, and 
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17 Rhodes, “Athenian Democracy,” 320, with n. 112, 320-1. Note that trials lasted no more than a day: see 
D. M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), 249-50.
18 Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 182. The dikastic oath is discussed further in Chapter 4, p. 193.
19 Plēthos, “multitude” or “majority,” was frequently used interchangeably with “dēmos,” “people,” in 
ancient Greek. Rhodes adopted this practice, as do I in what follows. 
“genuine debates still took place in the Assembly.” But, he suggested, “the atmosphere 
was different...the positive enthusiasm for democracy had gone.” 20
	
 To an extent, Rhodes’ judgment echoed an enduring theme in the historiography 
of classical Athens: that its fifth-century glory had been followed by a period of decline.21 
But there was more to his assessment than that. Almost all the changes he outlined 
pointed in the same direction: to the decreasing powers of the dēmos, the body of 
ordinary citizens, functioning directly in the assembly. In the years after 403, the 
assembly undeniably lost power to the courts, nomothetai, military and financial 
professionals and the Areopagos. It was presumably strengthened by the introduction of 
payment for attendance in the early fourth century, and again later in the century when, 
following the enlargement of its meeting-place on the Pnyx, the maximum number of 
attendees was increased.22 But these developments did nothing to mitigate the new limits 
placed on its political authority. And since the assembly is typically identified as the 
primary democratic institution in the Athenian political system, it would seem to follow 
from this that democracy as the Athenians understood it had begun to wane.
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21 See e.g. W. F. Ferguson, Greek Imperialism (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1913), 41; G. Glotz, The 
Greek City (London: Routledge, 1921), 128-262; A. R. Burn, History of Greece (Harmondsworth, UK: 
Penguin, 1985), 193-321; R. Garner, Law and Society in Classical Athens (London: Macmillan, 1987). For 
discussion, see Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 21-22; M. I. Finley, Aspects of Antiquity (New York: Viking, 
1969), 81-2.
22 Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 353-4.
	
 Yet it is precisely the traditional identification of Athenian democracy with the 
character and functions of the assembly that the Athēnaiōn Politeia invites us to question. 
This dissertation attempts to defend the ancient author against his modern critics, not by 
disputing any of the details of Athenian political development in the fourth century--
Rhodes’s account cannot be challenged on that score--but by developing a fresh account 
of the conception of dēmokratia held by the ancient Athenians, particularly as regards its 
chief institutional vehicle. While modern scholars have focused their attention on the 
assembly, our ancient evidence suggests that the Athenians regarded their courts as their 
most distinctively democratic institution and the body whose control by the dēmos was 
most critical to the preservation and flourishing of democracy as such. Viewed in this 
light, the judgment advanced by the author of the Athēnaiōn Politeia makes perfect sense: 
the majority of political changes after 403 either directly or indirectly strengthened the 
power and importance of judges in the popular courts--hence we can indeed say that the 
multitude gained power in the system overall. 
	
 Admittedly the price of this reinterpretation is high: it asks that we revise 
fundamentally the conception of Athenian democracy held by modern scholars, 
attributing far less significance to participation in policymaking in the assembly and more 
to participation in the administration of justice in the courts. Yet if the conception of 
democracy that emerges from this revision seems in some respects profoundly alien, the 
practices it supported proved highly successful. At least until the dramatic expansion of 
the Macedonian empire put an end to the autonomy of all Greek poleis, democratic or 
otherwise, the power of ordinary citizens in Athens’ courts does seem to have given them 
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supreme power in Athens overall. This form of democracy also seems to have punched 
far above its weight in relation to the history of political thought. It provoked a significant 
philosophical backlash in the form of the work of Plato: a backlash that had few serious 
short-term political consequences23 but proved remarkably powerful in the long run. 
Indeed, this Platonic backlash may itself go some way to explaining why the conception 
of Athenian democracy entertained by modern scholars has ended up so far from that of 
the fourth-century author of the Athēnaiōn Politeia. 
The Conventional View of Athenian Democracy
The centrality of the assembly to the idea and practice of democracy in Athens is 
supported by a wide variety of works, both recent and classic, produced by ancient 
historians, classicists, and political theorists alike. Athenian democracy was “assembly 
democracy”;24 it was a “direct democracy,” in which “policy, even in matters of detail, 
was decided by an assembly of all male citizens”;25 power in Athens “lay with the 
assembly,” in which “every male citizen counted for one, and one only”;26 the assembly, 
composed of “the citizenry as a whole,” was “the key sovereign body in Athens”;27 it was 
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23 Though see D. S. Allen, Why Plato Wrote (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2010), 90-141. 
24 Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 304.
25 W. G. Forrest, The Emergence of Greek Democracy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 16-18.
26 R. Lane Fox, The Classical World (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 2006), 96.
27 D. Held, Models of Democracy (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 17.
the “key decision-making body in the Athenian state,” 28 the “prime democratic body,”29 
the “real sovereign of the city,”30 the “supreme power of the state,” 31 “in a very real sense 
a sovereign body,” 32 the “dynamo” of the political system,33 the embodiment of “absolute 
democracy.” 34 Moses Finley stated the case with characteristic assurance. The assembly 
was quite simply the “crown” of the Athenian political system. It possessed “the right and 
power to make all policy decisions, in actual practice with few limitations, whether of 
precedent or scope.” No account of Athenian democracy could have “any validity” if it 
overlooked this point, which was simply “obvious.” 35
	
 There would certainly seem to be many good reasons to hold this view. To begin 
with, the assembly was easily the largest and most inclusive institution in Athens. Open 
to all male citizens over the age of eighteen (or possibly twenty in the later fourth 
century), it regularly attracted over six thousand attendees to its meetings, of which there 
were normally no fewer than forty per year.36 Before the Peloponnesian War, this meant 
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28 Ober, Mass and Elite, 7.
29 R. Osborne, Athens and Athenian Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 27.
30 N. D. Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980 
[1864]), 322.
31 V. E. Ehrenberg, The Greek State (London: Methuen, 1969 [1960]), 58.
32 A. H. M. Jones, Athenian Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986 [1957]), 3.
33 Ferguson, Greek Imperialism, 51.
34 Glotz, Greek City, 162.
35 Finley, Democracy Ancient and Modern, 49-50. Cf. M. I. Finley, Politics in the Ancient World 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 71 with fn. 4. 
36 Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 129-32. The frequency of meetings is attested only for the fourth century. 
that around a sixth of the adult male citizen body was probably present at any given 
meeting; in the fourth century, the proportion will have been closer to a fifth.37 Once 
estimates for the numbers of women, minors, foreign residents (metoikoi or “metics”), 
and slaves are factored in, we can say that an average assembly meeting in the fourth 
century will have included something like two per cent of the entire population of Attika, 
out of around ten per cent of the population who would have been eligible to attend.38 
This may seem a relatively low figure, and both the exclusion of women from political 
power and the existence of slavery have been deplored by many modern scholars.39 Yet it 
does, of course, compare favorably with the extent of the franchise in almost all times 
and places prior to the twentieth century. Moreover, notably, Athenian assemblygoers 
were not engaged in the selection of political representatives, as are voters in modern 
electoral democracies; rather, they were participating in government themselves. 
	
 The assembly was not only open to all male citizens, moreover; the range of those 
who actually attended was also apparently wide. The evidence at our disposal, though 
scanty, suggests that the socioeconomic background of attendees could vary considerably. 
Plato, for example, has Sokrates say that a speaker in the assembly might be “a 
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fourth centuries is estimated at 40,000 (before the Peloponnesian war) and 30,000 respectively.
38 Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 93, with citations. The total citizen population, including women and 
minors, can on the basis of demographic modeling be estimated at around 100,000. To this we may add 
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39 See e.g. P. J. Rhodes, Athenian Democracy and Modern Ideology (London: Duckworth, 2003). 
blacksmith, shoemaker, merchant, sea-captain, rich, poor, of noble family or low-born.” 40 
Xenophon, likewise, depicts Sokrates as saying that an average meeting might include 
“fullers, shoemakers, builders, smiths, farmers, merchants and profiteers.” 41 A couple of 
generations later, Aristotle’s premier student, Theophrastus, painted a similar picture: 
laying out the character of a rather dandified supporter of oligarchy, Theophrastos 
described him as “ashamed” when in the assembly “some scrawny, unwashed type seats 
himself beside him.” Relatively extreme social mixing was evidently at least conceivable 
in this setting.42 Widespread attendance was encouraged by the provision of a stipend, 
introduced in early in the fourth century at the rate of three obols per meeting, 
approximately equivalent to an entire day’s low-paid labor for an event that would in all 
probability be over by noon.43 By the end of the period, moreover, the amount had 
increased to six obols for an ordinary meeting and nine for the first and most important 
meeting of the month.44
	
 The Athenian assembly was thus a remarkably large and inclusive body, and its 
procedures were similarly open and equal. Every citizen was free to propose, in advance, 
items to go on the agenda for the next meeting; to address the crowd from the speaker’s 
Reasons to Rethink Athenian Democracy
13
40 Pl. Prt. 319d.
41 Xen. Mem. 3.7.6.
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43 Ps-Arist. Ath. Pol. 41.3. On wages, see M. M. Markle, “Jury Pay and Assembly Pay at Athens,” History 
of Political Thought 6 (1985), 265-97; reprinted in Athenian Democracy ed. P. J. Rhodes, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 95-131. On the duration of meetings, see Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 136-7.
44 Ps-Arist. Ath Pol. 62.2.
platform; and to vote, by show of hands, on all motions.45 Proposals could be tabled for 
reconsideration at a later date, but most were decided on the spot by majority opinion and 
put into immediate effect.46 To be sure, some citizens had a larger role in shaping the 
opinions of the crowd than others: Mogens Hansen estimates that during the fourth 
century, there may have been only about twenty to forty regular “rhētores,” “orators” or 
“politicians,” active at any one time.47 But no formal distinctions were drawn between 
attendees; every speech and every vote was, at least officially, worth the same as every 
other.
	
 Finally, the assembly had remarkably wide-ranging powers. From the revolution 
of Kleisthenes in 510, down to Athens’ final absorption into the Macedonian empire in 
322 (with the exception of two oligarchical interludes in 411/10 and 404/3), the assembly 
was the chief and final decision-maker on virtually all political issues. These included 
war, peace, and foreign relations; national self-defense; public finance and expenditure; 
the regulation of imports and exports; the bestowal of honors and rewards, including 
Reasons to Rethink Athenian Democracy
14
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46 This majoritarianism is striking. As Ste. Croix stressed, majority rule was practiced in Greece earlier than 
in any other society we know about, though it has attracted less attention than it deserves. G. E. M. de Ste. 
Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (London: Duckworth, 2001 [1972]), 348-9.
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355-322 BC,” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 25 (1984), 123-55. Hansen himself avoids the term 
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citizenship; the election of military generals and certain other important officials; the 
organization of public works; the celebration of festivals; and most instances of 
legislation and policy-making. It also held regular votes of confidence in office-holders, 
including generals, and retained the right to impeach any responsible agents in cases of 
suspected misconduct.48 In short, the assembly maintained supreme control of state 
policy and those responsible for executing it, and it did so directly, regularly, and on a 
wholly amateur basis. 
	
 Of course, no one acquainted with the classical Athenian political system would 
suggest that the practice of democracy in Athens was limited to the assembly. To the 
contrary, it was a genuinely multi-institutional affair, extending well beyond the assembly 
to include the council (boulē), which consisted of five hundred citizens chosen annually 
by lot; hundreds of low-level executive officials appointed by lot; nine chief archons, or 
magistrates, whose tasks were mainly religious and administrative, and who were also 
selected by lot; and finally the popular courts (dikastēria).49 Athenian citizens could also 
participate in government through their dēmē, or local political unit, of which there were 
139 in Attika.50 More informal political activity also took place in Athens’ squares, 
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schools, theaters, and social clubs, although the democratic significance of these bodies is 
ambiguous, since decisions were not taken there.51 Other significant political institutions, 
though not normally counted on the side of democracy, included the prominent board of 
military generals, chosen annually by election, and finally the Areopagos. The roots of 
this last institution were wholly aristocratic, but by the mid-fifth century it consisted 
exclusively of former chief archons chosen by lot, and exercised only judicial powers as 
the court responsible for judging cases of homicide.
	
 Of all these bodies, the two most significant for the character of democracy in 
Athens were the council and the courts. Positions on the council were allotted in 
proportion to the population of each dēmē; it was thus the only institution in Athens to 
form a demographic miniature of the entire citizen body, and its powers, likewise, can be 
regarded as a scaled-down version of the full range of political activity in Athens.52 The 
council made provisional decisions when the assembly was not in session, received 
envoys from abroad, heard reports from serving generals and ambassadors, and 
supervised magistrates on a day-to-day basis. Perhaps most important, it prepared, 
debated, and publicized the agenda of upcoming assembly meetings, including suggesting 
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specific wordings for decrees.53 The courts, in their turn, were also strikingly democratic 
and politically significant. Staffed entirely by ordinary citizens, with no room for 
professional judges or advisors of any kind, they had complete discretion over all legal 
cases in the polis (with the single exception of homicide, which was judged by members 
of the Areopagos).54 Moreover, since Athenian law included many overtly political 
offenses, such as treason, accepting bribes, lying to the dēmos, subverting the democratic 
system, speaking before the dēmos despite lacking the proper civic and ethical 
credentials, making an illegal proposal, and proposing a disadvantageous law, a great 
many issues that would not be justiciable in a modern setting were ultimately decided in 
court. The courts were also responsible for judging dokimasiai, the preliminary 
“scrutinies” that applied to every incoming office-holder (which included councillors, 
though not judges), and the same officials’ post-tenure “audits” (euthynai). Other 
formally non-political charges could also have a political complexion, since the courts 
were frequently used as a venue for social competition between political rivals. The result 
was that the courts were a fully popular and highly visible political entity.55
	
 No matter how democratic and politically significant the council and courts are 
known to have been, however, the view that the assembly was the “crown” of the 
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Athenian democratic system holds firm. Both the council and courts were, after all, 
considerably smaller than the assembly: only five hundred citizens a year participated in 
the council, while a judicial decision on a public charge could be made by as few as five 
hundred and one.56 Moreover, in contradistinction to the assembly, neither the council nor 
the courts were open to all comers. They were closed to anyone under the age of thirty, or 
who was in debt to the state, or who had lost some or all of his citizen rights. 
Additionally, no one could serve on the council more than twice in a lifetime, or for two 
years in succession, or who had failed his dokimasia; and no one could act as a judge who 
had not taken the judicial oath at the start of the year.57 Perhaps most important, neither 
the council nor courts enjoyed anything like the assembly’s wide-ranging powers. To be 
sure, the council’s “probouleutic” or “pre-considering” functions led some in the early 
part of the twentieth century to argue that it was the “real” ruler of Athens, but this view 
has long since been dismissed, given the assembly’s frequently used capacity to reject or 
amend the council’s suggestions.58 Equally, the courts’ control of the administration of 
justice may seem inherently less “political” than the assembly’s general authority. The 
frequency with which political issues ended up being decided in court--especially via the 
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charge of graphē paranomōn, used to strike down “illegal proposals” made in the 
assembly or council--certainly gave judges significant political clout. But the great bulk 
of political decisions undeniably continued to be made in the assembly.59
	
 Both for what it was and for what it did, therefore, the assembly is conventionally 
regarded as the primary vehicle of democracy in Athens. And this perception may be seen 
in the secondary literature on this subject in ways both large and small. One relatively 
minor but telling point is the fact that the assembly almost always comes first in lists of 
Athenian political institutions and analyses of the Athenian political system.60 In a similar 
way, the council, courts and other bodies are frequently characterized as “assisting” the 
assembly in managing the affairs of the polis, or as “committees” of the assembly, 
“feeder institutions,” or as the recipients of responsibilities “delegated” from the larger 
body, rather than as autonomous institutions in their own right.61 
	
 Some of the major themes of modern works on Athenian democracy--the wisdom 
of the multitude, the benefits of mass deliberation, the significance of equality of speech 
(isēgoria) and frank speech (parrhēsia), the involvement of the “whole people” in 
decision-making--also suggest the predominance of the assembly. These concepts are not, 
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to be sure, considered absent or irrelevant in any other part of the Athenian political 
system, but they would seem to be better exemplified by the activity of the assembly than 
that of any other body.62It would be going to far to suggest that the modern conception of 
Athenian democracy is inferred entirely from the character and functions of the Athenian 
assembly, but it is fair to say that, as our point of entry to the core ideological 
commitments of Athenian democracy, the assembly looms overwhelmingly large in the 
political imagination of modern scholars of the ancient world.
The View from the Fourth Century
On the modern understanding of Athenian democracy, then, the assembly was both the 
single most significant body in the Athenian political system and the most distinctively 
democratic. Yet if we focus exclusively on our primary evidence, a more checkered 
picture emerges. If we ask which political institution appears from our ancient sources to 
have been the most prominent in Athens, the answer would certainly be the assembly. But 
if we ask instead which institution our ancient authors associate most closely with 
“dēmokratia” according to their conception of that term, the answer that comes up again 
and again, particularly but not exclusively in our fourth-century texts, is not the assembly, 
but the courts. Both in the sense of being the most “demotic” (dēmotikon) institution in 
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the political system--that is, most closely tied to and on the side of the dēmos, conceived 
as a distinct subset of the polis63--and in the sense of providing the most crucial support 
for the preservation and development of the rule of the dēmos over the polis as a whole, 
the courts, rather than the assembly, seem to have been conceived by contemporaries as 
the sine qua non of classical Athenian democracy and the locus of the most specifically 
democratic activity in the polis. This view is evident in a number of texts, but I shall 
concentrate here on Aristotle’s Politics, the Aristotelian Athēnaiōn Politeia, and samples 
of work from the canonical orators, Aristophanes, and Plato.
	
 As Mogens Hansen and Eugene Garver have observed, Aristotle does not often 
mention Athens directly in the Politics.64 Although it is sometimes assumed that 
whenever he speaks of “extreme” democracy he must have had Athens in mind, there are 
too many democracies among the ancient Greek poleis about which we know very little 
for us to feel certain of this, especially since Athens was anomalous in several respects, 
and other poleis, such as Rhodes, were on some criteria notably more extreme than 
Athens.65 However, if we limit our attention to passages where Athens or Athenian 
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statesmen are mentioned by name, the democratic significance of the Athenian courts 
emerges very clearly. 
	
 Easily the most significant discussion of Athens in the Politics appears in Chapter 
12 of Book Two, where Aristotle describes the politeia of Solon (the early sixth-century 
lawgiver) and its long-term legacy.66 Aristotle’s first point is that Solon is commonly 
regarded as a good lawgiver (nomothetēs) because he “put an end to the existing 
oligarchical government, it being too extreme, and ended the slavery of the dēmos, and 
established the traditional form of democracy (dēmokratian) by skillfully blending the 
political system.” Next, he specifies the significant elements of this “blended” form of 
democracy. “For the Areopagos council was an oligarchic element, the elective offices 
aristocratic, and the courts (dikastēria) demotic (dēmotikon).” A modern reader coming to 
this passage for the first time could not be blamed for having expected to find the 
assembly listed as the “demotic” element in this system, rather than the courts, 
particularly since we know from other sources that Solon also allowed the lowest class of 
Athenian citizens, the thētai, to participate in the assembly.67 Nonetheless, Aristotle 
concentrates his attention on the courts, and his next line reconfirms their significance. 
“And though it seems that while, so far as the first two of these are concerned--the 
council and the elective offices--Solon merely refrained from putting an end to what 
already existed, he did in fact give the dēmos political standing (ton de dēmon katastēsai) 
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by constituting the courts (dikastēria) out of everyone (ek pantōn).” The assembly is not 
mentioned at all.
	
 Next follows an extremely valuable passage, worth quoting in full. It concerns the 
views of those with a negative evaluation of Solon’s achievements. 
And it is precisely on this account that he is sometimes blamed: for he 
effectively demolished the power of the other institutions (lysai gar 
thatera), by making the law-court (to dikastērion) supreme overall 
(kyrion...pantōn), it being chosen by lot (klērōton on). For as that 
institution grew stronger, people started to seek the favor of the dēmos as 
if it were a tyrant, and this gave rise to the present democracy; Ephialtes 
docked the power of the Areopagos council, along with Perikles, and 
Perikles introduced the system of payments for the courts, and so forth; 
and every one of the popular leaders (dēmagōgoi) continued down this 
path, to the point of the present democracy.
There are several points worth clarifying here. To begin with, it would seem that, at least 
in the eyes of Solon’s critics, there is a causal connection between the court’s being 
chosen by lot from the population at large and its becoming “kyrion,” or supreme, in the 
political system overall. This is initially suggested by the participle “on” in the first line, 
and it is confirmed by the opening clause of the second: “For as that institution grew 
stronger...” The “for” here has to be explicatory, and “that institution” can only mean the 
courts. The story that we are about to hear is thus that of the growing power of the dēmos 
as a direct result of the increasing strength of the courts. 
	
 Now, the term “dēmos” in this passage is (as often) ambiguous. It could denote 
the assembly: that usage is, for example, commonly seen in the enactment formulae used 
in the assembly’s decrees, “edoxe tō boulē kai tō dēmō,” “it seemed good to the council 
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and people,” and (less often) “edoxe tō dēmō,” “it seemed good to the people.” 68 Or it 
could denote the body of ordinary citizens in general, that is, “the people” as distinct 
from the particular individuals who fawningly seek the dēmos’s favor. Later in the 
passage those fawning individuals are identified as dēmagōgoi, “leaders of the people” or 
“rabble-rousers,” as exemplified by Perikles and Ephialtes: “dēmos” in this second sense, 
then, may be said to denote something like “those who are not leaders.” Or “dēmos” 
could be referring back to the court: that might be supported by the fact that we have just 
been told that the court is the chief demotic element in the political system. 
	
 On any of these interpretations, however, one point is consistent, though the 
underlying story varies slightly. We may read: “For as the court grew stronger, 
demagogues started to seek the favor of the assembly as if it were a tyrant, and this gave 
rise to the present democracy.” Or: “For as the court grew stronger, demagogues started 
to seek the favor of the mass of ordinary citizens as if it were a tyrant, and this gave rise 
to the present democracy.” Or: “For as the court grew stronger, demagogues started to 
seek the favor of the court as if it were a tyrant, and this gave rise to the present 
democracy.” On all these readings, the control of the court by ordinary citizens is taken 
for granted as the foundation of the present democracy, which developed via the 
ambitions of dēmagōgoi who took it in turns to boost the power of the dēmos as a way of 
augmenting their own political fortunes, until the dēmos itself reigned supreme. Whether 
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the dēmagōgoi themselves acted mainly in the assembly or courts is left uncertain, though 
the reforms pursued by Ephialtes and Pericles suggest that both venues played a part.
	
 The remaining question is whether or not this account, which Aristotle attributes 
to those who take a negative view of Solon’s accomplishments, is in fact plausible, and 
the closing lines of the passage, which give Aristotle’s own view on the matter, supply an 
answer to this question.
But this does not seem to have come about as the result of Solon’s 
intention, but rather on account of circumstances (for the dēmos having 
been responsible for the naval victories against the Persians, it began to 
think overly well of itself, and adopted low-class dēmagōgoi in the face of 
opposition from the more respectable classes); since it would seem that 
Solon only gave the dēmos the barest minimum power, that of electing 
officers and holding them to account (for without authority over this the 
dēmos would be nothing more than a slave and an enemy of the state), 
whereas he gave the power of actually holding the offices to the notables 
and men of wealth, that is, the pentakosiomedimnoi, the zeugites, and a 
third class, those called ‘knights’; while the fourth class, the thetes, did not 
get a share in any office.
What is crucial about this passage is what it does not say. For immediately after this 
Aristotle turns his attention to the projects of other Greek lawgivers; this is his last word 
on Athens for the time being. And what Aristotle does not say is that the common view of 
Solon’s legacy that he has described--either positively or negatively interpreted--is wrong 
in the significance it ascribes to the demotic character and power of the courts. Where the 
standard view is false, Aristotle argues, is in suggesting that the present democracy came 
about as the result of Solon’s intention. However, the basic narrative--the increase in the 
dēmos’s power as a result of the machinations of its fawning leaders, backed by the 
power of the demotic courts--is not disputed at all.
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 With this in mind, we can turn to the account of Athenian democracy presented in 
the Aristotelian Athēnaiōn Politeia. As several readers have noted, the democratic 
significance of the courts is a major theme in this text. In the words of Martin Ostwald, 
the claim that the “mainstay of popular sovereignty in Athens” was the “judicial power of 
the dēmos as vested in the jury-courts” runs “like a thread” throughout its entire historical 
section.69 John Keaney went further, arguing that the author saw in the reform of the 
courts by Solon “not only the most salient characteristic of the developed democracy but 
also the germ of that element which was to be its conditio sine qua non...To him, the 
courts represented the fundamental element in, and the strength of, the Athenian 
democracy.” 70 Earlier scholars also accepted this view: George Willis Botsford, for 
example, simply repeated the fourth-century author’s suggestion that “it was through the 
law-courts that the Demus became master of the government.” 71 And this position is 
arguably the key to understanding the author’s claim in Chapter 41 of the Athēnaiōn 
Politeia that the power of the multitude kept on increasing throughout the fourth century. 
	
 This solution is suggested, to begin with, by the explanation of the claim offered 
in Chapter 41 itself. “For the people (dēmos) has made itself master of everything, and 
administers everything by decrees and by jury-courts in which the people (dēmos) is the 
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ruling power, for even the cases tried by the Council have come to the people (eis ton 
dēmon).” 72 The assembly certainly plays a significant role here, since it is the agent 
responsible for all decrees. But the rest of the sentence suggests that the author was 
considerably more impressed by the activity of the dēmos in the courts. Indeed, he even 
uses the word “dēmos” as a stand-in for the word “courts” in the final clause.73
	
 Yet the suggestion that the courts might be the primary instrument of the dēmos’s 
rule is only a continuation of what has been, up to this point in the text, a recurrent theme. 
The first highly arresting comment is the author’s description of the three “most 
demotic” (dēmotikōtata) reforms of Solon: an end to debt slavery, the right of any 
individual to seek legal redress on behalf of one who had been wronged, and finally, “that 
which more than anything else is said to have strengthened the position of the majority,” 
the right to take disputes to a jury-court (dikastēria).74 Not only do two of these three 
reforms specifically concern ordinary Athenians’ access to justice as both litigants and 
decision-makers (while the right to attend the assembly, also recently established, is not 
mentioned), the author also spells out the special significance of the third reform. “For the 
people, having the power of the vote (psēphos), becomes sovereign (kyrios) in the 
government.” 75 What is most significant about this claim is the term “psēphos,” which 
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denoted a voting-pebble of the kind used in the courts, though not (as far as we know) in 
the assembly, at least in the classical period.76 
	
 The courts remain frequently in view in the rest of the historical narrative. We 
learn, for example, that Ephialtes, the “champion of the dēmos” in the late 460s, first 
undermined the power of the Areopagos by bringing its members before the courts.77 The 
introduction of jury-pay in the mid fifth-century is presented as another crucial move: the 
discussion of this initiative, described as a deliberate “popular counter-measure” 
promoted by Perikles to shore up a base of support against the elite patronage of Kimon, 
forms the longest single passage in this part of the text, and the measure is specifically 
said to have enabled the takeover of the courts by “ordinary people” (tōn tuchontōn), 
leading to what some called their “deterioration.” 78 
	
 Another striking point is the assumption made by the oligarchical conspirators in 
411, and not disputed by the author, that the courts would have to be made politically 
toothless before oligarchy could be established. This led directly to the first step in their 
coup, which was to abolish the courts’ power to overturn illegal proposals.79 The 
oligarchs in 404 did exactly the same thing. In that case, the author reports that this made 
the oligarchs seem “moderate” (metrioi) at the time, which suggests that the courts had 
come to be regarded as one of the more “extreme” sectors of the democratic system. The 
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coda to this episode is that within a few weeks the oligarchs had abolished the jury-courts 
altogether and moved to judging cases in the council. Intriguingly, they made no attempt 
to staff the courts with a more select, pro-oligarchical group of judges. It may be that a 
non-democratic dikastēria was effectively inconceivable.80
	
 Repeatedly, then, in the historical section of the Athēnaiōn Politeia, the courts are 
singled out as the most important moving element in the story of the rise of democracy. 
This contrasts strongly with the same author’s treatment of the assembly, which appears 
in a considerably more ambiguous light. Most notably, its actions are three times shown 
to have resulted in a reduction in the power of the dēmos rather than the other way 
around. The first occurred when Peisistratos, in the late sixth century, tricked the 
assembly into abandoning its arms, which ushered in his reign as tyrant. The second was 
in 411, when the assembly was manipulated into voting down the democracy in the hope 
that this would secure them Persian support in the war against Sparta. And the third time 
was in 404, when the assembly voted to give thirty prominent Athenians the power to 
produce a new code of laws amenable to the Spartans, which culminated an all-out 
oligarchical attack on the democratic system and eventually a full-blown civil war.81 As a 
result, strange though it may seem, the assembly would appear to be associated rather less 
with the strength of democracy in Athens than with its weakness. 
	
 Finally and perhaps most importantly, the democratic significance of the courts in 
the Athēnaiōn Politeia is shown by their representation in the contemporary section of the 
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text. An enormous amount of space is devoted to the courts in this section: they are the 
subject of the final seven of this set of twenty-eight chapters, while there is no equivalent 
treatment of the assembly.82 But what is most significant is the role of the courts in the 
author’s account of changes in the political system after 403. Since we know that he 
believed the power of the dēmos to have increased over the fourth century, it makes sense 
to pay special attention to every change mentioned in this part of the text, and the results 
of this examination are striking. Altogether, the author lists sixteen changes.83 Four of 
these relate to the increased use of the lot,84 three to increases in the numbers 
participating in certain executive functions,85  and three are miscellaneous.86 The 
remaining six cases all relate to the administration of justice. Four of these concern a 
transfer of power to the courts,87 while two concern increases in the numbers 
participating in other forms of judicial activity.88 The use of the lot is commonly regarded 
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as a key element in Athenian democracy, as is widespread participation; on this evidence, 
transferring power to the courts may well have been seen in the same light. 
	
 This conclusion is supported by the writings of the Athenian orators. The 
approximately one hundred and fifty extant speeches (and pamphlets in the form of 
speeches) are our single most important source of evidence on Athenian democratic 
ideology,89  and the significance of the courts as the ultimate backstop of Athenian 
democracy comes across overwhelmingly strongly in these texts. We may begin with a 
quotation from Lykourgos, a prominent statesman, who in 330 acted as prosecutor in a 
controversial trial for treason.90 According to Lykourgos, the three things which in the 
main “uphold our democracy and preserve our city’s prosperity” were “first the systems 
of law, second the vote of the jury (dikastai), and third the method of prosecution by 
which these crimes are handed over to them”--all three relating specifically to the 
courts.91 The finality of the judges’ authority elicited especially strong language from 
speakers. “I take it that everybody will agree that to invalidate judicial decisions is 
monstrous, impious, and subversive of popular government” (tou dēmou katalysis), 
Demosthenes proclaimed confidently in a trial of graphē nomon mē epitēdeion theinai, 
“proposing a disadvantageous law,” in 353.92 In the same speech, he argued that the 
courts were “the pillars of the constitution,” that “laws which are still authoritative have 
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given supreme authority (kyrious hapantōn) to the gentlemen of the jury,” and that he had 
been told “that in times past, popular government (tēn dēmokratian) had been overthrown 
this way, when indictments for illegal legislation were abolished, and courts of justice 
(tōn dikastēriōn) stripped of authority (akurōn genomenōn).” 93 Aischines adopted similar 
language in a case which indirectly attacked Demosthenes. He freely identified the judges 
with the polis as a whole and democracy in general, and likened their role in defending 
democracy to that of guardsmen in war: “as each man of you would be ashamed to desert 
the post to which he had been assigned in war, so now you should be ashamed to desert 
the post to which the laws have called you, sentinels (phulakes) guarding the democracy 
this day.” 94 Like Demosthenes, Aischines also emphasized the historical significance of 
the courts as the protector of the democratic system: “No one has attempted to overthrow 
democracy before he has made himself stronger than the courts.” 95 
	
 Many similar quotations can be found celebrating the democratic significance of 
the courts, and in particular the importance to democracy of the supreme authority of the 
judges.96 But two passages, one from Demosthenes and another found among his writings 
although not now attributed to him, deserve special attention. The first concerns a case 
that appears never to have come to trial, though the aggressively class-conscious contents 
of Demosthenes’ prosecution speech invite the question whether the defendant, a 
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fabulously wealthy individual named Meidias, might actually have tried to settle the case 
beforehand out of fear of what might happen if Demosthenes’ remarks were heard by 
members of the dēmos sitting in court.97 Meidias was accused of violating the sanctity of 
the Greater Dionysia by punching Demosthenes in the face while the latter had been 
acting as a chorēgos, chorus producer, during the festival of 351/50. Throughout the 
speech Demosthenes played up the powerlessness of ordinary Athenians in the face of 
bullying by men of great wealth and influence such as Meidias, but this theme reached its 
apotheosis in some of its last passages.98 Focusing on the judges before him, 
Demosthenes asked them to consider where their own power lay. Not in personal 
strength, or youth, or arms, he argued, implying coolly that the men before him did not 
excel in any of these categories. Their power lay exclusively in the laws. 
Do not, gentlemen of the jury (ō andres dikastai), do not betray me or 
yourselves or the laws. For if you would only examine and consider the 
question, what is it that gives you who serve on juries such power and 
authority (pot’ eisin humōn hoi dikazontes ischyroi kai kyrioi) in all state 
affairs...you would find that it is not that you alone of the citizens are 
drawn up under arms, not that your physical powers are at their best and 
strongest, not that you are in the earliest prime of manhood; it is due to no 
cause of that sort, but simply to the strength of the laws. 
The laws, then, were the source of these men’s power. But the strength of the laws 
could in turn be realized only through their own agency:  
And what is the strength of the laws? If one of you is wronged and cries 
aloud, will the laws run up and be at his side to assist him? No; they are 
only written texts and incapable of such action. Wherein then lies their 
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power? In yourselves, if only you support them and make them powerful 
enough to help him who needs them. 
Thus “the laws are strong through you and you through the laws,” Demosthenes 
concluded. Domineering men such as Meidias might try to bully, hector or buy their way 
to special treatment in the polis, but the laws, as embodied by the judges, were there 
specifically to defend the “little” man from the “big.” 99 The laws were, in effect, a 
weapon on the side of the dēmos--“you”--against the domination of the elite--“Meidias”--
perhaps the only weapon the unexceptional “little” men of Athens had.100
	
 Since these claims emphasizing the significance of judges and judging appear in 
speeches made before judges themselves, it is natural to wonder if they represent merely 
a captatio benevolentiae--that is, an attempt to gain the listeners’ goodwill. But for one 
thing, as Hansen has argued, while this may often be true, it is very striking that no 
similar claims hailing the final democratic power and authority of the assembly feature in 
our extant assembly speeches.101 For another, even if litigants did often seek the goodwill 
of the judges by emphasizing their power and significance in the democratic system, the 
fact that the speakers considered it worth their while to flatter the judges’ capacities in 
this way itself tells us a good deal about the distribution of authority in Athens. Finally, it 
is worth noting that flattery of the audience is not the dominant note in most of our 
speeches, either in the assembly or in the courts. More often, the listening voters were 
berated for their failure to act in the right way or indeed at all. 
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 This leads us to the second of the two passages from the orators to be considered 
here. A particularly interesting example of audience-berating appears in a speech given 
before the assembly around 351, attributed to Demosthenes though most likely not by 
him.102 What is most significant about this speech is the claim that Athenian citizens 
typically put too much stock in the power of their courts to protect them, when they ought 
to be developing alternative (in this case military) means of defense. According to the 
speaker, certain “phrases, false and injurious to the State,” had entered the Athenians’ 
“common speech,” such as “‘In the law-courts (dikastēriois) lies your salvation’ and ‘it is 
the ballot (psēphos) that must save the State’.” 103 Any mention of a ballot ought to cause 
readers to prick up their ears, for as we have seen they were a characteristic feature of 
judicial activity--in the assembly, except in extraordinary circumstances, attendees voted 
by raising arms.104 The speaker continued, somewhat testily: “I know that these courts are 
sovereign (kyria) to uphold the rights of citizen against citizen, but it is by arms that you 
must conquer the enemy, and upon arms depends the safety of the State.” 105 Both the 
accusation that the Athenians were losing the capacity for military action because they 
relied excessively on their courts and the acknowledgment that the courts were the 
institution responsible for deciding domestic conflict are very striking. 
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 The evidence surveyed so far was all produced in the fourth century. What of 
earlier sources? Most important for our purposes are the plays of Aristophanes, which 
alongside the work of Thucydides provide a major insight into Athenian social and 
political norms before the end of the Peloponnesian War. Both these authors are 
frequently cited in connection with the political significance of the courts in Athens. 
Athenian “litigiousness” is brought up as the subject of widespread complaints among 
Athens’ allies in the first book of Thucydides’ History, while the identification of Athens 
with judicial activity forms a running joke in Aristophanes.106 We meet the protagonists 
in Birds (414) fleeing Athens on account of suits launched against them in pursuit of 
debts, and their description of Athens focuses exclusively on the courts: “A splendid city, 
Athens, rich and free, / Denying none the right to...pay a fine! ...That stubborn folk will 
sit / And chirp on legal twigs til kingdom come!” 107 Shortly thereafter, when they identify 
themselves to Tereus, previously a man, now a hoopoe, as mortals “from the land of 
lovely triremes,” he replies without missing a beat “Jurymen (ēliasta)?” 108 Similarly, in 
Clouds (423), Strepsiades is flummoxed when shown Athens on a map: “But it can’t be; 
there are no juries (dikastas) sitting.” 109 Almost the same joke is repeated in Peace (421): 
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in a team of Greeks from multiple poleis, the Athenians are criticized for being good for 
nothing except going to law.110 
	
 More interesting than the general association of Athens with judges and judging, 
however, is the specific association of the courts with the supreme power of ordinary (or 
even specifically lower-class) citizens. This too appears in scattered fashion throughout 
Aristophanes. A good example is in Lysistrata (411), where a husband’s demand that his 
wife “put a stop to your bellowing!” prompts the immediate response “You’re not on a 
jury now, you know.” 111 Similarly, in Assemblywomen (c. 382), Blepyrus, as soon as he 
learns that women have taken over the administration of the state, asks: “Then my wife’s 
the dikastēs now, not I?” 112 
	
 The most substantial evidence on this point, however, appears in Wasps (422). 
This play revolves around a well-to-do son, Bdelykleon (“Loathekleon”) trying to cure 
his father, Philokleon (“Lovekleon”) of his “addiction” to judicial service.113 Accordingly, 
it is full of judicial analogy and activity, climaxing in an especially fantastic trial of the 
family’s dog on a charge of cheese-stealing.114 Yet two issues stand out in relation to the 
democratic significance of the courts. The first is the expected age and social standing of 
the judges; they are portrayed as principally the elderly and the poor. Philokleon is an old 
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man with an upwardly mobile son who feels that his father’s constant court-going is 
beneath him: the implication that he needs the money evidently reflects badly on the 
family’s reputation.115 The typical (or stereotypical) poverty of judges is also illustrated 
in a tragicomic conversation between the chorus-leader and his small son, whose request 
for a present of figs elicits a pathetic response from the father: he is so far from being able 
to afford figs that he claims not to know how the family will eat if he is not picked to sit 
in court that day.116 The second significant issue is the tremendous power wielded by 
judges. This is developed in a long and rather salacious speech of Philokleon, in which he 
revels in the groveling behavior of the litigants that come before him and compares 
himself to a king and to Zeus himself.117 The implication is clear: if an ordinary citizen 
wishes to feel like a king, the obvious venue is the courts, not the assembly. 
	
 Of course, since the plot of Wasps relates directly to the courts, one might expect 
their significance to be overstated in that work. A more accurate depiction of their 
character and significance might be expected to be found in a work dealing with political 
activity more broadly, especially if it gave some sense of the relationship between the 
courts and the assembly. Knights (424) provides this. The main political setting in this 
play is the assembly. The character Demos is explicitly introduced in association with the 
assembly’s meeting-place on the Pnyx, the hill in the center of Athens, and later he 
actively refuses to hear squabbling political leaders present their arguments anywhere 
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else.118 Yet the democratic significance of the courts also surfaces repeatedly. The main 
supporters of Paphlagon (i.e. the popular leader Kleon) are identified as “elders of the 
jury-courts, brethren of the three obols,” 119 and the promise of further jury-pay is 
represented as a major incentive for their offering him continued support.120 
	
 Most instructive in this vein is a remarkable exchange between the chorus of 
knights (that is, cavalrymen, members of Athens’ second-highest military and economic 
class) and Demos that takes place towards the very end of the play.121 First, the knights 
accuse Demos of being easily manipulated by political leaders: 
Chorus. Demos, you have a fine sway, since all mankind fears you like a 
man with tyrannical power (andra tyrannon). But you’re easily led astray: 
you enjoy being flattered and thoroughly deceived, and every speechmaker 
has you gaping. You’ve a mind, but it’s out to lunch. 
This accurately captures how Demos has been depicted throughout the play. But in the 
next passage, Aristophanes switches course dramatically, and attributes to Demos rather 
more cunning than might have been expected. His supposed stupidity is apparently only a 
guise that allows him to milk his leaders for whatever riches they have amassed in the 
course of their ascendancy. 
Demos. There’s no mind under your long hair, since you consider me 
stupid; but there’s purpose in this foolishness of mine. I relish my daily 
pap, and I pick one thieving political leader to fatten; I raise him up, and 
when he’s full, I swat him down. 
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The knights accept this and even expand upon the feeding and sacrificing analogy: 
Knights. In that case you’ll do well; and your character really does 
contain, as you claim, very deep cunning, if you deliberately fatten these 
men, like public victims, on the Pnyx, and then when you chance to lack 
dinner, you sacrifice one who’s bloated and have yourself a meal. 
A key feature of this passage is the singling-out of the assembly, on the Pnyx, as the 
location of the “fattening” part of this process. But even more significant for our purposes 
is that the culmination of this procedure, which confirms the ultimate power of Demos 
over the political elite that he has “fattened,” takes place nowhere but the courts. 
Demos. Just watch me and see if I don’t ingeniously trick them, those who 
think they’re smart and that I’m their dupe. I monitor them all the time, 
pretending that I don’t even see them, as they steal; and then I force them 
to regurgitate whatever they’ve stolen from me, using a verdict-tube as a 
probe.
The “verdict-tube” mentioned here was a wicker funnel used in the courts in this period: 
it rested on the neck of the voting urns, allowing the judges to cast their ballots without 
anyone seeing for whom they were casting their votes.122 The notion of using this as a 
“probe” to make the political class regurgitate the objects of their gluttony is arresting, 
and neatly suggests both the symbiotic relationship of the assembly and courts as 
democratic venues and the courts’ final political significance. The “fattening” would be to 
no avail without some means of recovering the goods; to this extent, the rest of the 
democratic system can be said to depend on the successful functioning of the courts, and 
especially on their control by the dēmos. Moreover, though it is possible that this 
interlude is itself no more than an Aristophanic captatio benevolentiae, a way of securing 
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the goodwill of his audience at the Lenaia for a play otherwise filled with criticism of the 
stupidity of the dēmos and the cupidity of its leaders, its significance still holds. Flattery 
is pointless if it is not persuasive, and for that to be the case it has to seem plausible. To 
the extent that this exchange reveals a plausible account of the relationship between the 
dēmos and its leaders as sketched out in the relative functions of the assembly and courts, 
it provides important evidence for the way that dēmokratia was conceived in Athens. 
	
 The foregoing 	
evidence is culled from the most obvious sources. The historical 
significance of the works of Aristotle and his students, the writings of the canonical 
orators, and the plays of Aristophanes is fully accepted, though the implications of these 
works may not have been fully digested. A trickier body of evidence to use for historical 
purposes are the philosophical writings of Plato, though this source may be the most 
politically significant of all. As is well known, Plato was a committed anti-democrat, 
albeit an idiosyncratic one: his advocacy of “philosopher-kings” in the Republic, for 
example, hardly reflected mainstream oligarchical sentiment in Athens.123 It is less often 
noticed that the specific venue Plato often has in mind when criticizing either 
majoritarianism in general or Athenian democracy in particular is not the assembly but 
the courts. The suspicion of democratic rhetoric in the Gorgias, for example, centers on 
its effects in the courts, while the long “digression” comparing politicians to philosophers 
in the middle of the Theaetetus also presents the courts as the political venue of most 
concern.124 Of course, the overwhelming significance of Sokrates’s trial and execution in 
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the Platonic worldview plausibly accounts for some of this attention, but the number of 
allusions and direct references to judicial activity in Plato’s works far outstrips what 
might be expected as a result of that event. 
	
 This invites us to reconsider Plato’s interest in the theme of justice in connection 
to its role in Athenian democracy; and here, perhaps, lies the most significant evidence 
for the supremacy of judicial activity in the conceptualization of democracy in Athens. 
The centrality of justice in Plato’s writings can hardly be doubted: as well as being the 
only virtue to be given the honor of a treatise in ten books, its literal centrality in his 
works has recently been demonstrated by J. B. Kennedy, who has found that the cluster 
“philosophy, justice and God” recurs at the exact center of a large number of his works.125 
Yet when read in the light of the general democratic significance of the courts, this 
attention to justice comes into a sharp new focus. A new view of the relationship between 
democracy and the administration of justice in Athens suggests a new understanding of 
Plato’s philosophical project: to undermine, to the fullest extent possible, the conception 
of justice that formed the chief intellectual bulwark of Athenian democracy.
Plan of This Work
What is exciting about the above evidence presented is not that it shows that the Athenian 
courts were a thoroughly democratic institution. That point is already widely accepted.126 
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Nor is it surprising to find that the Athenian courts played a substantial political role. 
Again, that point is well understood.127 What is novel is the possibility that the courts 
were conceived, by democrats and anti-democrats alike, as the most democratic--or 
“demotic”--space in Athens, the foundation of the dēmos’s specific power, and the 
institution whose continued control by the dēmos was deemed most crucial to the 
preservation and flourishing of dēmokratia itself.
	
 This dissertation begins the task of constructing a fresh interpretation of Athenian 
democracy on the basis sketched above. This interpretation may be called “dikastic 
democracy,” after the citizen-judges, or dikastai, who sat at its apex. It is preferable to 
avoid neologisms when possible, particularly those derived from ancient Greek. But since 
no currently existing English term is adequate to describe the kind of democracy that the 
Athenians had, some new coinage is necessary, and the need for it is itself instructive.
	
 The term “dikastic” comes from the Greek “dikastēs,” which, as Stephen Todd 
has noted, can with equal accuracy or inaccuracy be translated “judge” or “juror.”128 Like 
a judge in many legal systems, a dikastēs was responsible for interpreting both law and 
fact and was responsible for deciding on the appropriate sentence, with full discretion 
over both aspects of his verdict. Like a juror, he was an ordinary citizen with no legal 
training and usually sat on a panel alongside many other dikastai. But the differences 
between an Athenian dikastēs and either a modern judge or juror are perhaps even more 
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significant. Dikastai did not discuss verdicts before voting; they voted secretly and left no 
record of their reasoning; they received no legal instruction and were not required to 
follow precedent; and their verdicts could not be repealed. 
	
 Perhaps the most significant difference between an Athenian dikastēs and a 
modern judge or juror concerns the scope and political significance of the dikastēs’s role. 
In modern terminology, the dikastēs judged both fact and law; according to the ancient 
conception, he decided “to dikaion,” “what is just.” Ancient Greek politics revolved 
around two questions: first, what seemed advantageous for the polis, which was typically 
decided in an assembly or council, and second, what was to count as just within it, which 
was typically decided in court.129 In Athens and elsewhere, this latter function involved 
not only resolving disputes between citizens, but also disciplining politicians, military 
leaders, and others whom the polis had entrusted with responsibility. Hence the dikastēs 
had enormous political power. When this role was played by ordinary citizens, it meant 
that those ordinary citizens had final authority in the polis. 
	
 The term “dikastic democracy” is intended to capture this situation. It describes a 
system of government in which the dēmos--defined as the body of ordinary working 
citizens, those undistinguished by wealth, birth, influence, political prowess, or any other 
exceptional feature--rules principally through judicial decision-making.130 This is not to 
suggest, of course, that the assembly or its equivalent in such a system would play no 
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significant democratic role. In Athens at least, the courts and assembly probably 
developed symbiotically: the final authority of the courts may actually have enabled some 
of the freedoms of the assembly which modern scholars typically identify as 
“democratic,” such as openness to all to attend, speak and vote. Arguably, it was because 
the Athenian dēmos controlled the courts, and used the courts to control its political 
leaders, that it was able to give those leaders as much latitude as it did to shape policy in 
the assembly. The main burden of this work, however, will be to investigate the 
foundations of Athenian democracy from the perspective of the character and functions of 
the courts. A full account of the relationship between the courts and the assembly will 
have to wait for a later opportunity.
	
 The dissertation will proceed as follows. The first two chapters are largely critical: 
their task is to clear away two of the main obstacles in the way of the account of Athenian 
democracy that I wish to give. The first obstacle is the interpretation of Athenian 
democracy as “epistemic,” that is, centered on maximizing the returns to relevant 
knowledge. This has recently been argued at length by Josiah Ober,131 though he builds 
on the work of various other scholars, most notably Jeremy Waldron, whose 
interpretation of Aristotle as advancing the “doctrine of the wisdom of the multitude” has 
had a substantial influence on the conception of ancient Greek democracy held by 
political theorists and other scholars of the ancient world.132 In large part, this influence 
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stems from the fact that there are very few sustained defenses of mass political activity in 
our primary sources, and without doubt the most important is the passage of Aristotle that 
Waldron and others have interpreted along “epistemic” lines. Specifically, it is believed 
that Aristotle justified Athenian-style democracy by arguing that to combine the ideas and 
experiences of many people gathered together in an assembly, through discussion, would 
lead to better decisions being made overall.133 
	
 If this were right, it would undermine any account of Athenian democracy that 
sought to emphasize the role of the courts, where no discussion took place. However, I 
argue that the passage in question has been comprehensively misunderstood. As well as 
being, almost certainly, neither about Athens nor about dēmokratia (at least according to 
Aristotle’s conception of that term), the subject of Aristotle’s argument is not wisdom but 
virtue (aretē), and the activities to which he refers take place in both the assembly and the 
courts, though discussion is not one of them. Of course, if Aristotle is talking about 
neither Athens or democracy here, one might not want to throw out Ober’s account of 
Athenian democracy along with Waldron’s interpretation of Aristotle. Yet the only 
primary source to which Ober refers in his exposition of the significance of the 
aggregation of knowledge in Athenian democracy is this passage of Aristotle.134 We 
ought therefore to remain skeptical of the wider conclusions he draws, at least as they 
relate to the conception of dēmokratia dominant at the time. 
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 The next chapter picks up the theme of discussion begun in Chapter 1. The second 
major obstacle to my claim that the courts played a central role in Athenian democracy is 
the interpretation of Athenian democracy as “deliberative”: that is, as featuring a key role 
for discussion and debate as part of the political process. As noted above, there was no 
discussion at all among judges in the courts, which would seem to put them very far from 
the heart of Athenian democracy as currently conceived. I argue, however, that the term 
“deliberation” (to bouleuesthai) in Greek has been misinterpreted. Rather than group 
discussion, or “external-collective” deliberation, to adopt the terminology of Robert 
Goodin, to bouleuesthai referred to individual thought, or “internal-reflective” 
deliberation, in both the assembly and the courts. The major function of the Athenian 
dēmos was indeed to “deliberate,” but this denoted listening to the speeches that came 
before it and voting on them; the mass of ordinary citizens did not take part in speaking 
themselves. Rather, one who got up to speak before either the assembly or the courts by 
that very action placed himself, if only temporarily, outside the dēmos and became a 
“rhētor,” a “speaker” or “politician.” This radically alters our view of Athenian 
democracy. Among other things, it allows us to redefine at least some aspects of 
democratic activity in Athens on the basis of the activity of the courts. 
	
 The constructive part of the project begins in Chapter 2. Here I take on directly 
the question of the relative democratic strengths of the assembly and courts and the 
definition of “dēmokratia” that follows from this. I begin with the transfer of key political 
powers to the courts at the end of the fifth century, as described by Rhodes above. These 
reforms have been the subject of intense debate in the scholarly literature on Athens in 
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recent decades. The analysis of Rhodes and others suggests that the reforms were an 
attempt to “check” the popular will. But I will argue that they were intended to amplify it, 
because the courts were regarded by the majority of Athenians as a better representative 
of the dēmos, defined as those undistinguished by wealth, birth, influence, political 
prowess, or any other exceptional feature. Although the assembly was far larger, there is 
no evidence that the Athenians identified dēmokratia with large numbers. Rather, what 
was significant was how far ordinary citizens were able to participate in decision-making 
and how well protected they were from manipulation. I will show that in terms of 
composition and procedure, there were many good reasons, apparent by the end of the 
fifth century, for the Athenians to think that the courts were a better protector of the 
interests of the dēmos than the assembly could be. 
	
 Finally, in Chapter 4, I consider the impact of the Athenians’ democratic judicial 
practices on the conceptualization of justice in classical Athens. Some readers may doubt 
that the vote of a random assortment of ordinary citizens with no legal training, under no 
judicial instruction, required to follow no precedent and accountable to no one, not even 
to one another--in short, possessing absolute discretion over each and every verdict, with 
no possibility of appeal--could possibly have approximated anything like justice, at least 
as it is usually understood today. Indeed it could not; but it did accord with the 
conventional Athenian conception of justice, which was very different from our own. 
That is not to say that it did not have its merits. Arguably, the most compelling feature of 
the conventional Athenian understanding of justice is the constructive role it allowed to 
human agency in arriving at a judgment of “what is just” (to dikaion). In disputes 
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between the members of a political community, the only admissible criterion of justice 
was understood to be the opinion of other members of the political community--or rather 
the supreme part of it, in this case that of the dēmos as expressed by the vote of a 
randomly selected, and thus adequately representative, judicial panel. In Athens, the 
verdicts given by these panels seem to have been treated as defining justice quite literally: 
there was simply no other measure by which to ascertain what a just outcome might be. 
To be sure, this conception of justice may strike many readers as a frighteningly 
relativistic approach to what they would regard as first and foremost a moral, and 
therefore absolute, rather than a political, and therefore contingent, function: the task of 
giving sound judgment. Yet if this is a common response, it is worth bearing in mind that 
this circumstance is at least partly owing to the enduring success of an alternative 
conception of justice for which we may also have the activity of the classical Athenian 
courts to thank: that is, Plato’s. Plato’s signal achievement, seen most obviously in the 
Republic and Gorgias but evident throughout his writings, was to transform the political 
and philosophical terrain on which justice was conceived; and he did this, I argue, at least 
partly because he believed that in so doing, he was undermining a central pillar of the 
Athenian system of government. Against the notion that “what is just” was just solely 
because the political community held it to be so, Plato developed the concept of justice as 
a virtue (hē dikaiosynē) in order to establish the existence of justice as an eternal or 
abstract “form,” from which it follows that only truly just men can pronounce what is just 
in accordance with the form of justice itself. 
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Fascinatingly, in doing this, Plato may have been taking up and amplifying a 
minor element of the conventional Athenian approach to justice: the notion that in certain 
cases there was such a thing as a “right answer,” independent of the votes of the judges--
namely, cases in which the gods were deemed to have a special interest, principally 
homicide. When faced with the possibility that unexpiated blood-guilt might pollute the 
city, the Athenians relinquished their right to vote on what was just in the ordinary way. 
Instead, they passed such cases on to the city’s highest magistrates, to be tried in sacred 
precincts around or outside the city, with much tighter rules governing the kinds of 
evidence that could be heard. Plato, particularly in the Laws, seems to have conceived of 
something similar, but on a larger scale. In effect, what Plato did was to argue that the 
gods (or God) were (or was) always watching. He thus arrived at a conception of justice 
that would hold regardless of who happened to be sitting in court on any particular day, 
and so undermined what was widely taken to be the foundation of the Athenian 
democratic system: the right of citizens to decide what was just (to dikaion) for 
themselves. 
This was a remarkable innovation, and not the least remarkable thing about it was 
its long-term success. One indicator of its short-term influence is the fact that, as recorded 
by Diogenes Laertios, every treatise on justice prior to Plato appeared under the title Peri 
tou dikaiou (“On What is Just,” in the sense of an outcome), while those written after him 
discussed Peri tēs dikaiosynēs (“On Justice,” in the sense of a virtue)--with the striking 
exception of Aristotle, who wrote separate works on each.135 Perhaps the most significant 
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indication of the victory of the Platonic conception of justice over that of the Athenian 
democrats, however, appears in the extent to which the notion of justice that 
predominates in much legal and political philosophy and ordinary usage today retains the 
same basic shape as his. A common understanding of justice is that disputes admit of a 
“right answer,” which is independent of the reasoning of the judges: the most that is 
normally hoped for is that the judges involved will be able to get relatively close to it. 
This, arguably, owes a great deal to the conception of justice as an eternal or 
transcendental “form” that Plato was the first to develop, and that was carried into later 
Western political thought largely thanks to its congruence with Christianity. A great many 
modern citizens appear to accept the idea that there is a right answer “out there” in 
questions of justice, that arriving at this answer is an essentially technical or intellectual 
task rather than a popular or political one, and that this task is best performed by small 
bodies of specially trained, professional thinkers—judges or, for that matter, 
philosophers. This is not to suggest that a majority would claim that such individuals 
come up with the “right answer” all or even most of the time; but it is to suggest that they 
suppose that such an answer exists, if only we could reach it. Similarly, many people 
appear to feel uncomfortable with the idea of putting the ultimate decision of “what is 
just” exclusively into the hands of ordinary citizens, the role of juries in some legal 
systems notwithstanding. The thought here is that the chance of such groups 
systematically coming up with the wrong answer is just too great. 
This is an essentially Platonic conception of justice and its execution. Indeed, it is 
arguable that if Plato were around today, he, perhaps more than any other political 
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philosopher, would see good reason to be satisfied with the way that political and judicial 
functions are organized in modern representative democracies, at least at the highest 
levels. Democratically elected legislative assemblies are common, and separately elected 
executive officers are also widely seen, so the creation and enactment of laws are 
certainly, in many cases, democratically controlled. But there is little evidence to suggest 
that this would have struck Plato (or any other classical Athenian) as particularly 
significant in the absence of similarly direct democratic control over the interpretation 
and application of laws once they are made. 
Whether or not modern judges decide cases in a manner that Plato would have 
approved of is, of course, a different question, and there is no reason to think that Plato 
would have admired the general ethos of most modern regimes. But it is enlightening to 
think that in the eyes of both pro- and anti-democratic Athenians, it was primarily the 
power of the dēmos to decide “what is just” for itself, in the courts, that served as the 
supreme guarantee of democracy as they understood it. We may think that they were 
wrong about this; but it is worth noting that, to an ordinary Athenian democrat, the 
modern practice of democratizing the creation and enactment of laws, while 
simultaneously “outsourcing” their interpretation and application to small bodies of 
professionals beyond the reach of democratic accountability, would have seemed very 
strange, even dangerous. Such a policy would have been thought to invite the oligarchical 
capture of the entire political system, whether the majority of citizens realized it or not.
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CHAPTER ONE
Aristotle on the Virtue of the Multitude
Almost twenty years ago, Jeremy Waldron published a widely admired account of an 
argument made by Aristotle in support of the political authority of “the many,” as 
opposed to “the one” or “the few.” 1 The key text, from Book 3 of the Politics, reads:
For the many (to plēthos), of whom each individual is not a good man 
(spoudaios), when they meet together may be better (beltious) than the 
few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to 
which many contribute (ta symphorēta deipna) is better than a dinner 
provided out of a single purse (ek mias dapanēs). For each individual 
among the many has a share (morion) of excellence (aretē) and practical 
wisdom (phronēsis), and when they meet together, just as they become in 
a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses, so too with 
regard to their character (ta ēthē) and thought (dianoia). Hence the many 
are better judges than a single man of music and poetry; for some 
understand one part, and some another, and among them, they understand 
the whole (allo gar alloi ti morion, panta de pantes).2 
Waldron dubbed this argument “the doctrine of the wisdom of the multitude,” or 
“DWM,” and explicated it as follows. Aristotle thought that “the people acting as a body”  
were “capable of making better decisions, by pooling their knowledge, experience, and 
insight,” than any single member of the body, however excellent, was capable of making 
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on his own.3 Mass political activity thus resembled a “potluck dinner” 4 or an audience 
judging a play: a greater variety of contributions could produce a better result. This 
reflected decision-making in the Athenian assembly. Debating the invasion of Sicily, 
Waldron hypothesized, one citizen might know something about the coastline, another 
Sicilian military capacities, another the costs of such expeditions, and so on. From the 
diverse knowledge of the whole group there could thus emerge the “widest possible 
acquaintance with the pros and cons,” and hence the best possible decision.5
	
 Similar accounts had appeared before,6 but Waldron’s was easily the fullest and 
most elegant and has continued to influence students of democracy and of Aristotle alike.7 
Certain details remain disputed: for example, whether the aggregation of views was fully 
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“dialectical” or more “mechanical,” 8 and whether citizens themselves possessed 
knowledge relevant to the subject at hand or simply knew who did.9 But Waldron’s three 
core claims are widely accepted. First, that Aristotle’s “feast” is a “potluck dinner.” This 
is supported by a later appearance of the same analogy, in which “a feast to which all the 
guests contribute” (hestiasis symphorētos) is contrasted with “a banquet furnished by a 
single man” (mias kai haplēs).10 Second, that the multitude’s contribution to political 
activity is diverse knowledge, wisdom, insight or expertise.11 And third, that this reflects 
debate in an assembly, as in classical Athens.12
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 Accordingly, Aristotle is widely regarded as a moderate supporter of deliberative 
democracy on epistemic grounds.13 Yet there are reasons to doubt this view. The “pooling 
of knowledge” paradigm certainly fits the intellectual aspect of his argument, denoted in 
the text by “phronēsis,” “prudence” or “good sense,” and “dianoia,” “thought.” But how 
about its ethical aspect, denoted by “aretē,” “virtue” or “excellence,” and “ta ēthē,” 
“moral characteristics”? Also, Athenian assemblygoers seem to have been better known 
even among democrats for ignorance rather than for knowledge (especially in relation to 
the invasion of Sicily).14 Is an epistemic account really likely in this context? What about 
the second analogy: can an epistemic approach adequately explain audience responses to 
artistic works? And could Aristotle really have found potluck dinners so appealing? Did 
the ancient Greeks even have potluck dinners?
	
 None of these questions has been fully explored; those who doubt the argument 
have simply dismissed it as weak.15 I think we can do better. Aristotle was not interested 
in the benefits of pooling diverse knowledge, but in the political authority of aretē, 
“virtue,” understood in its general sense as a capacity for right action encompassing both 
ethical and intellectual qualities. He was concerned with the quantity of aretē that could 
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be possessed by different agents, and his claim in this passage was that some multitudes, 
when they act collectively, can exhibit more aretē than even highly virtuous individuals. 
Specifically, I will suggest, he believed that all forms of virtue--perhaps especially 
courage and justice, the two that he associated most with large numbers--are easier to 
practice in groups than alone, and this supported the view that a multitude could be an 
effective political agent.
	
 This account fits recognizably within the familiar framework of Aristotelian 
“virtue ethics” 16 (albeit with a twist that connects it to wider issues of collective action), 
which seems preferable to reading the passage as an outlier in Aristotle’s writings.17 But 
if my interpretation is sound, what explains the staying power of the former account? One 
factor is the difficulty of the text: it is highly truncated, leading many translators to 
expand upon it, inserting misleading terms in the process--thus giving false 
preconceptions to readers who have Greek and precluding understanding among those 
who do not.18 Another is the seeming plausibility of the assumption that the contributions 
made to the “feast” are individual dishes. This naturally suggests a “potluck dinner,” 
valued for its “variety,” and the rest follows. A third is the familiarity of epistemic 
arguments for political authority. Since at least Plato, a leading criterion of fitness for rule 
has been appropriate expertise; the current enthusiasm for epistemic defenses of 
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17 As implied, perhaps, by Waldron, “Wisdom of the Multitude,” 563. 
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democracy is only the latest incarnation of this approach.19 That Aristotle should have 
advanced a similar argument may thus seem unsurprising. If I am correct, however, he 
was engaged in a profoundly different project, which deserves attention not only for the 
sake of getting Aristotle right, but also because it provides a way of defending certain 
forms of mass political activity that may ultimately prove more powerful than the 
epistemic arguments favored today. 
The Conventional Account and its Weaknesses
The core elements of the accepted account are the “potluck dinner” analogy, the claim 
that the multitude’s contribution to political activity is fuller knowledge, and the thought 
that this reflects decision-making in the Athenian assembly. None of these elements is 
free from difficulty, however, as an examination of the text and its context reveals. 
	
 The essential feature of Aristotle’s collectively provided feast is that it is expected 
to be better than one provided by a single man. Yet, as others have noted, this is hardly a 
common view of potluck dinners.20 Indeed, in the Straussian tradition, it is precisely the 
improbability of this depiction (along with the reference to the “one man” with “many 
feet, and hands, and senses,” which is regarded as “monstrous”) that is taken to show that 
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the whole argument is ironic.21 Still, most commentators have proven willing to suspend 
disbelief on this point, since potluck dinners would seem to have a natural affinity with 
democracy. Everyone can participate; participation is on equal terms; contributions are 
small; and the results unpredictable. An analogy between dishes at a potluck and views in 
political debate is visible even at the linguistic level: in the words of Josiah Ober, benefits 
arise when different people bring different things “to the table.” 22 
	
 Yet no matter how natural the “potluck dinner” analogy may seem today, there is 
no evidence that potluck dinners existed in ancient Greece. We have plenty of evidence of 
communal dining23 but none of dinners where guests supplied dishes of their own 
choosing, and the idea fits badly with what we know of Greek domestic culture. Gender 
segregation suggests that any such dinner would have been all-male, yet for the same 
reason, attendees could not have cooked their own contributions; that would have been 
the task of a wife or slave.24 So we must imagine a series of Greek men arriving for 
dinner, each bringing a dish prepared by a dependent--and then suppose that this could 
have struck Aristotle as analogous to the production of the citizenry’s autonomous 
political decisions. 
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22 Ober, Democracy and Knowledge, 114.
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1164-68) and the Homeric eranos (Od. 1.226, 11.415).
24 Thuc. 2.78.3.
	
 If we take the point of the analogy to be “variety,” further difficulties arise. 
Classical Greece was not twenty-first century America; its culinary traditions were not 
notably diverse. The Greek diet comprised mainly bread, olive oil, garlic, figs and wild 
greens, with a little cheese, meat or fish. Could a “finer” (kalliōn) meal really have been 
produced by the “potluck” process when the options were anyway so limited?25 
Moreover, on the subject of meat, sacrificing and roasting whole animals was normal 
procedure--a tricky thing to prepare in advance and take to a neighbor’s in a dish.26 
Ancient standards of hospitality present another problem. The guest-host relationship was 
literally sacred, to Hestia, goddess of hearth and feast, and Zeus Xenios, protector of 
travelers, strangers, and guests. No self-respecting Greek householder could have 
proposed an evening’s entertainment on the condition that guests help out with the food 
and drink.27 Finally, whatever relation this passage bears to potluck dinners, another 
passage in the Politics suggests that Aristotle would have disapproved of them. At least, 
he disapproved of the Spartan requirement that all citizens, however poor, contribute to 
its public messes (syssitia); he preferred the Cretan system, in which such meals were 
provided from public funds, to which the poorest did not contribute.28
Aristotle on the Virtue of the Multitude
60
25 Pl. Resp. 372b-c; Plut. Lyc. 12.2. See also M.-C. Amouretti, “Urban and Rural Diets in Greece,” in Food, 
ed. J. L. Flandrin, M. Montanari and A. Sonnenfeld (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 80-2, 
and L. Foxhall and H. A. Forbes, “Sitometreia: The Role of Grain as a Staple Food in Classical Antiquity,” 
Chiron 12 (1982): 74. 
26 P. Schmitt Pantel, “Greek Meals,” in Food, ed. Flandrin et al, 90-5; H. W. Parke, Festivals of the 
Athenians (London: Thames and Hudson, 1977), 18. 
27 Contrast Pl. Smp. 174e-f.
28 Arist. Pol. 1271a27-33. 
	
 These points raise doubts that a potluck dinner is the relevant paradigm. The text 
does nothing to dispel them, though that is not obvious from most English translations. 
Common renderings of the “feast” terms include “a feast [or “feasts”] to which many 
contribute,” 29 “a feast to which all contribute,” 30 “a feast to which all the guests 
contribute,” 31 “a banquet to which many contribute dishes,” 32 and “potluck dinner” 
itself.33 Yet Aristotle says merely that the dinners are “symphorēta,” “collectively 
provided” (“sym,” “collectively” or “jointly”; “phērō,” “bring” or “provide”). This term 
is rarely attested: the only examples we have of it in connection with dining are the two 
under discussion, which brings us to a dead end.34 Nonetheless, it certainly does not 
imply that those who eat the dinner also help to provide it, or that the contributions made 
are individual dishes. All we can say is that Aristotle thinks a better meal will be supplied 
by more than one person, and that he is concerned with cost: the contrast he draws is with 
a meal “from a single purse” (ek mias dapanēs), not one cooked “by a single chef.” 35
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30 Arist. Pol. 1281b2, trans. Sinclair, rev. Saunders (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981). 
31 Arist. Pol. 1286a30, trans. Jowett; trans. Barnes. 
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 The next claim is that the multitude’s contribution to political activity is 
knowledge. The main evidence for this appears in the second analogy, on aesthetic 
judgment. Most English translations feature the verb “understand” here, though 
“appreciate” is also seen: viz. “some appreciate one part, some another, and all together 
appreciate all.” 36 Both suggest that Aristotle is concerned with some form of critical 
intellectual comprehension, but in the Greek there is actually no verb here at all. The 
relevant clause is highly truncated, reading simply “some a certain part, others another, 
and everyone the whole.” An appropriate verb must be supplied by the translator, and 
while many have opted for “understand” or “appreciate,” it need be neither. 
	
 The suggestion that Aristotle is interested in the production of better-informed 
decisions is also doubtful. What is described as “better” in the Greek text are not 
decisions, but rather the agents who make them and the act of judging itself. Aristotle 
says that many people can be “better” (beltious) than a single man, and that they judge 
“better” (ameinon), but he never describes a decision in this way. This might seem 
ultimately to come to the same thing,37  but a deeper issue is also at stake. The word 
“better” used here is not epistemic but moral: “beltious,” like the adjective “spoudaios” 
that denotes the “good man” in the preceding clause, is an explicitly ethical term, 
suggesting “decent” or “morally serious,” not “well-informed” or “correct.” 38 
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38 LSJ. Cf. the reference to “tous epieikeis,” the “good” or “respectable” classes, at Arist. Pol. 1281a12. 
Consequently, there is nothing in the passage to suggest that Aristotle is arguing on 
epistemic lines.39
	
 The final element of the accepted account is the link to the Athenian assembly. 
The “potluck dinner” paradigm certainly looks plausible here: different people contribute 
different points of view, and every contribution helps to shape the final decision. But the 
“potluck dinner” reading is dubious, as we have seen: it remains to consider the political 
context more closely.
	
 First, there is no reason to think that Aristotle is referring to classical Athens. He 
was acquainted with hundreds of poleis, seldom mentioned Athens directly (as Eugene 
Garver has observed, he cited Sparta considerably more often)40 and is here making a 
general claim.41 It might be assumed that Aristotle is defending Athens if he is defending 
democracy, but there were many democracies in the ancient Greek world,42  and anyway, 
it is not clear that he is defending democracy, at least on his definition of it.43 He is 
certainly defending the political authority of a multitude, but this could as easily be a 
reference to politeia (the first of the two types of rule by a multitude that he identifies) as 
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to dēmokratia.44 And since he supported politeia, but not dēmokratia, this seems very 
probable; in which case classical Athens is irrelevant, for he certainly took it as an 
example of dēmokratia, indeed one of the most developed of its kind.45
	
 It is thus unlikely that Aristotle was thinking of debates in the Athenian assembly. 
Indeed, he was most likely not thinking of debates in an assembly at all. He cites three 
specific examples of political activity in connection with this argument: elections to 
important offices such as generalships or treasury positions; euthynai or “audits,” the 
process of holding office-holders to account for their records; and judging cases in 
court.46 All of these tasks were often performed by large numbers of ordinary citizens--
assemblygoers, in the case of elections, citizen-judges (dikastai) or councilors in the case 
of audits, and dikastai again in the courts--so Aristotle did not need to look to assembly 
debates for an example of mass political activity. Indeed, the only hint that debates might 
be relevant here is his use of the verb “bouleuomai,” usually translated “deliberate” and 
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interpreted as suggesting group discussion.47 But this term could equally apply to 
decision-making in elections, audits, and in court, so this does not get us very far.48
	
 This leads to a crucial point. As we have seen, the accepted account of Aristotle’s 
argument affords an important role to speech as the medium through which diverse 
knowledge is shared; it is this that enables the best decision to emerge. This comes 
through especially clearly in Waldron’s account: for him, the “doctrine of the wisdom of 
the multitude” forms “a kind of model or paradigm of our nature as speaking beings”.49 If 
the relevant political context were debate in an assembly, this might seem convincing. 
However, since Aristotle specifically cites elections, audits, and judging court cases, we 
need an interpretation that works in these situations, and here the accepted account falls 
short, since none of these activities--common throughout the ancient Greek world--ever, 
as far as we know, involved speech-making among the decision-makers. In each case, 
decisions were made simply by voting, without prior discussion. In the case of elections, 
it is possible, though unlikely, that candidates or their proposers made a short speech 
before the vote, but it is highly unlikely that anyone else did so.50 Canvassing occurred, if 
at all, outside the assembly;51 at meetings, decisions were made speedily, usually by show 
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of hands.52 The situation in the courts is also clear. Aristotle reports that most legislators 
prohibited consultation (koinologountes) among judges prior to a verdict.53
	
 Aristotle thus cannot have supported the political authority of the multitude on the 
basis that it allowed diverse knowledge to be shared through public speech. Further 
confirmation of this is supplied by the text. Immediately after introducing this argument, 
Aristotle notes that it “would also apply to animals” (ta thēria). He sees this as a problem, 
and clarifies that the benefits of mass participation will arise only if the individuals 
involved have already achieved a certain level of virtue (aretē).54 But the striking fact, 
easily overlooked, is that Aristotle thought that the argument, as it stood, could apply to 
animals.55 Hence, it cannot depend on something that animals cannot do. Yet the 
possession of logos, “articulate reason” or “speech,” was to Aristotle the crucial 
difference between humans and divine beings on the one hand, and all other living 
creatures on the other.56 Under no circumstances could he have supposed that his 
argument would also apply to animals if speech played any part in it. It follows that 
speech cannot be a key feature of the political situations that he has in mind.
	
 The accepted account is thus surprisingly insecure. We should return to the 
analogies on which it rests and try to establish an alternative.
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The First Analogy Reexamined
The “feast” analogy appears twice in the Politics, denoted first by “ta symphorēta 
deipna,” “collectively provided dinners,” and second, “hestiasis symphorētos,” “a 
collectively provided feast”.57 Given the context, these terms are presumably intended to 
be synonymous, yet the second formulation is considerably more informative than the 
first. “Deipnon,” “dinner” or “meal,” was a common term in Greek, but “hestiasis” had a 
narrower meaning. It indicated a significant event, often privately financed, but held for 
communal political, diplomatic, or religious purposes.58 In Athens, “hestiasis” had a 
particularly limited referent: it denoted the tribal dinner enjoyed during a major festival.59 
Providing the dinner was a significant public service (leitourgia), akin to sponsoring a 
chorus or team of athletes, and as with the offices of chorēgos and gymnasiarchon, each 
hestiatōr (“public host”) was nominated from a list of 1200 individuals deemed wealthy 
enough to cover the event, and was supposed to be gratified by the honor of being 
asked.60 
Aristotle on the Virtue of the Multitude
67
57 Arist. Pol. 1281b2, 1286a30. 
58 Thuc. 6.46.3, Is. 3.80, Pl. Hipparch. 231b, Arist. Pol. 1321a38, Dem. 19.234, Plut. Nic. 3, Plut. Per. 11. 
59 P. Schmitt Pantel, La Cité au Banquet (Rome: École française de Rome, 1992), 5, 104, 121-31. Cf. 
Schmitt Pantel, “Greek Meals,” 90-5; G. Gilbert, Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens (London: 
Sonnenschein, 1895), 358-61; W. Smith et al, Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities (London: 
Murray, 1890), 896; N. F. Jones, Public Organization in Ancient Greece (Philadelphia, PA: American 
Philosophical Society, 1987), 49; R. Parker, Athenian Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 103.
60 M. H. Hansen, Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Norman, OK: Oklahoma University 
Press, 1999), 110-14.
	
 It is immediately obvious that such an event could not have resembled a potluck 
dinner. There were ten tribes in Athens, each consisting of several thousand citizens.61 
Even if some stayed at home, inviting culinary contributions from attendees would have 
been a logistical nightmare, and rather than redounding to the honor of the organizer 
would have made him look contemptibly cheap.62 Nonetheless, that Aristotle had a feast 
of this kind in mind is suggested by three points in the text. First is his mention of cost 
(dapanē), which implies that the event posed a significant financial burden and that 
funding, rather than culinary excellence, was the crucial factor in its provision.63 Second 
is his use of the verb “chorēgeō” to describe the act of putting the dinner together.64 This 
is derived from the noun “chorēgos,” “chorus-sponsor,” and while it cannot prove that he 
had festival feasts in mind, it does make it seem likely. The third point concerns the 
adjective “symphorētos,” “collectively provided”. As we have seen, this term is obscure, 
yet one possible interpretation suggests itself. We know that during the fourth century, the 
Athenians moved away from funding public services exclusively through single, very 
wealthy individuals and began to draw on panels of fifteen or more moderately wealthy 
individuals instead. Aristotle may be referring to a feast supplied in this way: that is, 
provided not by a single sponsor (nor by each attendee bringing a dish) but jointly funded 
by a committee.
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 Circumstantial evidence provides some support for this interpretation. Joint 
financing panels, or symmoriai, first appeared in Athens in 378/7 as a way of 
systematizing the payment of the war-tax, which fell only on the richest citizens.65 From 
358 a similar system was used to fund warships.66 We have no direct evidence that 
festival feasts were ever provided this way, but Demosthenes floated the idea in 355, and 
a “great revival and reorganization” of festival ceremonies occurred twenty years later, 
right around the time that Aristotle returned to Athens and began to teach the material that 
we now know as the Politics.67 Moreover, not only Athenian citizens but also wealthy 
foreign residents were liable to the performance of festival offices; Aristotle may even 
have participated himself.68 
	
 The major obstacle to this reading is the suggestion of Mogens Hansen that 
festival offices were always performed by single men.69 However, the evidence for this is 
not decisive. Hansen’s source, a speech of Demosthenes from 350 or 348 which mentions 
the relevant nomination procedures, does, to be sure, list each office in the singular, 
which we might not expect if multiple nominations were the norm.70 But since Greek 
lacks an indefinite article, we cannot tell whether “the” or “a” hestiatōr, chorēgos and 
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gymnasiarchon are under discussion here, and the appearance of the word “trierarchon,” 
“warship-sponsor,” also in the singular a few lines later--despite the fact that this speech 
was made several years after that office was opened to joint funding--suggests that “a” 
hestiatōr must be a plausible reading.71 In any case, even if festival feasts were sponsored 
singly down to 348, the reform might have occurred at a later date. On this evidence at 
least, the possibility that hestiaseis were jointly funded in the later fourth century cannot 
be ruled out.
	
 If this interpretation is on the right lines, two points follow. First, contributions to 
the collectively provided feast will not have been individual dishes, but rather money (or 
conceivably resources in kind, such as livestock or grain), from which the entire feast was 
then provided. Just as modern gala events are organized by committees that take joint 
responsibility for raising and disbursing the entire budget (even if particular individuals 
take responsibility for specific items), so too a hestiasis symphorētos was a collective 
undertaking performed by a joint agent disposing of common resources. This is 
significantly different from a “potluck dinner,” which is a collective undertaking 
performed by multiple single agents whose individual contributions remain distinct in the 
final outcome (“Paula’s special pasta salad,” and so on). 
	
 Second, though it is possible that a collectively provided feast might be preferred 
because of the greater variety of dishes, it is unlikely in this context. Festival feasts were 
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not especially varied: they chiefly comprised meat and bread.72 Additionally, collective 
funding for warships was introduced in order to build more ships, not to produce a more 
diverse fleet, and the goal in this case may have been similar.73 A collectively provided 
feast could have been “finer” simply because it was bigger.74 More sponsors could mean 
more money spent overall, even if each gave considerably less than would have been 
given a single man under the previous system. In turn, this would mean more animals 
sacrificed and ultimately more meat to eat, the major attraction of such events.75 It has 
been estimated that poorer households in Athens consumed 70-75 percent of their calorie 
intake in the form of grain; in these circumstances, it may have seemed obvious that what 
would make a meal “finer” was less “variety” than “abundance,” and especially the 
abundance of meat.76 The analogy itself supports this reading. A more familiar example 
of a collectively provided good would have been a warship; why should Aristotle have 
cited a feast instead? The relative novelty of the funding system may have been a factor, 
but more important may be the lack of correspondence between the money spent on a 
ship and the amount of ship produced. Extra resources would go to improving the ship in 
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74 As suggested by the translation of W. Ellis (London: Everyman, 1912).
75 Wilson, “Costing the Dionysia,” 96-8. Cf. Ar. Ach. 1048, 1095-113, Ar. Eccl. 305-8, 837-53, 1169-75, 
Plut. 543, 1136, Ar. fr. 128b.
76 Foxhall and Forbes, “Sitometreia,” 74. 
other ways: sheer size was not a relevant issue.77 If size was the relevant issue for 
Aristotle, however, we can see why the “feast” analogy might have seemed apt.
The Virtue of the Multitude
“Quantity,” not “variety,” thus lies at the heart of Aristotle’s “feast” analogy and 
motivates his support for the political authority of the multitude. Many relatively small 
amounts of something--in the “feast” case, money--can add up to a large total amount, 
surpassing even what could be provided by a single man or a few with a very large 
stock.78 What is contributed in the political context is stated in the next line. Every 
individual has a “portion” (morion) of aretē, “virtue” or “excellence,” and phronēsis, 
“wisdom,” “practical reason,” or “prudence,” or as Aristotle also puts it, “moral 
characteristics” (ta ēthē) and “thought” (tēn dianoian). These “portions” are then united 
when many men come together, just as their feet, hands and senses are united, making 
them “better” (beltious) than one man or a few.79
	
 “Aretē,” in this context, presents little difficulty. It seems clear that it refers to the 
complex of moral virtues explored in Aristotle’s ethical writings, such as courage, justice, 
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normally involves the aggregation of multiple different things, my account involves the aggregation of 
many small amounts of the same thing. Hence various objections traditionally made to “summation” will 
not apply. See Newman, Politics of Aristotle, 256-7; E. Braun, “Die Summierungstheorie des Aristoteles,” 
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79 Arist. Pol. 1281b10.
moderation, liberality, and so on.80 “Aretē” can also signify virtue in a general sense, 
including both moral and intellectual qualities, but when these aspects are distinguished, 
as here, it denotes the moral aspect alone.81 Additionally, the only moral virtues to feature 
repeatedly in the Politics are courage, justice, and moderation, so we may take these to be 
central here.82 
	
 “Phronēsis” is trickier to explicate. Though certainly an intellectual quality,83 it 
differs from technē (skill), epistēmē (scientific knowledge), sophia (wisdom), and nous 
(intelligence) in also being implicated in ethical activity. Both moral aretē and phronēsis 
are necessary for right action: moral virtue “ensures the rightness of the end we aim at,” 
phronēsis “the rightness of the means we adopt to gain that end.” 84 At a deeper level, 
phronēsis is required to develop full moral virtue, while phronēsis without moral virtue is 
mere “cleverness.” 85 Accordingly, when fully developed, moral virtue and phronēsis are 
inextricable,86 but this connection is difficult to convey in English. “Wisdom” is not an 
ideal translation, because while that term can signify a faculty of the intellect, which 
phronēsis is, it can also signify “that which is known” (as in, e.g., “a book full of 
wisdom”), which phronēsis is not. Particular knowledge does play a role in phronēsis, but 
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82 Arist. Pol. 1259b20-1260a34, 1277b13-23, 1323a27-34, 1334a20-25. 
83 Arist. NE 1139b15.
84 Arist. NE 1144a5-10. Cf. NE 1144b30-35, 1145a1-2, 1178a15-20. 
85 Arist. NE 1144b1-1145a2.
86 Arist. NE 1145a6-7.
the terms are not synonymous.87 “Practical reason” is thus a better rendering, since it 
unambiguously suggests a faculty rather than an item or repository of knowledge, yet it 
too is not ideal, since the relation between phronēsis and logos, “reason,” is incomplete in 
Aristotle’s usage. Aristotle consistently describes human intellectual (and ethical) 
capacities as “involving reason” (meta logou),88 but he also ascribes phronēsis (or at any 
rate a form of phronēsis) to certain animals, and animals do not possess logos.89 Given 
this, it seems better to avoid strictly intellectual terms altogether when translating this 
term and opt instead for “prudence” or “good sense,” with “sensible” for the related 
adjective “phronimos.” 90
	
 What a multitude contributes to political activity is thus each individual’s 
“portion” of moral virtue and prudence, or every form of aretē (in the general sense) 
except the higher intellectual virtues. Exactly what Aristotle meant by “portion” is 
uncertain: perhaps a single element of virtue, such as “courage” or “justice,” or perhaps a 
package of all combined.91 The analogy drawn between virtues and body parts (moriōn) 
in the Eudemian Ethics supports the latter:92 the correct reading of the reference to “one 
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92 Arist. EE 1220a1; cf. HA 486a, 588a; Pl. Prt. 392e. 
man” with “many feet, hands, and senses” would then be that just as each man puts both 
his feet, both his hands, and each of his senses at the service of the group, so too he 
contributes his entire stock of justice, courage, moderation and prudence. This question is 
relatively unimportant for our purposes, however;93 the main thing is that the result is 
clear. What Aristotle is talking about is the coming-together of individual aretē when 
groups act collectively.
	
 We may focus initially on one key point. Aristotle is discussing the aggregation 
not of knowledge but of moral and intellectual capacities such as courage, justice, 
moderation, and good sense. He is concerned not with what any given agent knows, but 
rather what he is like: how brave, just, moderate, sensible, and so on. This is a crucial 
distinction, because on Aristotle’s ethical theory, it is these qualities that determine what 
agents can do and how well they can do it. Plato argued that virtue was knowledge, but 
Aristotle explicitly rejected that view.94 To Aristotle, aretē was action-centered: it was a 
“power” (dynamis) of “providing and preserving good things.” 95 Specifically, it had the 
“twofold effect” of rendering its possessor “good” (or, we might say, a good specimen of 
its kind) and causing it to “perform its function well.” 96  It followed that an agent with 
more aretē could outperform one with less, and this, I suggest, is the foundation of 
Aristotle’s support for the political authority of the multitude. 
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 The idea that a group of people acting together can outperform even highly 
capable individuals is relatively common in ancient Greek political thought. Xenophon’s 
Hiero remarks that “nothing equals an organized body of men (syntetagmenoi), whether 
for protecting the property of friends or thwarting the plans of enemies,” and one of 
Aesop’s fables suggests the same.97 Demosthenes also expressed this view. The 
fabulously wealthy Meidias had “mercenaries to look after him” and “witnesses to come 
running...when he asks,” which was naturally “alarming to the rest of you as individuals, 
depending each upon his own resources.” The solution was then to “band yourselves 
together” (syllegesth’ hymeis): 
so that when you find yourselves individually inferior (elattōn) to others, 
whether in wealth or in friends or in any other respect, you may together 
prove stronger (kreittous) than any one of your enemies and so check his 
insolence.98   
	
 The obvious arena in which bands of individually inferior men can outperform 
their superiors is war, and this forms the crucial backdrop to Aristotle’s argument. In 
archaic Greek, “aretē” meant above all military prowess, and Aristotle also used it in this 
sense, as in the suggestion that conquerors possess more “aretē” by definition and hence 
have a just claim to rule.99 Yet war not only illustrated the link between greater numbers 
and greater power, it also indicated the greater efficacy achieved when a mass of men acts 
together. Though the figure of “one man” with “many feet, hands and senses” has been 
deemed “monstrous” by some, Aristotle may well have been thinking of a body of 
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98 Dem. 21.139-40.
99 Arist. Pol. 1255a22. 
hoplites, whose strength lay precisely in their capacity to fight as one.100 Significantly, 
hoplites also formed the citizen body in a politeia, which Aristotle defended on the 
specific grounds that military virtue, unlike other forms of virtue, could exist in large 
numbers.101 Indeed, he even posited an etymological connection between “politeia” and 
“polemos” (“war”) on this basis.102
	
 Even if a mass of men can defeat their superiors in war, however, what does this 
have to do with voting in elections, audits, and court cases, where more than brute force 
is required? First, even military virtue, on Aristotle’s view, involved more than brute 
force. It included many elements of aretē,103 particularly justice and courage.104 More 
broadly, Aristotle characterized all practical virtues--that is, every moral virtue, plus 
prudence--as useful in both politics and war.105 Indeed, these virtues sufficed for the 
“complete fulfillment of man’s proper function,” that is, the realization of a flourishing 
life in a polis.106 It is also possible that the moral virtues played a larger part in Aristotle’s 
conception of mass political activity. Not only were courage and justice, as key elements 
in military virtue, particularly associated with large numbers, but Aristotle’s confidence in 
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the intellectual capacities of the multitude was typically low.107 Yet this did not 
necessarily make men of the multitude bad or useless citizens. Indeed, Aristotle observed 
that “some people seem to form opinions better, and yet choose the wrong things from 
wickedness.” 108
	
 The same capacities that made a multitude useful in war could thus be expected to 
make it useful in politics. But a hard question follows. Even granting that more aretē 
might lead to greater success in these contexts, why should the “portions” of courage or 
justice or any other virtue of a mass of men be cumulative across a group? Why should a 
mass prove to be better than a single good man, when every individual fell short? Why 
should the group not prove as mediocre as its median member--or more vicious than any 
one of them?	

	
 This question has long puzzled readers who have seen the role of moral aretē in 
Aristotle’s account. Newman, in 1887, spotted that Aristotle’s principle would “justify the 
inference that the larger the gathering is, the greater its capacity will be,” and responded: 
“Aristotle forgets that bad qualities will be thrown into the common stock no less than 
good...he forgets also the special liability of great gatherings of men to be mastered by 
feeling.” 109 Susemihl and Hicks likewise supposed that crowd emotion would inhibit 
rather than support virtue.110 Yet Aristotle does seem to have thought that aretē and crowd 
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size were simply correlated. He likens aretē as to wealth, strength and weight, all of 
which increase arithmetically across groups.111 He states that a mass can be “stronger,” 
“richer” and “better” than a few, apparently all for the same reason;112 his conviction that 
aretē is purely beneficial may also have persuaded him that it was summative.113 He also 
explicitly believed that crowds are less likely to be swayed by emotion or other 
corrupting influences than smaller groups. At the second appearance of the “feast” 
analogy, he states that crowds make the best judges, both for the “feast-related” reason 
and because they are more stable: “it is difficult to make a mass of men get angry and go 
wrong at the same time.” 114 To be sure, this view directly contradicts modern notions of 
“mob justice,” but Aristotle’s presentation suggests that it was widely accepted among the 
Greeks.115
	
 There is certainly a puzzle here, but a final twist in Aristotle’s argument may help 
to resolve it. Apparently, aretē can not only be aggregated in group contexts; it can also 
be amplified. Acting alone, Aristotle says, most men’s injustice and folly will lead them to 
behave badly and make mistakes:116 each is “immature in judgment.” 117 But by “mingling 
with their betters” (mignumenoi tois beltoisi), the same men will become useful to the 
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113 Arist. Rhet. 1355b. Contra Risse, “Virtuous Group,” 55-6. 
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polis.118 This suggests that acting collectively can enable both the aggregation of aretē 
within groups and its amplification within individuals. If so, mass political activity could 
be expected to produce something more than the sum of its parts--just as Waldron himself 
suggested.119 In attributing this result to the dialectical quality of debate in the assembly, 
Waldron merely misdiagnosed the mechanism through which this phenomenon occurs. 
	
 One part of the puzzle is thus solved. If acting with others can be expected to 
increase the aretē of each individual, then the sum total of aretē across the group will 
obviously increase when it acts together. Moreover, if this action includes voting, as in 
elections, audits, and court cases, we can even see how the aggregation of aretē would 
occur: the votes are simply added together. 
Yet the underlying mystery remains. Why should we become more courageous, 
just, moderate, or sensible when we act with others? Here we must return to the wider 
intellectual context. The idea that acting with or alongside others can strengthen 
individual virtue was another relatively common feature of ancient Greek political 
thought. The effect could be gained in multiple ways: through moral support,120 
emulation,121 rivalry or competition,122  the desire to impress an audience,123  or the fear of 
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shame.124 Each mechanism pointed in the same direction: the presence of others will 
cause individuals to amplify socially valued characteristics and repress those that are 
disapproved, leading groups to act better and do more than single men.
	
 Aristotle was an innovator in several respects, but not this one.125 He saw the 
value of rivalry and competition: “if all men vied with each other in moral nobility (pros 
ton kalon) and strove to perform the noblest deeds, the common welfare would be fully 
realized.” 126 He recognized the importance of shame, especially for stimulating “civic 
courage,” 127 and that the eyes of others are its “abode.” 128 Most significantly, he believed 
that it was easier to practice aretē in groups than alone. This emerges most clearly in his 
discussion of friendship.129 The life of virtuous activity ought to be supremely pleasant, 
“yet a solitary man has a hard life, for it is not easy to keep up continuous activity by 
oneself; it is easier to do so with the aid of and in relation to other people” (meth’ heterōn 
kai pros allous). The life-work of the “good man” (ho spoudaios) will thus be more 
“continuous” if “practiced with friends”; moreover, his society will supply “a sort of 
training in goodness” for others.130 This recalls the claim that men become useful by 
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“mingling with their betters”: evidently, good models are important, and this is confirmed 
elsewhere. Friendship between “inferior people” is evil, for they take part in inferior 
pursuits, but friendship between the good is good, for they “become better by practising 
friendship and correcting each other’s faults, as each takes the impress from the other of 
those traits in him that give him pleasure.” 131 This suggests that the benefits of collective 
political activity will emerge only if the parties involved have already achieved a certain 
level of aretē--which is precisely the point Aristotle makes about the non-applicability of 
this argument to animals.132 Notably, however, this condition is met in a politeia, where 
all citizens possess at least military virtue. In that context, acting “with the aid of others” 
could certainly be expected to increase aretē across the board. 
	
 This interpretation may not be self-evident. Yet neither is it particularly far-
fetched. Indeed, especially in relation to the positive effects of moral support and the 
desire to avoid shame, it is arguable that something like Aristotle’s reasoning is accepted 
even today. Courage presents the most obvious example. Individuals are commonly 
braver in groups than alone: this is frequently observed in wars and revolutions, and the 
same dynamic can be imagined in the political situations that Aristotle has in mind. 
Recall that elections in ancient Greece were decided publicly, by show of hands: 
individuals might well have felt bolder in their choice-making if they could see that 
others shared their view. Or take the case of a general accused of treason: one-on-one, an 
ordinary citizen might have felt too awed to demand punishment, though he could do so 
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as one of a crowd.133 Justice may seem harder to interpret on these lines, given the 
modern skepticism of “mob justice” (which, as we have seen, however, Aristotle did not 
share). Yet we should remember that justice, for the ancient Greeks, was intrinsically 
other-regarding, and that judicial activity concerns what is due the polis as a whole; the 
presence of other members of the community might well have helped individual judges to 
keep that end in view.134 Moderation, also, can be boosted by moral support, as anyone 
who has dieted knows, and its use in the role of wealth could plausibly be enhanced if the 
eyes of others encouraged self-restraint.135 Finally, it is significant that Aristotle 
specifically defines phronēsis in the political sphere as the capacity to discern the 
common interest (to koinē sympheron).136 It is surely easier to focus on what is common, 
rather than one’s private interests, when acting as one of a crowd. Moreover, there may 
even be an internal connection between phronēsis and crowd size: at least, a larger 
decision-making group will by definition give a better indication of what the whole 
community takes the common interest to be. 
	
 The theme here is thus not the positive effects of diverse knowledge on decision 
making but rather the benefits of collective activity on individual and group aretē. 
Collective action by sufficiently virtuous individuals can boost each man’s stock of 
courage, justice, moderation, and prudence, thus increasing the effectiveness of the entire 
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group. As Aristotle notes, this argument will not support men of the multitude acting as 
generals or treasury officials: those tasks must be performed by single men.137 But they 
can certainly participate in any tasks open to collective authorship, such as electing men 
to office and judging them in court.138 The only condition is that the aretē of the group 
reaches the necessary standard. A group of animals will never reach it (and, Aristotle 
asserts, some men are not so dissimilar from animals). Also, if the polis includes some 
man or men of exceptional virtue, the multitude will fall short in comparison (which is 
why Aristotle turns next to the discussion of ostracism and kingship). But if and when the 
aretē of a multitude exceeds that of other subsets within the polis, Aristotle accepts that it 
will have a claim to political authority. 
	
 It may be asked how the “amplificatory effect” discussed here fits with the 
interpretation of the “feast” analogy given above. Surely the same dynamic cannot be 
seen in that case? Actually, it is not implausible that competition for honor might lead 
each sponsor to contribute more than he had originally anticipated. If so, the superiority 
of the collectively provided feast would result not only from the fact that the aggregated 
funds of a group can exceed those supplied by a single man. It would also reflect the 
increased size of each contribution when men act together.
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The Second Analogy Reexamined
We may now ask how this account fits with the second analogy, that concerning aesthetic 
judgment. Aristotle says that just as a multitude, when it comes together, becomes “one 
man with many feet and many hands and many senses,” so too it unites its ethical 
qualities (ta ēthē) and thought (dianoia), and adds that “this is also why many people 
judge better of both musical productions and the works of the poets: for some a certain 
part (morion), others another, and everyone the whole.”139 
	
 The idea that a multitude can judge artistic productions better than a small number 
of men--for instance, the ten men appointed to judge dramatic competitions at the 
Dionysia--is certainly historically plausible.140 Aristotle may have been thinking of 
Euripides, who won few prizes in his own day but was always a great favorite with 
audiences (especially the poor), and by Aristotle’s time was accepted as one of the great 
tragic poets alongside Aischylos and Sophokles.141 Or he may have had Aristophanes in 
mind, whose Clouds was placed third by the judges, despite the audience having “noisily 
demanded that it be put first on the list.” 142  How may these cases relate to the account 
given so far?  
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 The crux of the matter is how to supply the missing verb in the clause “some a 
certain part, some another, and everyone the whole.” As we saw above, a common 
solution is “understand,” although “appreciate” is also seen; a third possibility is 
“judge.” 143 Of these, “judge” is preferable on syntactical grounds, since this verb appears 
in the previous clause, and Greek verbs are more commonly ellipsed than repeated.144 
However, another approach is also possible. Arguably the most striking feature of the 
second analogy is the term “morion,” “portion” or “part”. This term was used in the 
previous line to describe the “portion” of moral virtue and prudence supplied by each 
member of the multitude when the group acts together, but in the second analogy it has 
always been understood to have a different referent: the “parts” or “aspects” of the music 
or play judged by the multitude. That referent is implied whether the verb supplied is 
“understood,” “appreciate,” or “judge”: in each case, what is divided into parts is the 
object of the multitude’s attention. The act of judgment is thus conceived in terms of a 
division of labor: each member of the group understands (or appreciates, or judges) a 
different part of the work, and as such the whole group understands (or appreciates, or 
judges) the whole.
	
 An alternative interpretation is that the term “morion” may refer to the same thing 
in both cases. In both, Aristotle may be referring to the “portion” of aretē supplied by 
each member of the group when it acts together. On this reading, a possible rendering of 
the missing verb would be “supply” or “provide” (taking a cue from “pherō,” the root of 
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the term “symphorētos” seen in the “feast” analogy): viz. “some supply a certain part [of 
the aretē supplied overall], others another, and everyone the whole”. On this view, what 
is divided into portions is not the object of the multitude’s attention, i.e. the work of 
music or poetry, or (in the political context) the candidate in an election, office-holder in 
an audit, or litigant in court. That object is always regarded as a whole. Rather, what is in 
“parts” are the multitude’s shares of ethical virtue and prudence, all of which are 
mobilized in the act of collective judgment.
	
 As far as I know, there is no linguistic or syntactical obstacle to reading the text 
this way. It could only be ruled out if we knew for certain what the “portion” mentioned 
in the second analogy is a portion of, and we lack that information. Yet this interpretation 
is not only more parsimonious than the usual approach, it also works better in context. 
Aristotle’s next point is that what distinguishes a good single man from a mass of people 
is that the good man comprises in himself all the parts of aretē that, in the mass, are found 
scattered about. This is often regarded as a new thought, or even an objection to the 
previous one, but on the view given here it is a continuation of the same reasoning about 
the “parts” and the “whole” of virtue that governs the rest of the passage. Aristotle’s 
discussion of music in Book 8 of the Politics also supports this reading: the argument of 
that section concerns the importance of moral virtue for judging music correctly,145  and 
while a strictly epistemic account of audience response to artistic performance will 
struggle to draw these two parts of the Politics together, on the present interpretation they 
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are fully compatible.146 Even Aristotle’s comment on animals makes sense in this light, 
since he observes that some animals enjoy music.147 
	
 Most significantly, this interpretation suits the political situations that Aristotle 
mentions. For one thing, it is not obvious that either voters in elections or judges in court 
judge purely on the basis of “knowledge” (or even conscious thought), and the ancient 
Greeks certainly did not think that they did. Judging by “character,” which drew on the 
judge’s own ethical virtue and prudence, was entirely acceptable, even expected.148 For 
another, it is not clear that a “division of labor” model adequately captures how 
multitudes judge either political actors or works of art. Certainly, different individuals 
will weigh different aspects of the judged object differently, but it does not follow that 
each responds only to a single aspect: more plausibly, each responds to the object as a 
whole, though in different ways.149 Certainly, this was assumed in Greek dramatic 
competitions, where was no tradition of scoring acting, dancing, writing, costumes and so 
on separately. Rather, productions were judged against each other as wholes.150
	
 This reading confirms the interpretation of the “feast” analogy advanced above. If 
Aristotle was indeed thinking in terms of collective agency, it would logically have been 
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148 Aeschin. 1.117, 1.179; A. Lanni, Law and Justice in the Courts of Classical Athens (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 41-73. 
149 The conventional account implies that if everyone in the audience could understand every aspect of the 
object before them, they would judge identically as to its merits, but there is no reason to think that 
Aristotle accepted that (Platonic) view.
150 Marshall and van Willigenberg, “Judging Athenian Dramatic Competitions,” 90-107.
impossible for him to draw a strict one-to-one correspondence between each man’s 
contribution to a collective act and a specific “portion” of the task at hand. On the 
interpretation of the argument offered there, something is added when groups act 
collectively that cannot be traced back to any single individual, but is rather an emergent 
property of the mass. This is a very different conception of popular political activity from 
that implied in the usual account of this argument. On that view, the collectively 
produced outcome can be traced back to individual contributions in a straightforward 
way: one spectator understands one part of a performance, another another; hence 
together they understand the whole. Nothing is incorporated into the final outcome that is 
not already possessed by each contributor, conceived separately. But when Aristotle states 
the argument, he does not suggest that what happens when a multitude comes together is 
that each person is individually responsible for a discrete part of the collectively 
produced outcome. Rather, he says that everyone contributes his “portion” of ethical 
virtue and prudence to the collective agent, the “one man” with many hands, feet, and 
senses, by whom the outcome is ultimately produced, and this is a very different idea.151 
	
 The easiest way to illustrate this difference is to revert to the contrast between a 
potluck dinner and a collectively provided feast. In the potluck, each part of the dinner--
each dish--can be traced back to the individual who originally contributed it: the meal is 
the sum of numerous distinct acts. In the collectively provided feast, however, the whole 
feast is the result of a single collective act, enabled by numerous contributions to a single 
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fund. It would be impossible to assign any “part” of this feast to an individual sponsor: 
rather, the whole panel is collectively responsible for the whole. Arguably, Aristotle has a 
similar conception of political activity. At a fundamental level, he does not imagine that 
the activity of the polis can be broken down into several distinct parts, attributable to each 
single citizen within the community. Rather, the whole polis is ultimately implicated in 
the flourishing of the whole, because the aretē of each part is involved in the successful 
self-development of the rest.152
Conclusion
On the usual account of the argument explored here, Aristotle thought that a multitude 
can make better decisions by pooling its knowledge than individuals or small groups can 
make alone. Mass political activity thus resembled a potluck dinner or an audience 
judging a play: a greater variety of contributions could produce a better result. I have 
suggested that Aristotle’s support for the political authority of some multitudes rested not 
on their access to diverse knowledge but rather on his belief that the ethical qualities and 
good sense of single men can be aggregated and even amplified when they act together. 
A multitude thus has a claim to rule whenever its aretē exceeds that of other groups 
within the polis, so long as its acts can be jointly authored.
	
 This account detaches Aristotle from those who would wish to cite him in support 
of democracy on epistemic grounds. However, it need not diminish his significance for 
democrats today. I will close by suggesting where this significance lies. 
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 Let us return to Waldron’s suggestion that Aristotle’s argument “stands as a kind 
of model or paradigm of our nature as speaking beings.” As we have seen, this must be 
false, since speech does not feature in Aristotle’s examples of political activity, nor does it 
fit his contention that his argument would also apply to animals. Yet there is deeper 
misconception at work in Waldron’s interpretation, which takes us to the very heart of 
Aristotle’s political thought. The problem lies in the supposition that Aristotle regarded 
logos, “articulate reason” or “speech,” as the defining mark of man’s nature as a “political 
animal”.153 He certainly believed that logos made man more “political” than any other 
animal, but it cannot define political animals as such, because while other animals--bees, 
ants, and cranes, for example--are also “political” on Aristotle’s account, man alone 
possesses logos.154 What defined a political animal was in fact not the capacity to speak, 
but being engaged in “some one common activity” (hen ti kai koinon...to ergon).155 In 
other words, acting collectively, not reasoning, was to Aristotle the fundamental political 
activity. 
	
 I suggest that this perspective may prove salutary for contemporary political 
theory. The current enthusiasm for epistemic defenses of democratic authority faces a 
potential problem: what if the decisions of the multitude turn out not to be “better,” on 
epistemic grounds, after all? What if mistakes are made that could have been avoided 
under “expert” guidance? Does that mean that ordinary people should be excluded from 
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154 Arist. Pol. 1253a2-18, 1332b5; HA 488a10.
155 Arist. HA 488a8; cf. Pol. 1276b28.
political authority? To Plato, the obvious answer to this question was yes, but democrats 
will find that less appealing. There are ways of getting around this problem in its own 
terms,156 but on Aristotle’s view, this is simply the wrong way to think about political 
activity. The great interest of Aristotle’s account is that he does not base political 
authority on the contingent possession of potentially useful information but rather on a 
range of ethical and intellectual capacities that, given the right training and external 
conditions, can be widely shared.157 To be sure, the benefits of collective political action 
will emerge only if most members of a community actually value such qualities as 
courage, justice, moderation, and good sense; if cowardice, viciousness, intemperance, 
and folly are widely tolerated, this cannot happen. However, this merely underscores the 
significance of a point made immediately before the appearance of this argument in the 
Politics, which is that true poleis are distinguished from mere “alliances” precisely by 
their attention to aretē.158 It does not follow that those who participate in political 
authority on this basis must be a small group; to the contrary, Aristotle’s conception of 
what is politically valuable might well prove more hospitable to democratic aspirations 
today than the currently admired epistemic approach.
	
 The question remains what this might mean in practice, and here we should 
reconsider the historical context that Aristotle had in mind. As observed earlier, there is 
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no reason to think that his argument applied particularly to classical Athens. He does, 
however, link it clearly to Athens in an earlier era, that of Solon in the early sixth century. 
Solon is cited approvingly as the lawgiver who gave the Athenian plēthos the right to take 
part in elections and audits, while his judicial reforms, which gave ordinary Athenians 
control over the administration of justice, are discussed elsewhere in a positive light.159 
This ought to be very striking to modern democrats. Aristotle evidently believed that his 
argument supported the kind of mass political participation introduced by Solon. This 
system was certainly less democratic than classical Athens: for example, there was no 
general right to speak in the assembly. Yet it was still considerably more democratic than 
any modern democracy, judged by the extent of the powers enjoyed by ordinary citizens. 
Then as now, citizens had the power to elect their leaders, but the Greek practice of 
routinely holding those leaders to account has no equivalent today, and the fact that 
supreme judicial power was wielded by large bodies of ordinary citizens without any 
legal training is also unparalleled. Most people today would probably agree that hearing 
court cases, pronouncing final verdicts, and setting appropriate penalties requires special 
knowledge and expertise, and thus cannot be done satisfactorily by a mass of ordinary 
citizens. This confident sense of the limits of mass political activity was shared by Plato, 
and is readily justified by an epistemic account of political competence. It was not shared 
by Aristotle, however, and the failure of some of his recent readers to see this may reveal 
not only a deficiency in the contemporary interpretation of Aristotle but in the 
contemporary conception of democracy as well.
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CHAPTER TWO
Deliberation in Classical Athens: Not Talking But Thinking
Deliberative democracy has been a subject of intense interest among political theorists in 
recent decades.1 “Deliberation,” in this context, implies the group discussion of a public 
matter, undertaken with a view to making a decision or recommendation on that matter, 
in which it is hoped that the give-and-take of argument among numerous individuals with 
different points of view will lead to a better understanding of the issues involved and thus 
to a better (i.e., more reasonable) outcome.2 At the heart of this conception is an ideal of 
dialogue as a process of free and equal exchange that allows for the articulation of a 
variety of viewpoints and responses to those viewpoints. It is admitted that such dialogue 
may be difficult to achieve outside small groups, and that even under ideal conditions, 
many participants may not actually speak. Nonetheless, the ideal remains attractive, and 
has become the object of not only theoretical interest but also practical experimentation.3
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1 See e.g. D. Held, Models of Democracy (3rd ed., Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press), 231-55, for 
brief overview and bibliographical information.  
2 See e.g. J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1989); A. Gutmann and D. Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1996); B. Manin, “On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation,” Political Theory 15 (1987): 
338-68; S. Benhabib ed., Democracy and Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
3 R. Goodin, “Democratic Deliberation Within,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (2000): 81-109; S. 
Chambers, “Rhetoric and the Public Sphere: Has Deliberative Democracy Abandoned Mass Democracy?” 
Political Theory 37 (2009): 323-50; J. Fishkin, The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995); D. Thompson, “Deliberative Democratic Theory and 
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 Alongside this understanding of “deliberation” as group discussion, it has not 
been forgotten that the term carries another meaning: the private weighing up of factors 
for and against choosing a particular course of action that goes on inside the mind of an 
individual. This is the sense in which the term appears in Hobbes4 and Rousseau,5 though 
by the late nineteenth century the dialogical sense had become more prominent.6 These 
two senses of “deliberation” have been distinguished by Robert Goodin as “internal-
reflective” and “external-collective” respectively. Goodin accepts that the internal-
reflective variety can be useful; nonetheless, he does not doubt that, from a democratic 
perspective, it is inferior to its external-collective cousin. “Invariably modeled upon, and 
thus parasitic upon, our interpersonal experiences of discussion and debate,” internal-
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4 T. Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. R. Tuck and M. Silverthorne (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
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addressing (as on a pair of scales), where the weightier consideration necessarily goes into effect by its own 
natural inclination.” Cf. Leviathan, ed. R. Tuck (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 44: “the 
whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes and fears, continued till the thing be either done, or thought 
impossible, is that we call deliberation.”
5 J.-J. Rousseau, Du Contrat social, ed. R. Derathé (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 193: “Si, quand le peuple 
suffisamment informé délibére, les Citoyens n’avoient aucune communication entre eux, du grand nombre 
de petites différences résulteroit toujours la volonté générale, et la délibération seroit toujours bonne.” Ed. 
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Legitimacy and Political Deliberation,” 345) that “deliberation” in this passage is strictly synonymous with 
“decision.” That might be a reasonable interpretation of the noun used in the final clause if it appeared by 
itself, but the verb “deliberates” earlier in the sentence must denote a continuous action (i.e. that during 
which no communication takes place), which seems incompatible with the interpretation “decides.” 
However, the account given in this chapter suggests that Manin was certainly right to stress the lack of 
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6 See e.g. J. S. Mill, “On Representative Government,” in On Liberty and Other Essays ed. J. Gray 
(Oxford: Oxford World’s Classics, 1991), 272: the function of a deliberating body is to “secure hearing and 
consideration to many conflicting opinions.” Here, Mill was no doubt influenced by the activity of the 
British Parliament, the very name of which, of course, derives from the French “parler,” to speak. 
reflective deliberation cannot “substitute for,” but only “supplement,” the “exchange of 
reasons” that is the hallmark of external-collective deliberation.7 
	
 Classical Athenian democracy plays a small but significant supporting role in this 
context. Despite being difficult to achieve in large groups, external-collective deliberation 
is nonetheless believed to have happened regularly in Athens in the fifth and fourth 
centuries BC. What the Athenians called “isēgoria,” the equal right of speech, and 
“parrhēsia,” “frank speech,” are widely regarded as principal elements of Athenian 
democracy, even synonymous with it.8 One institution is deemed particularly significant 
in this respect: the assembly (dēmos or ekklēsia), which was open to all adult male 
citizens to attend, speak, and vote.9 There were around thirty thousand adult male citizens 
in Athens during most of the classical period, of whom around six thousand were 
normally present at any given meeting.10 Debates could be long and energetic,11  and the 
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Athenians’ passion for speech-making was noted by contemporaries.12 Today, external-
collective deliberation is regarded as emblematic of Athenian democracy. In the words of 
one theorist, “We can picture this regime most clearly when at its most public and 
dramatic, in the great set-piece debates in the Assembly at which it took its most 
momentous decisions.” 13
	
 Accordingly, Athenian democracy is often treated as an example of deliberative 
democracy, frequently with a tinge of regret that Athenian deliberative practices would 
seem impossible, for reasons of scale, to imitate in modern conditions. A representative 
example appears in Gutmann and Thompson’s Democracy and Disagreement (1996). 
Noting that “genuine public conversation” is difficult to sustain in large groups, they 
write: 
Aristotle believed that ordinary citizens deciding together could reach a better 
decision than experts acting alone, but he had in mind a relatively small assembly. 
He did not imagine a town meeting on a scale that would be necessary to govern a 
major American city by direct democracy, let alone a state or national 
government.14
We may temporarily leave aside the question of whether a meeting of six thousand people 
is well described as “relatively small”.15 It is more important to notice the role played by 
classical Athens in this passage: as a paradigm the necessary conditions for which have 
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been lost, but which remains attractive as an ideal. Writing on Athenian democracy is 
often colored by a touch of nostalgia (once nicely characterized as “polis envy”); in the 
words of Cynthia Farrar, “we admire what we think the Athenians had, we want it, we 
fear it, we suspect it is unattainable, we are determined to do without it.” 16 Many modern 
democrats envy the capacity of the Athenians to subject their affairs to wide public 
discussion, and would ideally wish to imitate it; sensibly, however, they recognize that 
modern society is excessively large and complex, and trim their hopes to experiments 
involving deliberative “mini-publics” on a smaller scale.17
	
 Yet, happily for those who might wish to mine Athenian democratic practices for 
aids to democracy today, this understanding of Athenian deliberation is almost certainly 
mistaken. “Deliberation” in classical Athens was not feasible because the assembly was 
sufficiently small to facilitate mass discussion; assemblygoers did not engage in mass 
discussion at all. Careful examination of the Greek terms associated with the English 
term “deliberate” and its derivatives shows that while English translations of debates in 
the Athenian assembly imply that a single act is taking place, performed by a single 
agent--that is, the act of external-collective deliberation, performed by the assembly as a 
whole--our Greek texts distinguish between two forms of activity, performed by two 
distinct agents. One activity is speaking: typically, arguing for or against a proposed 
course of action. This is usually denoted by the verb “symbouleuō,” meaning “advise” or 
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“counsel”; occasionally, the verb “bouleuō” is also used in this context, but this was more 
common in the Homeric era. Another useful verb was “dēmēgoreō,” from “dēmos,” 
“people” or “assembly,” and “agoreuō,” “speak publicly”: hence “address the people” or, 
more pejoratively, “harangue”.18 The actions denoted by these verbs are attributed to a 
small number of individuals, identified by contemporaries as “rhētores,” i.e. “orators,” 
“public speakers” or “politicians”.19 The other activity consisted in listening to speeches, 
judging them, and finally deciding, by majority vote, on a course of action. These were 
the acts attributed to the assembly as a whole. The key verb here was “bouleuomai,” the 
middle voice of the verb “bouleuō” seen above, though it had a significantly different 
meaning: on the evidence presented here, in the classical period at least, it typically 
meant internal-reflective deliberation.
	
 This finding has profound implications for our understanding of Athenian politics. 
To begin with, it suggests the distinctness of speakers and listeners in the Athenian 
political system. “The assembly,” as a unit, was not conceived as engaging in discussion, 
even vicariously, through the interventions of relatively few individuals. Rather, the 
Greek suggests that speakers cast themselves, by the very act of speaking, outside the 
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(internally-reflectively) deliberating unit, and into the role of “advisor.” 20 These different 
parties had different tasks, and it was an important feature of Athenian democratic 
politics that those who heard and judged speeches in the assembly--and still more 
importantly, in the courts--held final decision-making power.21 Moreover, far from being 
regarded as a sign of incomplete participation in politics, listening and judging were 
regarded as the supreme political functions in the polis.
	
 The significance of widespread participation in public speaking in classical 
Athens thus seems to have been overstated. No doubt it was important, from a democratic 
perspective, that all citizens had the right to speak; certainly it was better than allowing 
no one but the elite by birth or wealth to do so. However, since it was impossible, in a 
meeting of six thousand people, for more than a tiny minority of attendees to exercise this 
right, there had to be--and there were--other ways for the dēmos, the mass of ordinary 
non-speaking citizens, to exercise and preserve their supremacy, including over their self-
selected leaders. The importance of the dēmos’s rhetorical hegemony as a factor in 
Athenian democracy has been persuasively argued,22 but the evidence presented here 
suggests that the institutional mechanisms used by the Athenians to maintain power over 
their elite may have been more significant. Particularly important were routine measures 
such as dokimasiai (scrutinies) and euthynai (audits), the frequently used graphē 
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Frank Speech, Flattery and Accountability in Democratic Athens,” History of Political Thought 33 (2012): 
185-208. 
21 On the significance of the courts for Athenian democratic politics, see ch. 3. 
22 J. Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
paranomōn (“charge against proposing an illegal measure”), and other public charges 
such as treason, bribery, and impeachment (eisangelia). Since all these judicial processes 
could be initiated by any citizen, and ordinary citizens, as members of large judicial 
panels, controlled the outcome of all lawsuits, the use of the courts as the final authority 
in the Athenian political system did not represent a derogation of the powers of the 
dēmos, but rather an amplification of them; and political leaders in Athens expected to 
spend a good deal of time defending themselves and their actions there.23
	
 The major difference between Athenian and modern democracy is thus not that a 
greater proportion of Athenian citizens participated in political debate, but that a large 
sample of ordinary citizens voted on every political decision, and that the barriers to 
public speaking were low, while the risks associated with this activity were high--the 
reverse of the situation today. Classical Athens was neither an “aristocracy of orators” 
holding court over a mass of passive listeners,24  nor the contemporary deliberative ideal 
of a democracy of orators. Rather, it was a democracy of voters who used a variety of 
judicial processes, judged by ordinary citizens, to limit and direct the power of a minority 
of orators. These practices would not be beyond our power to imitate, if we chose.
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Three Terms for “Deliberation”
The most straightforward of the three Greek verbs associated with “deliberation” in 
English is “dēmēgoreō.” Derived from “dēmos,” “people” or “assembly,” and “agoreuō,” 
“speak publicly” (etymologically, in the agora, or public square), this verb 
unambiguously meant “speak before the people,” and was almost always used to indicate 
speaking in the assembly.25 Demosthenes, for example, described his career as 
“politeuesthai kai dēmēgorein,” “taking part in politics and speaking before the people,” 26 
and identified “to dēmēgorein,” “public speaking,” as his special privilege.27 As a verb, 
“dēmēgoreuō” is in fact never translated “deliberate” or “discuss,” since it is clear that the 
direction of the action is only one-way: even in the plural it indicates numerous 
individuals speaking to an audience, rather than several members of a group speaking to 
one another. Where a link to the concept of “deliberation” has emerged, however, is in the 
use of the English adjective “deliberative” to render non-verbal forms derived from this 
term. The noun “dēmēgoria,” for example, appears repeatedly in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and 
is often translated “deliberative oratory.” 28 Similarly, the adjective “dēmēgorikos” is 
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25 See LSJ. An extended use is to apply this term to the making of “populist” speeches outside the 
assembly, e.g. Pl. Grg. 482c.
26 Dem. 18.60.
27 Dem. 18.236. Cf. Aeschin. 1.40.
28 E.g. Arist. Rhet. ed. and trans. H. Lawson-Tancred (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992), at section 1.1.10 
(this edition lacks Bekker numbers). The Barnes translation is almost identical. 
typically translated “deliberative.” 29 Many further examples appear in our extant 
orations.30
	
 What appears to have happened here is that translators, having initially identified 
public speaking in Athens with external-collective deliberation, have imported the 
English term “deliberative” into this context without fully investigating whether this 
might mislead Greekless readers interested in the concept of “deliberation” in ancient 
Greece. Something similar would seem to have occurred in relation to the second Greek 
verb associated with the concept of “deliberation,” “symbouleuō.” Normally, this verb is 
translated “advise” or “counsel,” with “symboulos” as “advisor” and “symbouleutikon” 
“advisory”.31 A representative example is Euryptolemos’ description of himself as 
“symbouleusōn,” “about to advise,” at the beginning of his speech on the fate of the 
generals after the battle of Arginousai.32 Aischines and other orators used this verb in the 
same context.33 Yet occasionally, “deliberative” is also used in translation. Again, 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric supplies several examples. An assembly speaker, described by 
Aristotle as “ho symbouleuōn,” literally “the one advising,” is designated a “deliberative 
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29 Arist. Rhet. trans. Lawson-Tancred, 3.12.1, 3.14.12. 
30 E.g. Lys. 14.45, trans. W. R. Lamb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930); Dem. 19.15, 
22.48 and 23.13, trans. C. A. and J. H. Vince (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935-9); 
Aeschin. 1.1, 1.195, 2.56, trans. C. D. Adams (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1919); Din. 
2.15, 2.17, trans. J. O. Burtt (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954).
31 LSJ. 
32 Xen. Hell. 1.7.16.
33 Aeschin. 1.29, 2.165; cf. Dem. 8.73, Din. 1.31, Lycurg. fr. E1. 
speaker”;34 advisors as a body are “hoi symbouleuontes,” translated “deliberative 
orators”;35 Isokrates, in a pamphlet written in the form of an assembly speech, is 
described as “symbouleuōn,” “deliberating,” and the adjective “symbouleutikon,” 
modifying assembly speeches, is translated “deliberative.” 36 Outside Aristotle, similar 
renderings appear: in one early speech of Demosthenes, for example, the infinitive 
“symbouleuein” is given as “deliberation”.37 
	
 It is natural to ask why these terms should not be translated “deliberate” or 
“deliberative” in the external-collective sense. Why should Euryptolemos’ statement not 
be rendered “I am about to deliberate [with you],” rather than “I am about to advise 
[you]”? An initial answer is that the preposition “with” (meta) does not appear, and could 
not anyway be used with “symbouleuō” to produce this meaning: “symbouleuō meth’ 
humōn” would mean “I advise [someone else] with your assistance,” not “I deliberate 
with you,” or “we deliberate together”. However, it is possible to use a form of the verb 
“symbouleuō” to describe a situation where two or more people are debating a matter 
together and mutually advising each other--that is, an external-collective deliberative 
situation--and this brings us to a deeper answer to this question.
	
 “Symbouleuō” can indicate external-collective deliberation if it appears in the 
middle voice rather than the active voice, which appears in the examples above. In the 
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34 Arist. Rhet. trans. Lawson-Tancred, 1.3.5. 
35 Arist. Rhet. trans. Lawson-Tancred, 1.3.6. 
36 Arist. Rhet. trans. Lawson-Tancred, 3.17.11, 1.3.3. 
37 Dem. 14.8, trans. Vince. 
active voice, the subject of a verb performs the action specified (e.g. “I walk”). In the 
middle voice, however, the action of a verb returns in some way to the subject, perhaps 
indirectly. Often, the idea expressed is that the action happens “to,” “for,” or “in the 
interest of” the subject: a textbook example is that while “paideuō adelphon” (in the 
active voice) means “I educate my brother,” “paideuomai adelphon” (in the middle 
voice) means “I have my brother educated,” i.e. I do not educate him myself, but I take 
responsibility for it and in some way benefit from it.38 Verbs in the middle voice can also 
suggest reflexive actions (for example, dressing oneself) or otherwise doing something 
for oneself. In this case, while “symbouleuō,” in the active voice, suggests “advise” or 
“counsel,” “symbouleuomai,” in the middle, suggests “consult with,” i.e. ask the advice 
of another or “deliberate” with them.39
	
 Many examples of this usage appear in our ancient texts. Those in the lexicon 
include Herodotos’s description of the Egyptian pharaoh Sesostris, who “consulted his 
wife” (symbouleuesthai tē gynaiki) on what to do when he found himself in a burning 
building;40 Demodokos’s suggestion that he and Sokrates talk over (symbouleusasthai) 
his son’s education in the Platonic dialogue Theages;41 Thucydides’ claim that Antiphon, 
the man responsible for planning the oligarchical coup of 411, was the most able man in 
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38 H. Hansen and G. M. Quinn, Greek: An Intensive Course (2nd rev. ed., New York, NY: Fordham 
University Press, 1992), 168. 
39 LSJ. 
40 Hdt. 2.107.
41 Pl. Thg. 122a.
Athens when someone required his opinion on something (hostis symbouleusaito ti);42 
Xenophon’s description of Cyrus and Cyaxares discussing preparations for war, and 
deciding to “consider later” (authis symbouleusometha) whether they needed more men 
or not;43 and the promise of the Chorus to Strepsiades in Aristophanes’ Clouds that if he 
learned what they had to teach him, he would find many people wishing to “consult with 
you” (symbouleusomenous meta sou).44 
	
 Each of these examples indicates external-collective deliberation, though the 
numbers involved are strikingly small. If the same verb in the same voice were used in 
connection with the assembly, we could say with some confidence that “deliberation” in 
the same sense took place there. But I have been unable to find any examples of the 
middle voice of “symbouleuō” used in this context. All the examples of “symbouleuō” 
presented earlier, including those rendered using the English term “deliberative,” are in 
the active voice. Moreover, if indicative verb forms such as symbouleuō are normally 
rendered “advise” or “counsel,” participles such as “symbouleusōn” and infinitives such 
as “symbouleuein” arguably ought to follow the same pattern. As with “dēmēgoreō,” what 
seems to have happened is that translators use the English term “deliberation” in this 
context simply because there is a connection between the term “deliberation” and public 
speaking in English usage. However, it is not obvious that an identical connection exists 
in Greek. 
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43 Xen. Cyr. 2.1.7.
44 Ar. Nub. 457.
	
 This would not matter if there were not, in Greek, another verb more closely 
associated with the English term “deliberate.” It is perfectly respectable translation 
practice to use concepts available in English but not in Greek to render Greek thought. 
(Indeed on one view of translation that is all that is possible.) But another Greek term 
actually lies behind virtually all the cases where “deliberate” or its derivatives are seen in 
English translation.45 This is “bouleuomai,” the middle voice of bouleuō, which is in turn 
the root of the verb “symbouleuō” just discussed. 
	
 In the Homeric era, “bouleuō” was regularly used to denote “considering” (often 
in council), “counseling,” or “giving advice.” 46 In the classical period, however, many of 
these functions were taken over by “symbouleuō”.47 By contrast, “bouleuomai” is very 
common in the classical era, particularly in conjunction with assemblies. Indeed, it is the 
only one of the three terms discussed here that is used to describe the activity of the 
Athenian assembly as a unit. When Aischines (in translation) describes the Athenian 
dēmos as “deliberating,” this is the verb and voice used.48 The same usage appears in 
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our surviving sources: a “quick and dirty” search using Perseus gives nearly 1100 appearances for bouleuō, 
compared to only 128 appearances for “dēmēgoreō” and 466 for “symbouleuō,” in classical political, 
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both middle/passive and active forms of the verb (i.e. bouleuō as well as bouleuomai), but no non-verbal 
forms (i.e. nouns such as “dēmēgoria” or “symboulos,” and adjectives “dēmēgorikos,” “symbouleutikos” 
and “bouleutikos,” are not included). 
46 E.g. Il. 1.531. Indeed, as might be expected, “bouleuō” and “boulē” (council) share the same root: see 
further LSJ. 
47 Exceptions to this general rule include the use of “bouleuō” to mean “advise” or “give counsel” at Xen. 
Hell. 1.1.31 and Thuc. 6.39. 
48 Aeschin. 1.22, 1.33, 2.50, 2.60, 2.61, 2.67, 2.70, 2.82, 2.120, 3.67, 3.151, 3.251, 3.255, trans. Adams.
Demosthenes.49 Plato, similarly, used “bouleuomai” to describe the activity of the 
assembly.50 So did Aristotle. In Book 3 of the Politics, for example, where he posits the 
right to “take part in deliberative and judicial duties”--that is, “to bouleuesthai kai 
dikazein,” shortly thereafter expressed as “archēs bouleutikēs kai kritikēs” (literally “the 
deliberating and judging office”)--as definitive of citizenship, the venue associated with 
“to bouleuesthai” is specifically an assembly.51 However, “bouleuomai” is almost never 
used to describe the activity of individual speakers engaged in the act of addressing an 
assembly meeting. This is an intriguing fact, requiring careful examination.
The Meaning of “Bouleuomai”
It should first be said that when “bouleuomai” is used in relation to the assembly it is not 
only translated by “deliberate” and its cognates but also by “discuss” and “debate.” On 
the face of it, rendering “ho dēmos ebouleueto” by “the people deliberated” need not 
imply discussion, since “deliberate,” as we have seen, is ambiguous in English. Either 
external-collective or internal-reflective deliberation might plausibly be meant. Yet the 
former sense is suggested by alternative renderings of “bouleuomai” in the same context. 
For example, in the Loeb edition of Andokides’ speech “On the Mysteries,” the term 
“ebouleuesthe” (referring to the Athenian dēmos as represented by the judges who made 
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49 Dem. 3.1, 5.2, 6.28, 9.19, 10.30, 18.86, 18.196, 19.96, 23.109, 24.99, 25.14, Ex. 6, trans. Vince.
50 E.g. Pl. Prt. 319a-d. 
51 Arist. Pol. 1275b15-20, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930). Cf. 
“deliberating or judging,” “deliberative or judicial administration,” trans. Barnes, ed. Everson (The Politics 
and the Constitution of Athens, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
up Andokides’ audience), is twice translated “you discussed,” while in the same series’ 
edition of Demosthenes’ “First Philippic,” the participle “bouleuomenos,” referring to the 
dēmos, is rendered “debating.” 52 Similarly, in Demosthenes’ assembly speech on the 
Rhodians, “ebouleuesth’” is translated “you were discussing,” while “tō bouleuesthai” 
appears as “debate” in “Against Aristogeiton I,” and “tou dēmou bouleuomenou” is 
rendered “when the people are debating” in Theophrastos’ Characters.53 
	
 The assumption that “bouleuomai” implies external-collective deliberation is thus 
well-established. Nonetheless, caution is necessary. In none of the above cases is it 
obvious that the subject of the verb, the dēmos, is conceived as engaging in speaking as 
well as listening, thinking, and making an internal decision. No contextual clues require 
that reading. In fact, it is entirely possible that the activity implied is purely internal-
reflective, that is, that members of the dēmos are simply pondering the recommendations 
put to them by the speaker.
	
 The possibility that “bouleuomai,” when used to describe the assembly, might 
indicate internal-reflective activity is supported by its frequent use with this meaning 
elsewhere. The most obvious example of this is in relation to individual agents, where it 
quite clearly suggests thinking to oneself and nothing else. The classic text on this point 
is Book 3, Chapter 3 of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, which is typically identified as a 
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52 Andoc. 1.73, 1.82, trans. K. J. Maidment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1941). Dem. 4.39, 
trans. Vince. Cf. (in the same edition) Dem. 10.1, 15.1. 
53 Dem. 15.6, trans. Vince; Theophr. Char. 26.1, trans. J. Rusten (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1993). It has been pointed out to me by David Langslow that “debate,” like “deliberate,” is 
ambiguous in English, since it can also refer to internal-reflective activity. He is right, of course. 
Nonetheless, I suspect that the external-collective connotations of “debate” in this context would prove 
decisive for most readers, unless they were explicitly directed to think otherwise.
discussion of “deliberation.” 54 An indication of the precise sense of “deliberation” to be 
explored features in the preceding chapter, where Aristotle defines “choice” (prohairēsis) 
as a form of voluntary action “preceded by deliberation” (probebouleuomenon).55 Given 
the range of contexts in which choice-making can occur, we may infer that Aristotle is 
not thinking exclusively of external-collective deliberation here, and this inference is 
rapidly confirmed. This might not seem immediately obvious: the statement that “the 
things about which we deliberate” (hōn bouleuometha) must be within our own power to 
effect, rather than in the hands of others such as the Spartans or Scythians, might suggest 
that Aristotle has external-collective deliberation principally in mind.56 But that meaning 
is excluded when he observes that “a doctor does not deliberate (bouleuetai) about 
whether he is to cure his patient, nor an orator whether he is to convince his audience, nor 
a statesman whether he is to secure good government.” 57 Clearly, these are not matters for 
collective discussion, but rather for individual thought; and many similar examples of 
“bouleuomai” can be found.58
	
 “Bouleuomai” thus indicates internal-reflective deliberation when used of 
individuals. Yet it might be objected that this has no bearing on cases where more than 
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55 Arist. NE 1112a15-18. 
56 Arist. NE 1112a33-112b1. 
57 Arist. NE 1112b13-16, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934).
58 For example, Aristotle’s observation that one man may arrive at the right conclusion by prolonged 
deliberation (bouleuomenon), while another may do so quickly (NE 1142b), or his claim that the only 
animal which is “deliberative” (bouleutikon, trans. Peck) is man, because while many others have the 
power of memory and can be trained, only man can recall past events at will (HA 488b; cf. NE 6.1.6). Cf. 
Pl. Cra. 420c, Hdt. 7.10d, Dem. 37.13, and LSJ.
one person is involved. Of course individuals reflect internally on issues that concern 
them; but where there is more than one person, discussion typically takes place. Indeed, 
as Goodin suggested, the very notion of internal-reflective deliberation is arguably 
parasitic on its external-collective counterpart. Internal reflection is “deliberative” 
precisely because it resembles the back-and-forth reasoning that is essentially 
characteristic of external-collective deliberation involving more than one person. Hence, 
the fact that “bouleuomai” signifies internal-reflective deliberation in individual contexts 
is irrelevant. 
	
 There is certainly something to this argument. However, intriguingly, 
“bouleuomai” is also frequently and unmistakably used to mean internal reflection in 
group contexts in the ancient Greek world. The most obvious example of this is in the 
courts. “Bouleuomai” often appears in connection with Athenian judicial panels, 
particularly at the end of speeches when the litigants urge their listeners to consider the 
case carefully, typically using the phrases “eu bouleuesthe” or “bouleuesthe kalōs,” both 
often translated “deliberate rightly”.59 Readers--Greekless or otherwise--would be 
pardoned for interpreting these exhortations as a request to discuss the matter carefully, 
since this would undoubtedly be the expected meaning of such a request to a jury today. 
But judges in classical Athens (as elsewhere in the ancient Greek poleis) were actually 
prohibited from discussing cases among themselves prior to reaching a verdict, so this 
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1.11, 1.15; see also Isoc. 15.178.
interpretation is impossible.60 Rather, internal-reflective deliberation must be what is 
meant.
	
 The fact that Athenian judicial panels--always a minimum of two hundred judges, 
five hundred if the case was on a public charge, and sometimes one thousand or more61--
did not engage in external-collective deliberation, but rather considered the matter 
internally and communicated their decisions through their votes, and that this practice 
was denoted by the same verb in the same voice that was used to denote the activity of 
around six thousand individuals in the assembly, is in itself very arresting. It proves 
nothing, of course: “bouleuomai” may still have indicated external-collective deliberation 
when it was used in relation to the assembly. Yet, strikingly, we also have several 
examples of “bouleuomai” being used to describe the activity of the assembly in 
situations where external-collective deliberation is ruled out. An important one appears in 
Aischines’ speech “On the Embassy,” his defense against a charge of treason brought 
against him by Demosthenes in 343. The case concerned Aischines’ role in the decision to 
establish peace with Philip of Macedon three years earlier, a decision made in the second 
of two assembly meetings. At the first meeting, anyone who wished to speak was invited 
to do so, and both Aischines and Demosthenes came forward. At the second, however, 
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Law of Athens: Procedure (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968-71), 39, on the Areopagos. However, there was 
no opportunity for formal debate of the kind that is understood to constitute external-collective deliberation. 
61 Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 186. 
speeches were not allowed, but only votes taken on the various proposals concerning the 
peace and future alliance. What is important here is that the verb “bouleuomai” is used to 
describe the activity of the dēmos at both meetings, including the one at which no debate 
was held.62 It is especially instructive, moreover, that these usages are not merely 
Aischines’ own words. One appears in an enacted decree read aloud by the clerk; the 
other in a formal affidavit sworn by a witness.63 
	
 These examples are unequivocal. It is absolutely plain that the appearance of 
“bouleuomai” in relation to the second meeting denotes internal reflection alone. Other 
examples are more ambiguous, but nonetheless an internal-reflective meaning may be 
most likely. One such appears in the speech “On the Peace with Sparta” attributed to 
Andokides, where he observes that “a number of you are anxious to see peace concluded 
as quickly as possible. In fact, according to those in question, the forty days allowed you 
for consideration (bouleuesthai) are a waste of time and a concession which we delegates 
have done wrong to obtain...” 64 Forty days of external-collective deliberation are 
presumably not intended here: at least some internal-reflective deliberation must be 
meant, and might indeed be all that is meant. A similar example is Demosthenes’ sarcastic 
complaint to the assembly that “you alone reverse the general practice of mankind; for 
other people deliberate (bouleuesthai) before the event, but you after.” 65 It is possible that 
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64 Andoc. 3.33, trans. Maidment. 
65 Dem. 10.30, trans. Vince. 
Demosthenes might have described external-collective deliberation as the “general 
practice of mankind,” but internal-reflective deliberation seems a more plausible reading. 
	
 In various cases involving the two largest and most “demotic” bodies in Athenian 
politics, then--that is, the assembly and courts--an external-collective reading of 
“bouleuomai” either must be comprehensively ruled out or seems less plausible than an 
internal-reflective reading. Are there any cases where an external-collective reading must 
be ruled in? I have been unable to find any involving the assembly. However, an 
alternative venue where this might be expected is the council (boulē), which comprised 
five hundred citizens selected annually by lot and whose tasks included framing the 
wording of motions to be voted on by the assembly and planning the assembly’s 
agenda.66 It is inconceivable that these tasks could have been accomplished without 
group discussion; moreover, we know that “bouleuomai” was used to describe the 
activity of the council, for Lykourgos and others use the term in this context.67 However, 
we do not know whether “bouleuomai” was used to describe discussion in the council, 
and we have virtually no primary evidence here.68 Moreover, we know that many 
members of the council--quite possibly the majority--did not speak much, if at all. In 
Demosthenes’ speech “Against Androtion,” for example, the complaint is made that if 
Androtion is acquitted, the “talkers” (tois legousi) will rule in the council-chamber, but if 
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Knowledge (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 142-51, he cites no primary sources. Cf. H. 
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he is convicted, the “ordinary citizens” (idiōtai) will rule instead.69 It is thus possible that 
even in relation to the council, “bouleuomai” suggested internal-reflective deliberation in 
the first instance, rather than discussion. 
	
 On my survey of the available evidence, I have in fact been able to find only a 
handful of cases where “bouleuomai” appears unequivocally to denote external-collective 
deliberation. Some of these relate to political activity, though not in the assembly: 
Demosthenes, for example, used the term to describe the activity of a small group of 
envoys who met together and considered (“ebouleuonth’”) which of them should be left 
behind.70 A similar usage appears in Thucydides, when Nikias says that he would need to 
consult (bouleusaito) with his colleagues, i.e. the other two generals in charge of Athens’ 
expedition to Sicily.71 Further examples occur in the works of Plato, in the context of 
equally small groups. Speaking to Kallias in the Gorgias, Sokrates observes that he once 
“overheard” (epēkousa) Kallias and three friends “bouleuomenōn,” “deliberating,” the 
question of wisdom, during the course of which they “called on each other” not to 
philosophize to the point of pedantry.72 Here, “bouleuomai” certainly indicates external-
collective deliberation. Similarly, in the Meno, Sokrates invites Anytos to join him in 
discussion with the words “met’ emou koinē bouleuesthai,” “consider jointly with me.” 73 
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Other interesting examples of this usage appear in the Critias, in the description of the ten 
kings who met every five years in the Temple of Poseidon and there “took counsel 
(ebouleuonto) about public affairs and enquired if any had in any way transgressed and 
gave judgment.” These kings also agreed that “if anyone should attempt to overthrow any 
city in their royal house, they should all lend aid, taking counsel in common 
(koinē...bouleuomenoi), like their forerunners, concerning their policy in war and other 
matters.” 74 
	
 This last example, along with that from the Meno, is particularly interesting, 
because the qualification “koinē,” “in common” or “jointly,” suggests that by itself, 
“bouleuomai” might not indicate sufficiently strongly that the members of the relevant 
group were committed to considering the matter together, i.e. in this case through joint 
discussion, as opposed to each of them internally. This kind of clarification in a case of 
undisputed external-collective deliberation is precisely what we might expect given our 
examination so far, and it raises a couple of intriguing implications. First, it suggests that 
the primary meaning of “bouleuomai” was internal-reflective, even in relatively small 
groups: a supporting adjective might be necessary to make the external-collective sense 
clear. Second, it suggests that at least in the Greek context, Goodin’s analysis of the 
relationship between external-collective and internal-reflective deliberation ought to be 
reversed. Rather than internal-reflective deliberation being “modeled on, and thus 
parasitic upon, our interpersonal experiences of discussion and debate,” the concept of 
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external-collective deliberation in Greek (as denoted by “bouleuomai” or “koinē 
bouleuomai”) may have been modeled on, and hence parasitic upon, the concept of 
internal-reflective deliberation. Further support for this view is found in Aristotle’s 
discussion of “deliberation” in Book 3 of the Nicomachean Ethics. When a matter is 
important, he says, we sometimes “take others into our deliberations” (symboulous de 
paralambanomen), mistrusting our own capacity to decide (diagnōnai).75 He does not say 
“bouleuometha,” “we reflect” (normally rendered “we deliberate” in English), or even 
“koinē bouleuometha”. On the account given here, that would have been ambiguous. If 
group discussion was what was meant, some other locution had to be found. 
Listeners and Speakers
It thus seems that of the three Greek terms translated by “deliberative” and its cognates, 
only two, “dēmēgoreō” and “symbouleuō,” certainly indicated speaking, while the third 
term, “bouleuomai,” typically implied internal reflection, at least when applied to both 
individual agents and large political institutions such as the assembly and courts. The 
next question, then, is: so what? No one has ever doubted that deliberation, in the 
external-collective sense, involves both speaking and thinking. While each speaker gives 
his views, of course the other members of the group are engaged in listening and thinking 
only. Why then should it matter if two of the Greek terms associated with the term 
“deliberation” in English suggest speaking, and one suggests listening, thinking, and 
coming to an internal decision? Both activities form part of the deliberative process. 
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75 Arist. NE 1112b8-12, trans. Rackham. 
	
 The answer to this question is that in the external-collective deliberative situation, 
group members are conceived as engaging in both speaking and listening by turns: it is 
the “exchange of reasons” among individuals who play both roles sequentially that is 
supposed to secure the benefits of this form of deliberation.76 As such, it makes sense to 
attribute to the decision-making unit, of which all speakers are members, the act of 
general discussion, whether or not all or even most members of the relevant group 
actually speak. But in Athens the situation was different. In the Greek texts, these 
different terms consistently refer to two distinct agents: “dēmēgoreuō” and “symbouleuō”  
to a small number of rhētores, “orators,” who address the decision-making unit, and 
“bouleuomai” to the decision-making unit itself. What is more, these are not merely ad 
hoc designations. The standard use of the second person plural by speakers to address 
their audience, while typically reserving the first person plural to refer to those who 
speak, suggests that there was an accepted conceptual distinction between these two 
groups. Members of the decision-making unit certainly could cross the line dividing 
deliberators and advisors and become advisors themselves: the barrier to entry was low, 
although not perhaps as low as is sometimes imagined. But the decision-making unit, 
insofar as it was conceived as a single agent, was not conceived as engaging in 
discussion.
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76 It is not necessary that all group members should take part in both speaking and listening: on the 
contrary, as noted above, relatively few may actually speak. However, in order for the description 
“deliberative” to stick, at least some members of the decision-making group must take part in both 
activities, such that the activity of discussion can be attributed to the group as a whole.
	
 There are numerous examples in the extant Greek literature of “bouleuomai” 
being used to refer to a decision-making unit, that is, an assembly, council, or court. We 
have seen many already, and more can easily be found.77 Equally, there are many 
examples of “symbouleuō” and “dēmēgoreō” being used to describe the activity of 
speakers.78 What are most instructive for present purposes, however, are cases where 
“bouleuomai” and a verb suggesting speaking are juxtaposed, with these two acts being 
attributed to two different agents at the same time.
	
 A good example features in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, when he introduces the different 
issues that arise for decision in assemblies.79 In the Penguin edition, the line runs: “the 
most important subjects of deliberation, and those most often discussed by deliberative 
speakers, are...” In the Loeb, it is: “the most important subjects about which all men 
deliberate and deliberative orators harangue...” In the Greek, however, the subjects in 
question are defined as those about which “all men reflect” (bouleuontai pantes) and 
“those who advise speak publicly” (agoreusin hoi symbouleuontes). In the English texts, 
the repeated use of “deliberate” and its cognates suggests that a single act is taking place, 
performed by a single undifferentiated group. The Greek, however, distinguishes between 
two separate activities, one performed by “all men” and which does not involve speaking, 
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77 Aeschin. 2.60, Dem. 19.96, Lycurg. 1.37, Thuc. 4.87. 
78 Aeschin. 1.3, Dem. 1.1, Din. 1.31, Pl. Grg. 455b-c.
79 Arist. Rhet. 1359b20. 
the other performed by “advisors,” and which does.80 The division of labor between 
listeners and speakers is thus clear. 
	
 Similar examples are plentiful. Aischines, in the speech “On the Embassy,” quotes 
Demosthenes as saying that he was “amazed at both parties, as well the listeners as the 
ambassadors, for they were carelessly wasting time--the listeners (tōn akouontōn) 
wasting the time for taking counsel (tou bouleuesthai), the ambassadors the time for 
giving it (tou symbouleuein).” 81 Demosthenes also regularly distinguished between the 
tasks of speakers and those of the dēmos. It was the “duty of all speakers” (tous legontas 
hapantas) to put forward the best counsel, “especially when you are debating (hymōn 
bouleuomenōn) a question of urgent public importance”;82 a speaker (ton symbouleuonta) 
ought to “give the best advice,” while the audience ought to “listen to the right sort of 
arguments.” 83 Speakers often “fail to offer advice,” but their proper task is to explain 
what is “most profitable for you who deliberate” (tois boulomenois).84 Plato, similarly, 
assigned “to bouleuesthai” and speaking to two distinct agents,85 as did Thucydides: 
speakers speak (eipon) while those listening “hear them and decide” (akousantes 
bouleusontai) or “consider” (ebouleuonto) what to do.86 Another rich source on this point 
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80 A nearly identical example appears at Dem. 14.8.
81 Aeschin. 2.49, trans. Adams.
82 Dem. 8.1, trans. Vince. 
83 Dem. 10.17, 10.75, trans. Vince.
84 Dem. Ex.6, trans. Vince. Cf. Dem. 18.86. 
85 Pl. Prt. 319d. 
86 Thuc. 3.8, 3.29. 
is Kleon’s speech in the second Mytilenaian debate. He first criticizes the Athenian dēmos 
for wanting to be like the orators, then tells them that they act more like spectators of 
sophists than men who take counsel (bouleuomenois), and finally presents a striking 
series of distinctions: between “we” who advise and “you” who give matters only brief 
consideration, between advisors who are held accountable for their actions and listeners 
who are not, and between those who give advice and those who follow it.87
	
 Some prominent individuals thus identified a clear division of labor in Athenian 
politics. Yet the different tasks attributed to speakers and listeners did not end there. The 
roles of both parties were well fleshed out, suggesting that the conception of a division of 
labor between speakers and listeners was well developed. Orators gave advice, made 
proposals,88 took a “broad view” and “explored best policy”;89 their role was to discern 
the trend of events at the outset, forecast results, and offer warnings when necessary.90 
More extensive, and arguably more important, were the tasks attributed to the dēmos. Not 
only did it listen91 and reflect (bouleuomai);92 it also judged,93  voted,94 and, finally and 
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87 Thuc. 3.38, 3.43. 
88 Din. 1.35. 
89 Dem. 16.1. 
90 Dem. 18.246. 
91 Din. 2.16, Dem. 2.31, Dem. 19.34. 
92 Dem. 19.34. 
93 Arist. Rhet. 1.4, Thuc. 6.39. 
94 Aeschin. 2.160, Dem. 8.19. 
most significantly, acted.95 For both good and ill, speakers in the assembly did not 
identify themselves with the agent responsible for the acts of the polis. That agent was 
rather their audience, those who listened, thought, and voted. Demosthenes once asked: 
“Who sent reinforcements to Byzantium and prevented the entrapment of the 
Hellespont?” He answered his own question: “You, and when I say you I mean the whole 
city (tēn polin).” 96  He continued: “Who advised the city, moved resolutions, took action? 
I did.” 97 A similar distinction appears in Aischines’ speech “On the Embassy,” when he 
observes that “I propose, I keep laws from being passed, I make covenants,” while “you 
vote.” 98 The implication seems clear. Speakers can offer advice and assistance, but the 
agent that actually decides and acts is the dēmos--with whom speakers do not typically 
identify themselves. 
	
 This final point is important and deserves further elaboration. Perhaps the most 
striking aspect of our extant speeches is the typical use of the second person plural (that 
is, “you” pl.) by Athenian political speakers to address their audiences, while they use the 
first person plural (“we”) to refer to themselves and other speakers, rather than 
themselves and the rest of the polis. In the classic external-collective deliberative 
situation, the pronoun “we” is typically used to identify the decision-making group as a 
whole: questions are posed in the form of “What are we to do about X?” and responses in 
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95 Dem. 19.34, Dem. 18.88, Hyp. 4.9. 
96 Dem. 18.88, trans. Vince.
97 Dem. 18.88, trans. Vince.
98 Aeschin. 2.160, trans. Adams. 
terms of “I think we should do Y.” 99 But in Athens this was almost never the case. There 
are some exceptions: occasionally speakers do use “we” to include their audience, 
especially when talking about war or some other external threat to the polis.100 But these 
cases are greatly outnumbered by those in which a clear line is drawn between “we” the 
body of advisors to the dēmos and “you” the dēmos itself. Demosthenes, for example, 
described those who spoke before the assembly as “all of us who address you,” 101 and 
complained that “you have a habit of asking a speaker on every occasion, ‘What then 
must be done?’; but I prefer to ask you, ‘What then must be said?’” 102 The division 
between advisors who speak and ordinary citizens who act also emerges in the speeches 
of Hypereides, especially “Against Demosthenes,” in which he identifies “the people” (ho 
dēmos) as “them,” while those who speak before the people are described as “us.” 103 At 
the same time the conception of the audience as the agent of deliberation and decision 
also appears clearly. “You would have been insane if you had framed the law in any other 
way,” Hypereides declared as part of an argument that impeachment was an appropriate 
threat to hold over political speakers but ought not to apply to non-speaking citizens.104 
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99 Cf. e.g. D. Estlund, Democratic Authority (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 230; J. 
Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1983), passim. 
100 E.g. Dem. 18.89, Thuc. 3.44; cf. Aeschin. 1.33. 
101 Dem. 14.2, trans. Vince. 
102 Dem. 8.22, trans. Vince. 
103 Hyp. 5, cols. 28, 29. 
104 Hyp. 4.9, trans. Burtt; see also Dem. 25.41, Dem. 21.189-90, Dem. 23.4, Dem. 24.123, Dem. 19.182, 
Hyp. 4.4, Hyp. 4.27, Hyp. 4.31. 
	
 We may infer from these examples, and from many others already quoted, that 
coming forward as an advisor in Athens had the implied effect of stepping outside the 
decision-making group. Of course, this was not literally the case: those who spoke in the 
assembly did not thereby lose their vote. But the difference between voting as one of a 
group of six thousand or more and having the opportunity to shape the views of that 
group was so great that it is hardly surprising that speakers spoke as though their identity 
in one role overwhelmed their identity in the other. The body of regular speakers was 
relatively tiny: it has been estimated that it consisted of around twenty to forty citizens at 
any one time.105 It is true that a larger number of citizens, perhaps some hundreds, 
occasionally put forward proposals; however, many of these did not actually speak in 
support of the proposal they advanced, but merely sponsored it as it passed through the 
council.106 Moreover, though the barrier to entry as a speaker was low, it was not 
negligible. Unlike in a modern “town hall meeting” or Quaker meeting-house, for 
example, speakers had to get up from their seats and walk down to the speakers’ platform, 
where they would wait their turn before addressing an audience of thousands. This took 
some courage and preparation.107 Additionally, achieving prominence as a speaker 
involved significant risks: there was an ongoing possibility of being taken to court for 
treason, corruption, bribery, or simply being an inappropriate person from whom to take 
advice. The most common charge of this sort was that of making an illegal or inexpedient 
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105 M. H. Hansen, “The Number of Rhētores in the Ekklēsia, 355-322,” Greek, Roman and Byzantine 
Studies 25 (1984): 123-4.
106 Hansen, “Athenian ‘Politicians’.”
107 Cf. Plut. Dem. 6-9, Pl. Alc. 2, Xen. Mem. 3.6. 
proposal, a frequently-used political weapon that, on a third conviction, resulted in the 
complete loss of citizenship.108 In contrast to this, as speakers liked to point out, simply 
listening and voting in the assembly involved no risk at all.109 
	
 There was thus a significant gulf in Athens between political speakers and 
ordinary citizens. Paradoxically, however--to a modern audience at least--one thing that 
“deliberators” in Athens did not do was speak publicly. Rather, their task was to listen, 
reflect, judge, vote, and later, if any one of them so chose, take their political leaders to 
court for breaking the laws of the polis. The Athenian dēmos enjoyed real and extensive 
powers. But what it did, it did not do through talking.  
Conclusion
The central implication of this study is that “deliberative” is not an appropriate label for 
Athenian democracy, unless “deliberation” in the exclusively “internal-reflective” sense 
is meant. Political activity in Athens involved two distinct tasks, giving counsel and 
taking it: both were necessary and valuable, but they were performed by two different 
agents, one of which offered advice while the other listened and determined the issue. 
There was thus no mass “deliberating” group in the external-collective sense, and this 
leaves us with a dilemma. Either we must accept that Athenian democracy was not 
“deliberative” in the sense of the term familiar to contemporary political theorists (and 
hence lose our only well-attested historical example of that political form), or we accept 
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109 Thuc. 3.43, Hyp. 4.9. 
that only a tiny number of people in Athens took part in such “deliberation,” that is, 
speaking and listening by turns. Neither of these options is likely to seem attractive to 
today’s deliberative democrats. However, the former has the advantage of reflecting the 
Athenian conception of the matter, and for that reason seems preferable. 
	
 The final question we must ask is why it should matter whether the Athenian 
dēmos took part in group discussion of public policy or simply took advice from a small 
number of speakers who, by the very act of speaking, cast themselves as something other 
than ordinary members of the decision-making group. We can focus on three reasons. 
First, the revised view alters our interpretation of several important passages in the 
surviving literature and thus transforms our understanding of both the idea and practice of 
democracy in the ancient world. Second, it suggests that the importance of widespread 
participation in public speaking in Athens (and by extension in other political systems) 
has been overstated. Third, it suggests that the structure of Athenian politics was 
significantly closer to that of modern political systems than is commonly allowed. 
Nonetheless, this does not lessen Athens’ usefulness as a political model. To the contrary, 
it suggests that the strategies adopted by the Athenians to control the minority of active 
“politicians” in their midst might also be effective today.
	
 On the first issue, we may consider a few representative passages from Aristotle’s 
Politics. First, let us recall Aristotle’s definition of a citizen, quoted earlier, as one who 
participates in deliberating (tou bouleuesthai) and judging (krinein).110 The usual 
interpretation of this line is that Aristotle takes the right to participate in discussing policy 
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to be essential to citizenship. On the account given here, however, it would seem that 
what is essential is rather the right to participate in considering the issues prior to voting 
on them, i.e., effectively, the right to be part of the decision-making unit, rather than the 
right to speak itself.111 A similar case is Aristotle’s comment that in certain poleis, no-one 
who owns land on the frontier is allowed to take part in deliberating questions of war (tou 
bouleusasthai).112 If “tou bouleusasthai” indicates not speaking but thinking, this 
suggests a significant limitation on political action: it implies that the citizens in question 
are not allowed to be part of the decision-making group at all. Finally, we should consider 
Aristotle’s claim that in democracies, citizens of all classes ought to take part in 
deliberating (to bouleuesthai), “for they will advise better (bouleusontai beltion) when 
deliberating jointly (koinē bouleuomenoi pantes), the people (ho dēmos) with the notables 
and the notables with the people.” 113 It might seem natural to read “deliberating” in this 
context as “discussing”; but if the reading favored here is right, Aristotle should probably 
be understood as saying that the outcome will be better when members of both classes 
listen and vote together, not that they must speak to one another. In other words, Aristotle 
appears to be pointing to the importance of having both the common people and the 
notables present as part of the same body and hearing the same advice on the same 
questions, as opposed to meeting as two separate bodies (like the Spartan gerontes and 
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opportunity to vote on policy proposals, though not to take part in discussing them. The fact that many 
Roman writers regarded both Athens and Rome as democracies adds further support to this point: Athens 
and Rome were believed to be more alike than not in essential respects. I owe this point to Richard Tuck. 
112 Arist. Pol. 1330a20. 
113 Arist. Pol. 1298b20-25, trans. Barnes. 
ephorate, or the English Lords and Commons), or, worse, leaving the dēmos to make 
decisions by itself.114 
	
 In each of these examples, what emerges is that that the key instrument of self-
expression in ancient Greek deliberation was each individual’s vote rather than his voice; 
and this points to a second important implication. This is that the importance of 
widespread participation in public speaking in Athens, and more broadly as an element in 
any flourishing democracy, may have been overstated. This is not to say that the role of 
advisors was not important: if anything, the fact that these individuals were in Athens 
regarded as something of a distinct tribe rather underlines the power and influence that 
they possessed. But the fact that public speaking was not an activity attributed to 
members of the dēmos--unlike, for example, listening, thinking, voting, and acting--
suggests that public speaking was not a major element of democratic activity strictly 
conceived, i.e. activity conducing to and reflecting the dēmos’s own power. The fact that 
public speaking was open to all citizens is undoubtedly significant, but the purported 
advantages of wide discussion would seem to have been a less important factor in the 
success of Athenian democracy than is often imagined. Rather than focus on the rights of 
isēgoria and parrhēsia, then, which were not taken up by most citizens, more attention 
ought to be paid to those things that members of the dēmos did do, such as listening 
critically, deciding, voting, and helping to hold speakers to account in the courts. 
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114 A further thought might be that being together in the same place will help to focus the mind on 
genuinely common interests rather than sectional ones, and thus help to avoid stasis. 
Especially important here is the idea and practice of judging.115 Aristotle, in the Rhetoric, 
identified both assemblygoers and jurors (dikastai) as “judges” (kritai), and this, 
arguably, was regarded as the core of democratic political activity in Athens.
	
 The third and final implication of note is that the respective roles of the dēmos and 
its advisors in classical Athens as presented here suggests that there may be greater 
parallels between ancient and modern electoral democracies than is commonly allowed. 
For in at least one respect modern democracies face the same difficulty as the ancient 
Athenians. At around thirty thousand adult males during the fourth century, the Athenian 
citizen body was indeed much smaller than those commonly seen today, but it was still 
far too large to hold what Gutmann and Thompson call “genuine public conversation.” 
Decisions had to be made by smaller samples of the citizen body: as we have seen, 
around six thousand in the assembly, and usually between two hundred and a thousand in 
the courts. Yet even the smaller figure of six thousand in the assembly prohibited public 
conversation of the kind imagined by many modern scholars. Rather, just like today, the 
Athenians had to “outsource” much necessary political activity to a relatively tiny 
number of individuals eager to increase their personal honor and renown. The result was 
a democracy of almost entirely non-speaking voters whose task, in part, was to prevent 
the minority of vocal “politicians” in their midst from becoming too powerful--a task for 
which the dēmos’ control of the administration of justice was particularly crucial.
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 In Athens, then, as in modern democracies, an overwhelming majority of non-
speaking voters attempted to control a minority of prominent political actors who took 
primary responsibility for advocating and carrying policies. The key differences between 
Athenian and modern democracy were thus not that all or even many Athenians took part 
in political discussion, but, first, that large samples of ordinary citizens had the 
opportunity to vote on every political decision, and second, that the barriers to becoming 
politically influential were relatively low, while the risks associated with this position 
were high. This is the reverse of the situation today, where a high barrier to entry as a 
politician--often financial--is combined with a low risk of losing one’s position once 
established. To be sure, one can fail to be reelected, but this pales in comparison to the 
mechanisms of accountability available in Athens, such as routine annual audits 
(euthynai) covering both moral and financial issues. In the modern system, by contrast, a 
feedback loop is set up in which corruption becomes endemic, since the high costs of 
running for office are in large part met by supporters whose opportunity to shape policy is 
then significantly greater than that of ordinary voters, with very little way for those 
ordinary voters to hold the politician in question to account, either before or after the next 
election. 
	
 Yet the fact that modern states feature a similar distinction between committed 
political leaders and ordinary citizens to that seen in Athens suggests that the Athenians’ 
solutions to the problem of the political division of labor might also be effective today. 
Both lowering the initial barrier to entry as a politician (if only by making it less 
expensive to run for office) and raising the personal risks associated with political activity 
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would help to strengthen the control of ordinary citizens over those who are more 
politically active. If this could be combined with giving representative samples of 
ordinary citizens the power to decide policy issues, so much the better. At any rate, this 
would be more in tune with the spirit of Athenian democracy and “deliberation” than the 
kind of deliberative mini-publics occasionally explored today.
Deliberation in Classical Athens
131
CHAPTER THREE
The Most Democratic Branch? The Athenian Assembly vs. the Courts
There is a longstanding puzzle in studies of Athenian democracy. Why, towards the end 
of the fifth century BC, did the Athenians deliberately increase the political powers of 
their courts, at the direct expense of those of the assembly? This so-called “era of legal 
reform” is often interpreted as an attempt at political self-limitation, because the 
assembly is regarded by modern scholars as the best institutional representative of the 
popular will, and the courts as a “check” on that will. This view reflects modern 
expectations of the relationship between legislative and judicial bodies, but there is no 
evidence that the Athenians saw their courts in this light. In fact, the evidence at our 
disposal suggests that they regarded their courts as an even more democratic institution 
than the assembly: more reliably on the side of the dēmos against the elite, and more 
crucial to the development and preservation of democracy in Athens.1
	
 This suggests an alternative interpretation of the “era of legal reform.” The 
majority of Athenians in the late fifth century may have been glad to give final decision-
making power in political matters to their courts because they regarded them as a better 
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1 Greek political vocabulary suggests a distinction here that is less natural in English. In ancient Greek 
terms, the courts were a more “demotic” (dēmotikon) institution than the assembly, that is, closer to and 
more reflective of the interests of the dēmos, understood as the mass of ordinary citizens in 
contradistinction from the elite (in terms of wealth, birth, influence, political prowess or any other grounds). 
This term is distinct from “democratic,” which indicates that the dēmos (as defined above) has authority 
(kratos) in the system overall; we might say that “dēmokratia” is effected when a “demotic” body rules. 
The significance of this distinction is lost in most English translations of Greek works, however, since 
“democratic” is often used to translate “dēmotikon” (e.g. at Arist. Pol. 1273b42; Ps. Arist. Ath. Pol. 9-10). 
This is arguably misleading, but with some reservations I have decided to follow standard practice here. 
vehicle for the will of the dēmos, defined as those undistinguished by wealth, birth, 
political prowess, or any other exceptional feature. To be sure, the assembly was the 
larger and more open body: all citizens were entitled to attend, speak, and vote. However, 
this very openness rendered the assembly more vulnerable to oligarchical takeover, as 
was revealed on two separate occasions in the final decade of the fifth century when it 
was manipulated into voting for the dissolution of democracy. The assembly’s 
weaknesses related to both composition and procedures: ordinary citizens did not 
necessarily dominate, unscrupulous speakers could wield excessive power, and voting by 
raising hands invited intimidation and corruption. By contrast, the courts were staffed by 
random samples of relatively underprivileged citizens, with restrictions on speech and a 
secret ballot, making them a more secure vehicle of popular rule. 
	
 This interpretation challenges the modern account of dēmokratia in classical 
Athens, which holds that the assembly was the single most democratic body in that 
system. The evidence presented here suggests that this claim is faulty. The Athenian 
conception of democracy cannot be simply inferred from the activity of the assembly, and 
this has significant implications for our understanding of the differences between ancient 
and modern democracy.
The “Era of Legal Reform,” c. 420-399
For most of the fifth century, the assembly had sole legislative and policy-making 
authority in Athens, but by around 420 this had begun to change. The first key 
development was the introduction of the graphē paramonōn, or “indictment for 
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proposing an illegal measure”: this enabled the courts to strike down any proposal 
advanced in the assembly or council, and punish its proposer, if it was found to be 
“paranomōn” or “beyond the laws,” whether or not the proposal in question had been 
enacted, as well as to enact it, surprising though this may seem, if it was found acceptable 
by the judges and had not yet been voted on in the assembly.2 Second, beginning in 410, 
restarted in 403, and completed around 399, the entire body of laws was revised, 
recodified, and reinscribed in a prominent position in the centre of Athens.3 Third, several 
striking legislative changes appeared in or just after 403/2. For the first time, a formal 
distinction was established between a nomos, a “law,” and a psēphisma, a “decree,” with 
major institutional ramifications. The power to make nomoi, i.e. permanent, general laws, 
was transferred from the assembly to panels of nomothetai (“lawmakers”) composed of 
men who had taken the judicial oath, i.e. the same individuals who staffed the courts. 
These men made their decision following what was effectively a “trial” of the proposed 
law, with a small number of pre-selected speakers arguing for and against its enactment.4 
The assembly retained only the power to approve decrees, i.e. short-term policy decisions 
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of an explicitly lower status than laws. No decree could trump a law, and if a law was 
found to conflict with a decree, the decree would be abolished.5 Finally, underlining their 
commitment to their new two-tier legal system, the Athenians introduced the graphē 
nomon mē epitēdeion theinai, or “indictment for proposing a disadvantageous law.” This 
was the counterpart to the previously established graphē paranomōn, which from that 
point on would apply only to decrees. The new charge allowed the courts to strike down 
any addition to the laws that they deemed “mē epitēdeion,” “not beneficial,” and if the 
case was brought within a year of the original vote, the proposer might be liable to the 
death penalty.6
	
 Scholarly accounts of these reforms have fallen into two camps. The first 
emphasizes their significance, for two reasons: first because they signaled the transfer of 
ultimate political authority in Athens from the assembly to the courts, and second because 
this represented a change in the character of Athenian democracy. Mogens Hansen is 
preeminent here. Beginning in 1974, and continuing to the present with only minor 
modifications, Hansen has emphasized that in fourth-century Athens, there was nothing 
that the assembly could do that the courts could not overturn, while the opposite was not 
the case: the assembly could do nothing to alter a decision made by the courts. As a 
result, Hansen argues, the courts rather than the assembly ought to be considered 
sovereign in the fourth century, signifying a shift from radical to more moderate (or at 
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5 M. H. Hansen, “Nomos and Psephisma in Fourth-Century Athens,” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 
19 (1978): 315-30;  M. H. Hansen, “Did the Athenian Ecclesia Legislate After 403/2 BC?” Greek, Roman 
and Byzantine Studies 20 (1979): 27-53. Cf. Pl. Def. 415b. 
6 Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 212, with Dem. 20 and 24 and Ps-Arist. Ath. Pol. 59.2.
least “modified”) democracy.7 Similarly, Martin Ostwald suggests that the reforms 
marked a move from “popular sovereignty” in the fifth century to “the sovereignty of 
law” in the fourth; Raphael Sealey that the Athenians abandoned democracy after 403/2 
in favor of republicanism and the rule of law; and Walter Eder that the full realization of 
democracy in Athens included recognition that constitutional limitations on popular 
sovereignty were an essential part of its very nature.8
	
 In the second camp are the many historians and theorists who find these claims 
overstated. Here, too, two distinct arguments have been made: first that the effects of the 
reforms were insignificant, and second that the character of Athenian democracy could 
not anyway have been greatly altered by them. In support of the first argument, it is noted 
that the effort to maintain a coherent law code proved unsustainable;9 that the vast 
majority of political decisions continued to be enacted in the assembly, without being 
challenged in court;10 that even when the new legislative procedures were used, the 
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7 M. H. Hansen, The Sovereignty of the People’s Court in Athens in the Fourth Century BC (Odense: 
Odense University Press, 1974), 7, 17, 59. Cf. M. H. Hansen, “The Political Powers of the People’s Court 
in Fourth-Century Athens,” in O. Murray and S. Price eds., The Greek City from Homer to Alexander 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 215-43; Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 351-2. Note that Hansen early 
came under attack for his use of the term “sovereign” in the Athenian context, and since the late 1980s has 
stuck to the Greek “kyrios.” However, as Ober has observed, this does not greatly affect his argument. J. 
Ober, The Athenian Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 120 with n. 26. 
8 Ostwald, Popular Sovereignty; R. Sealey, The Athenian Republic: Democracy or the Rule of Law? 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 1987); W. Eder, “Aristocracy and the Coming of 
Athenian Democracy,” in I. Morriss and K. Raaflaub eds., Democracy 2500? Questions and Challenges 
(Dubuque, IO, 1998), 105-40.
9 A. Lanni, Law and Justice in the Courts of Classical Athens (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 142-6.
10 As Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 156, 167, points out, we have over four hundred extant decrees from 
the fourth century, as against only six examples of laws.
assembly retained ultimate authority, since it was responsible for convening the 
nomothetai and voting their pay;11 and finally that the graphē nomon mē epitēdeion 
theinai was scarcely ever used.12 Respecting the second argument, it is said that since 
both the assembly and courts represented the Athenian dēmos, or “people,” shifting 
certain decisions from one venue to another mattered less than one might think. Like the 
assembly, judicial panels (including the nomothetai) were composed entirely of ordinary 
citizens, several hundred in number: the courts could thus be conceived as virtually a sub-
committee of the assembly, or even the dēmos itself under a different name, so increasing 
their political power made no difference in democratic terms.13 Moreover, the very labels 
“radical” and “moderate” can be considered anachronistic in this context.14 Preeminent in 
this camp are Moses Finley and Josiah Ober, but they are in good company: as Stephen 
Todd observed in 1993, almost everyone who has written on this subject since Hansen, 
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11 D. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), 49; R. K. 
Sinclair, Democracy and Participation in Athens (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
83-4.
12 We have only six examples of this graphē (in addition to its mention at Dem. 24.33), compared to around 
35 of the graphē paranomōn. They are Dem. 24.138 (two examples); Dem. 20 passim; Aeschin. 1.34; Dem. 
24; Dem. 1.102-7. See further Hansen, “Nomos and Psephisma,” 325-29. 
13 A. R. W. Harrison, “Law-Making at Athens at the End of the Fifth Century BC,” Journal of Hellenic 
Studies 75 (1955): 35; M. I. Finley, Politics in the Ancient World (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), 71, and Democracy Ancient and Modern (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
1985), 117-18; Ober, Mass and Elite, 95-103, 299-304, and Athenian Revolution, 30, 117-20; M. Christ, 
The Litigious Athenian (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 22-5.
14 G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient World (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1981), 76; B. Strauss, “On Aristotle’s Critique of Athenian Democracy,” in C. Lord and D. O’Connor eds., 
Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1991), 212-33; A. Boegehold, “Resistance to Change in the Law at Athens,” in J. Ober and C. Hedrick eds., 
Demokratia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 203-14; P. Millett, “Mogens Hansen and the 
Labelling of Athenian Democracy,” in P. Flensted-Jensen et al eds., Polis & Politics (Copenhagen: 
Museum Tusculanum Press, 2000), 339-60. 
with the significant exceptions of Ostwald, Sealey and Eder, has rejected his 
conclusions.15
	
 There is much to be said for the arguments made by the second camp. Yet they are 
not in themselves sufficient to undermine the view advanced by the first. Whatever the 
ultimate effects of the reforms, the Athenians obviously believed that they were doing 
something useful by passing them. We must therefore ask what that was, and to this 
question one answer currently holds the field, accepted equally by those who emphasize 
the significance of the reforms and those who doubt it. Tired of the instability of the fifth-
century political system, it is said--an instability exemplified above all by the oligarchical 
coups of 411 and 404, both of which were initially legitimated by a vote of the 
assembly--the Athenian dēmos, once it had returned to power, simply decided to limit 
what it could do to itself politically. In particular, on this view, the Athenians wished to 
restrict their capacity to make “hasty decisions”.16 In the words of Josiah Ober, the 
“errors” made by the assembly during the Peloponnesian War had “brought home to the 
Athenians the dangers of unrestrained exercise of the popular will”; they therefore 
“enacted constitutional measures aimed at correcting the problem”.17 Thus, on this 
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15 S. C. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 299. 
16 Harrison, “Law-Making,” 35-6; J. A. O. Larsen, “Dēmokratia,” Classical Philology 68 (1973): 45-6; 
MacDowell, “Law-Making,” 74; P. J. Rhodes, “Athenian Democracy after 403 BC,” Classical Journal 75 
(1980): 322-3; Finley, Democracy Ancient and Modern, 140-1; Ostwald, Popular Sovereignty, 522-4; 
Sinclair, Democracy and Participation, 83-4; Ober, Mass and Elite,301-2; R. Bauman, Political Trials in 
Ancient Greece (London: Routledge, 1990), 77-8; Eder, “Aristocracy,” 112; Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 
151, 303. 
17 Ober, Mass and Elite, 301.
account, the reformers wished to use the courts as a “check” on the potential excesses of 
democratic rule--that is, as a check on themselves.
	
 At first glance, this view seems plausible enough. Certainly it fits perfectly with a 
familiar claim in modern constitutional discourse: that a key role of the judiciary in 
democratic regimes is to act as a check on the popular will. Moreover, similar parallels 
have often been drawn between ancient and modern judicial activity. A. H. M. Jones 
likened Athens’ courts to a Supreme Court, while Josiah Ober, Richard Tuck, Adriaan 
Lanni, and Edwin Carawan, among others, have all described their powers as a form of 
“judicial review,” in which courts have the power to strike down new legislation in the 
name of protecting a higher body of law.18
	
 But the very ease with which the Athenian political situation has been assimilated 
to the modern paradigm of the relationship between legislatures and courts should give us 
pause. In the modern era, the concept of constitutional self-limitation via judicial 
intervention has had undeniable political and ideological traction: one need only look to 
the numerous formal constitutions and bills of rights produced since the eighteenth 
century, not to mention the reams of scholarship devoted to them. Yet no such concept 
appears in our ancient evidence, and this presents a problem. If the Athenians had 
increased the political power of their courts in order to restrict their capacity to make 
Most Democratic Branch?
139
18 A. H. M. Jones, Athenian Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980 [1957]), 4; 
Ober, Mass and Elite, 8; R. Tuck “Hobbes and Democracy,” in A. Brett ed., Rethinking the Foundations of 
Modern Political Thought (Cambridge, UK; Cambridge University Press, 2006), 171-90; A. Lanni, 
“Judicial Review and the Athenian ‘Constitution’,” in M. H. Hansen ed., Démocratie athénienne - 
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“hasty decisions,” as both sides in this debate agree, we should expect to find some 
indication that the courts were capable of being conceived as a “limit” on the activity of 
the Athenian dēmos, where the dēmos was in the first instance identified with the 
assembly. But (with the exception of one complicating factor that will require more 
attention than can be given here19), our ancient sources suggest precisely the opposite: 
that the courts were not only, as is widely known and appreciated, highly democratic and 
politically significant, but also, and more intriguingly, that they were often conceived as 
even more democratic than the assembly: more reliably on the side of the dēmos against 
the elite, and more crucial to the development and preservation of democracy in Athens 
as such.
	
 The evidence on this issue is occasionally allusive, but it is consistent enough.20 
Aristotle explicitly attributed the political “founding” (katastēsai) of the Athenian dēmos 
and its increasing strength over time to the fact that Solon had opened the law-courts to 
the lowest class of citizens.21 The same view appears in the Aristotelian Athēnaiōn 
Politeia, which inter alia reports that “the dēmos, having the power of the vote”--that is, 
the psēphos, the voting-token used in the courts--“becomes sovereign (kyrios) in the 
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19 This is the use of the term “dēmos” to mean “assembly,” as in the opening formula of the Athenian 
assembly’s decrees: “edoxe tē boulē dēmō kai tō dēmō...,” “it was decided by the council and assembly...” 
This question, which involves a reconsideration of the history and functions of ancient Greek assemblies, 
will be treated in a separate article.
20 The evidence presented in this paragraph is supplemented and discussed fully in the Introduction, pp. 
20-42.
21 Arist. Pol. 1273b36-1274a23; see also 1305b20-40, which mentions instances of the dēmos’s control of 
the courts leading to the establishment of democracy in other poleis.
government.” 22 Similar claims abound in the oratorical corpus: Lykourgos identified the 
three main bulwarks of democracy in Athens as the legal system, the vote of the jury, and 
the procedures by which wrongdoers were handed over to them;23 Aischines repeatedly 
equated democracy with the rule of law and Athens’ judges as its “guards”;24 and one 
speaker in the assembly complained bitterly that such “common sayings” as “In the law-
courts lies your salvation” and “It is the psēphos that must save the State” were 
hampering Athens’ readiness for war.25 Aristophanes and Thucydides are often cited in 
connection with the political significance of Athens’ courts;26 Aristophanes’ use of 
judicial analogies to exemplify the power of ordinary citizens is particularly striking, as 
in the following husband-wife exchange from Lysistrata (411): “I’ll put a stop to your 
bellowing!/You’re not on a jury now, you know.” 27 The author of the Athēnaiōn Politeia 
found among Xenophon’s writings also stressed the courts’ role in Athenian democracy, 
even suggesting that their current organization was its sine qua non.28 Finally, Plato’s 
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xi; Botsford, G. W., The Development of the Athenian Constitution (New York: Columbia University Press, 
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23 Lycurg. 1.3; cf. Lycurg. 1.4 and 1.138; Dem. 24.2. 
24 Aeschin. 3.200, 7; cf. Aeschin. 1.4-5, 3.6, 3.23; Din. 3.15. 
25 Dem. 13.16; cf. Dem. 7.7.
26 Thuc. 1.77, Ar. Eq. 1315, Ar. Nub. 206, Ar. Pax 500-5, and Ar. Vesp. passim.
27 Ar. Lys. 379; cf. Ar. Eccl. 460. 
28 Ps. Xen. Ath. Pol. 3.7-9; cf. 1.16-18.
treatment of democracy supports this picture. Surprisingly often, his criticisms of rule by 
“the many” have the courts rather than the assembly as their institutional target.29
	
 This evidence may be considered inconclusive. The philosophers are often 
deemed unreliable in relation to democracy, since they did not support it.30 The same is 
said of the historians and Aristophanes, while the orators are doubted for a different 
reason: since most of their speeches were produced for trials, any suggestion that judges 
had a peculiarly significant democratic role can be interpreted as flattery.31 These 
objections are not unanswerable: even an anti-democrat may provide an accurate glimpse 
of democracy, and even if the orators were frequently engaged in flattery, such flattery 
will have to have seemed plausible to its audience if it was to work, and will have 
affected judges’ beliefs about their roles and hence in turn Athenian democratic ideology. 
But even if we allow some force to the two objections mentioned above, the accepted 
explanation of the reforms remains doubtful, for there is no evidence that the courts were 
conceived as a “limiting” factor in the Athenian system. We may therefore pursue an 
alternative explanation: ordinary Athenians supported the late fifth-century reforms not 
because they wished to restrict popular rule but because they wished to deepen it, by 
augmenting the powers of what they saw as their most obviously democratic institution: 
their courts. 
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30 See e.g. M. H. Hansen, “The Concepts of Demos, Ekklesia and Dikasterion in Classical Athens,” Greek, 
Roman and Byzantine Studies 50 (2010): 505-7. 
31 Hansen, Sovereignty of the People’s Court, 18. 
	
 This challenges the accepted view of classical Athenian democracy, according to 
which (as we saw in the Introduction) the assembly was the undisputed “crown” of the 
democratic system.32 Of course, as is equally commonly stated, the assembly was not the 
only democratic institution in the polis: the council, courts and other bodies also played 
significant roles.33 Nonetheless, though it has occasionally been suggested that other 
institutions were more powerful than the assembly--recently, as we have just seen, the 
courts, at least in the fourth century, and earlier in the twentieth century, the council--it 
has not been argued that another institution was intrinsically more democratic.34 To the 
contrary, the assembly’s essential compositional and procedural characteristics--openness 
to all, an equal right of speech, and an equal right to vote--are often regarded as definitive 
of the idea and practice of dēmokratia in Athens.35 Yet there are reasons to be skeptical of 
that view. 
 	
 In the first place, there is some evidence that the post-403/2 political system was 
regarded by fourth-century Athenians as noticeably more democratic than its 
predecessors. Aischines described Athenian democracy as taking on “new life and 
vigor” (ex archēs ischusantos) after this date, while Lykourgos and others praised the 
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34 Cf. e.g. Sinclair, Democracy and Participation, 84-8; P. J. Rhodes, The Athenian Boule (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1972), 64-81 and 213-23; Finley, Democracy Ancient and Modern, 1-12; Ober, Mass and 
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Athens (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996); R. K. Balot, Greek Political Thought 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 65-7; Ober, Mass and Elite,163-5. 
men of that era as especially noteworthy defenders of democracy.36 Most striking is the 
testimony of the Aristotelian Athēnaiōn Politeia.37 According to this text, the Athenian 
political system had since Solon become gradually more democratic, albeit with 
occasional setbacks; but it reached new heights in 403/2, when the dēmos became fully 
authoritative (kyrios), and since then had only become more extreme.38 This view is today 
regarded as “mistaken,” 39  but one should perhaps hesitate to reject the view of any 
ancient author outright, and turning our attention from the assembly to the courts may 
help here. For the two most prominent changes in the fourth-century political system, 
according to this author, were the increasing use of the lot and transfers of power to the 
courts.40 The former is interpreted today as an obviously democratic move; perhaps the 
latter should be understood that way as well.
	
 In the second place, there is the history of the two late fifth-century coups. The 
first, in 411, was orchestrated by leading political figures in Athens and Samos, where the 
Athenian fleet was anchored, and took place against the backdrop of a campaign of terror 
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38 Ps. Arist. Ath. Pol. 41.2.
39 P. J. Rhodes, in Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, rev. ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2002), 18, 85; 
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(53.1, 55.4). See also Ps. Arist. Ath. Pol. 41.2, where the author exemplifies the dēmos’s new authority by 
the fact that even cases tried by the council now come to the courts. 
that included the murder of several democratic politicians.41 The second, in 404, began 
with the appointment of thirty prominent citizens, backed by Sparta, to construct a new 
law code for the city, and soon turned extremely violent.42 Some fifteen hundred 
supporters of democracy--more than the Peloponnesians had killed in thirty years of 
warfare--were executed; many others fled.43 The democrats regrouped, fought back, and 
recaptured the city within a few months, but the experience remained deeply 
traumatizing.44 Now, it is surely right to interpret the bulk of the reforms45 as a response 
to these calamities; but the view that the intention behind them was to restrict the 
capacity of the mass of Athenians to make “hasty decisions” would suggest that the 
majority of citizens in 410 and 403/2 held themselves responsible for these episodes, and 
there is not a shred of evidence for that. While it is true that both coups were initially 
legitimated by a vote of the assembly, it was widely agreed that the assembly had been 
forced by fear and deceit to vote against its wishes, not that it had made an “error” by 
willfully voting the wrong people into power.46 Indeed, one of the fundamental tenets of 
Athenian democratic ideology was that the dēmos was always right, and that any fault, 
when things went wrong, lay not with the voters, but with the speakers who had misled 
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42 Xen. Hell. 2.3-4; Ps. Arist. Ath. Pol. 34-40.
43 Aeschin. 2.77; Xen. Hell. 2.4.20.
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46 Aeschin. 2.176; Ps. Arist. Ath. Pol. 29.1, 34.3; Lys. 12.72-75 and 12.90). The only hint of a contrary view 
that I have been able to find appears in Diod. 13.34, 36, on the 411 coup.
them. There is no doubt that in the case of the Four Hundred in 411, and the Thirty in 
404, the blame was lodged firmly at the oligarchs’ door.47
	
 The case for “self-limitation” is thus faulty. More plausibly, the majority of voters 
in 410 and 403/2 wished to strengthen popular rule, in order to prevent an usurping elite 
from ever again gaining power through semi-legal means.48 This intention may at first 
seem surprising, since the activity of the Athenian assembly has been so closely 
associated with the practice of democracy in Athens, on the basis of its openness to all. 
By contrast, a court case on a political charge could be decided by only 500 citizens, and 
a law enacted by only 500 nomothetai. Yet the seeming incongruity of favoring the courts 
over the assembly as a representative of the Athenian dēmos may simply indicate two 
differences between ancient and modern democratic thinking. First, an implicit 
assumption of modern democratic ideology is that size matters: all else being equal, the 
more people involved in making a given decision, the better. However, the Athenians do 
not seem to have thought this way. Judging from both their actions and their words, what 
they saw as most crucial to democracy was that final decision-making power should be in 
the hands of ordinary citizens, those undistinguished by wealth, birth, influence, political 
prowess, or any other exceptional feature, and that this power should be exercised 
securely. There was no requirement that all or even most citizens of this description 
needed to be involved in any given decision: indeed, in some circumstances that might be 
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48 Cf. C. Farrar, “Power to the People,” in Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece ed. K. Raaflaub, J. Ober 
and R. Wallace (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007), 177; Christ, Litigious Athenian, 32. 
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counter-productive.49 Second, as we have seen, a common view in modern democratic 
ideology is that the popular will may sometimes need to be “checked” by essentially non-
democratic courts in the interests of higher forms of law or justice. But in Athens, direct 
democratic control of the administration of justice--the “end of the line” in political 
terms--was regarded as an integral part of popular rule, and arguably more crucial to its 
preservation than popular control of policy-making. Moreover, both of these lessons were 
driven home by the events of the late fifth century, as the following pages will show.
The Assembly vs. the Courts I: Composition
The Athenian assembly’s openness to all citizens is often regarded as its most democratic 
feature. There were limits: attendees had to be males over the age of eighteen,50 and 
anyone convicted of certain moral offenses, such as neglect of parents or cowardice, or 
who was in debt to the state, was not allowed to speak.51 But all who met these criteria--
some thirty thousand people in the fourth century, more in most of the fifth52--were free 
to attend, speak, and vote. All they had to do was turn up at the Pnyx, the hill in the center 
Most Democratic Branch?
147
49 A striking example of this way of thinking appears in the speech “Against Alkibiades” found among the 
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50 Ps. Arist. Ath. Pol. 42.1.
51 Aeschin. 1.28; Andoc. 1.73.
52 Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 90-4.
of Athens where meetings were usually held, before dawn on the relevant day. Regular 
sessions were advertised in advance; in emergencies, trumpeters were used to gather the 
populace.53 The result was that each of at least forty meetings a year was attended by 
thousands of citizens, probably around six thousand.54
	
 These numbers are certainly impressive. Yet there was an underlying problem. 
Although any citizen could, in theory, attend any meeting, it was impossible for every 
citizen to attend. The estimate of six thousand attendees is based in part on the size of the 
amphitheater on the Pnyx: it simply cannot have accommodated many more.55 
Consequently, no meeting could represent more than a fifth of the citizen body, and there 
was no way to ensure that this fifth was a fair sample of the population, that is, that it 
represented the entire citizen body equally. Indeed, the lack of formal restrictions on 
attendance, combined with an absolute physical limit, could easily reward organized 
factionalism.
	
 The most amusing depiction of such manipulation is the opening scene of 
Aristophanes’ Assemblywomen (c. 392). The transvestitory takeover of the assembly by 
Athens’ leading ladies is, of course, fictional, but the plot is predicated on a genuine 
institutional vulnerability: if a large crowd arrived at the assembly before anyone else, 
other citizens would be unable to get in, and those present would be able to enact 
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54 Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 130-2. In the second half of the fourth century (probably between 338 and 
330) the Pnyx was rebuilt and massively expanded. Hansen estimates that the new Pnyx could hold 13,800 
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55 Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 131.
whatever they pleased.56 But real-life examples of similar distortions are not hard to 
find.57 Potential agitators included the hetaireiai (“comradeships”) of wealthy young men 
implicated in the mutilation of the Herms and the mocking of the Eleusinian Mysteries in 
415: these had an important role in the coup of 411.58 Another example is the gangs of 
“three hundred to do the shouting” that Demosthenes identified as part of the entourage of 
any effective politician.59 A more ad hoc grouping appeared after the battle of Arginousai 
in 406, when hundreds of sailors drowned following an unexpected victory over the 
Peloponnesians. It was unclear whether the generals in overall authority, the captains of 
the ships sent to pick up the survivors and corpses, or the storm that had hindered the 
rescue should be held responsible for the deaths, but the captains managed to pin the 
blame on the generals in part by recruiting bereaved relatives to turn up at the assembly, 
begging for the generals to be punished.60 The most serious example of such “stacking” 
occurred in 411, when the government of the Four Hundred was approved. This meeting 
was held at Kolonos, about six miles outside the city walls, thus disadvantaging not only 
those who lived in the city or in the Peiraios (the strongly democratic harbor-town), but 
also anyone who lacked his own shield and spear--i.e. anyone from the lowest property-
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57 Some distorting effects were a standard feature of the political landscape: for instance, those who lived 
closest to the city were probably over-represented, as were peasants (as opposed to wage-earners). 
However, since these can be supposed to have affected both courts and assembly equally, they do not form 
part of my argument here. See further Todd, Shape of Athenian Law, 163, 167-8. 
58 Andoc. 2.8, Lys. 12.44, Thuc. 8.54. Cf. G. Calhoun, The Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation 
(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1913).
59 Dem. 2.29-30, 13.20. 
60 Xen. Hell 1.7.8; Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 284 with note 185. 
class, over two-thirds of the citizen body--since the presence of Peloponnesian forces not 
far away at Dekeleia put attendees at risk of attack. Since many lower-class Athenians 
were away manning the fleet during this period, the number of democrats in attendance 
was further reduced, and the result was the abolition of democracy.61 As this suggests, a 
key issue for democrats was simply getting sufficient numbers of the lowest property-
class to show up to support the system that empowered them.62 If they attended in 
proportion to their size in the population, they would easily outnumber any faction; if not, 
the elite’s strengths in terms of wealth, birth, influence, political prowess, and leisure 
might easily be deployed against them.63
 	
 By contrast, the courts were significantly more representative of the dēmos in 
respect of their composition. First, judicial panels were considerably smaller: only two 
hundred dikastai were needed to judge private wrongs, and five hundred for public 
charges.64 By the standard of modern juries, of course, these are large numbers; but the 
significant point is that the courts did not need to attract as many lower-class citizens as 
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61 Thuc. 8.67-9. 
62 Pl. Prt. 319d, Xen. Mem. 3.7.6, and Theophr. Char. 26.5 suggest that there was socio-economic diversity 
in the assembly. However, we lack evidence as to proportion, which is the key issue here. 
63 Presumably some elite citizens were genuine democrats: see e.g. Ps-Xen. 2.19. But it is striking how 
many leading figures in the 411 coup--almost all prominent politicians--had previously been believed to be 
committed democrats: see Thuc. 8.68; Andoc. 1.36. 
64 For the most important cases, multiples of these numbers were used. On the distinction between private 
and public charges in Athens (that is, dikai and graphai) see Todd, Shape of Athenian Law, 99-112; Hansen, 
Athenian Democracy, 192-3; R. Osborne, “Law in Action in Classical Athens,” Journal of Historical 
Studies 105 (1985): 40-58.
the assembly, in absolute terms, in order to ensure that this part of the population was 
adequately represented.65 
	
 Second, the courts were staffed using random sampling, and the selection 
procedures became increasingly sophisticated over time. The first step was to get oneself 
listed on the annual judicial roll: this was limited to six thousand citizens in the fifth 
century (we lack evidence for the fourth), selected by lot at the beginning of the year.66 
The second was to turn up at the entrance to the courts at dawn whenever the courts were 
in session, and hope to be selected, again by lot, to judge that day.67 Selection by lot was 
a pre-eminent marker of democracy in ancient Greece,68 and it was brought to a high art 
in Athens’ courts. To facilitate rapid and virtually incorruptible sortition, the Athenians 
built allotment-machines (klēroteria), which used white and black balls to choose or 
reject each citizen’s name-plate (pinakion). By the time of the Aristotelian Athēnaiōn 
Politeia, the process included nine separate rounds of sortition, making it impossible to 
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65 The maximum number of dikastai that might be called on any one day was 5000 (ten panels of 500). 
However, the courts cannot have been filled to this capacity every day, because private cases, which were 
judged by a minimum of two hundred citizens, also had to be heard.
66 Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 181-3. 
67 Actually, at least three different entry systems were used at different points in Athens’ history, becoming 
progressively more sophisticated. The earliest that we know about appears in Wasps (425), and did not 
involve sortition at the entrance to the courts; rather, panels were established at the beginning of the year, 
and judges knew in advance which cases they would be hearing. This was open to corruption, as illustrated 
by Anytos’ success in 409 at bribing an entire jury (Ps. Arist. Ath. Pol. 27.5, Diod. 13.64; see also Ps-Xen. 
3.7). By the time of Aristophanes’ Assemblywomen (c. 392), sortition at the door had been introduced, 
making this much harder. See E. S. Staveley, Greek and Roman Voting and Elections (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1972), 61-3, for further details. 
68 Arist. Pol. 1294b8-10, 1303a15-20; cf. Eur. Heracl. 545. 
know in advance who would hear any given case.69 External manipulation of the voting 
body may not have been completely eradicated: there was some scope for the pinakion-
sorter (himself randomly selected) to make the selection of particular individuals slightly 
more or less probable,70 and what went on outside the courts could not, of course, be 
controlled.71 But it was certainly harder to manipulate the composition of a judicial body 
than that of the assembly (or council), and the fact that the Athenians continued to refine 
selection procedures throughout the period suggests that they saw this as a priority.
	
 Third, and perhaps most significant, lower-class citizens were ensured an 
adequate voice in the courts by the provision of pay. Both democracies and oligarchies 
made use of financial incentives: according to Aristotle, payment for participation was a 
standard democratic device, since it increased attendance by the poor, while oligarchies 
punished non-participants (all of whom were wealthy by definition) with a fine.72 In 
Athens, payment was introduced in the assembly from the first decade of the fourth 
century; yet, strikingly, it was launched for dikastai some fifty years earlier.73 Introduced 
by Perikles, apparently as a deliberate attempt to shore up support among the lower 
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69 See Ar. Eccl. 686. See also Ar. fr. 152, which suggests that klēroteria were introduced alongside random 
seating assignments in the council in 410/09. For a different interpretation of the courts’ selection 
procedures, see V. Bers, “Just Rituals: Why the Rigmarole of Fourth-Century Athenian Lawcourts?” in 
Polis & Politics, ed. P. Flensted-Jensen, T. H. Nielsen and L. Rubinstein, 553-62, 2000, 553-62.
70 S. Dow, “Aristotle, the Klēroteria, and the Courts,’ Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 1 (1930): 31.
71 See Aeschin. 3.1, Dem. 19.1 and Dem. 19.332.
72 Arist. Pol. 1297a35-40 and 1300a1; cf. Plut. Per. 11.4. 
73 Assembly pay was introduced early in the fourth century at a rate of 1 obol per meeting, and soon 
reached 2 and then 3 obols (Ps. Arist. Ath. Pol. 41.3; see also Ar. Eccl. 289, 309-10). By the end of the 
democratic period it had been increased to 6 obols for an ordinary meeting and 9 for an ekklēsia kyria (Ps. 
Arist. Ath. Pol. 62.2; see Todd, Shape of Athenian Law, 172-3, on the possible timing). 
classes, it seems to have had the expected effect: according to the Aristotelian Athēnaiōn 
Politeia, there was a noticeable decline in the quality of judicial personnel after this date, 
“because ordinary persons (tōn tuchontōn) always took more care than the respectable to 
cast lots for the duty”.74 By the mid-420s, the idea that most judges were primarily 
motivated by money formed a running jibe in the plays of Aristophanes.75 Such evidence 
is tricky to interpret, of course, but caricatures have to bear some resemblance to reality 
in order to be amusing, and the view that the courts were dominated by the relatively 
poor seems likely, though it has been disputed.76 Not only was this an easy way to make 
extra cash, but the introduction of pay for participation will have dishonored the office in 
the eyes of elite citizens.77 If it was shameful to be put on a par with a “scrawny, 
unwashed” man in the normal course of things,78 it was doubly so if the motive was 
assumed to be money. This view is supported by the political ambitions harbored, 
apparently, by elite young men, such as Alkibiades and Plato’s brother Glaukon: they 
dream of shining as speakers before a vast audience in the assembly, not of queueing up 
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74 Ps. Arist. Ath. Pol. 27.4; cf. Plut. Per. 7.2-3.
75 Ar. Eq. 255-7, 797, 804; Ar. Vesp. 251-2, 290-315; Ar. Plut. 277. 
76 M. M. Markle, “Jury Pay and Assembly Pay at Athens,” History of Political Thought 6 (1985), 265-97, 
reprinted in Athenian Democracy ed. P. J. Rhodes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 95-131; S. C. 
Todd, “Lady Chatterley’s Lover and the Attic Orators,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 110 (1990): 146-173; 
contra Jones, Athenian Democracy, 36-7.
77 See Arist. NE 1163b5-10. 
78 Theophr. Char. 26.5.
outside the courts to sit as one of several hundred judges, or even of speaking to those 
judges once assembled.79 
	
 These are the main arguments supporting the courts’ claim to be a better 
representative of the dēmos with respect to composition. However, two further points 
should also be noted. First, participation in judicial bodies was restricted by age. Men 
under thirty were excluded, as they were from the council:80 the most they could do was 
watch proceedings from the spectators’ gallery.81 On the modern conception of 
democracy, this would seem inherently anti-democratic; however, it may well have 
seemed democracy-enhancing to the Athenians, since young men were widely regarded 
as emotionally unstable and lacking the appropriate temperament to preserve majority 
rule.82 Recent events supported this belief: the young were widely blamed for restarting 
the Peloponnesian War after the Peace of Nikias, which ran from 421 to 415;83 for 
intimidating the populace by mutilating the Herms in 415;84 for laying the groundwork 
for the oligarchical coup in 411;85 and for supporting Kritias, the most extreme of the 
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79 Pl. Alc. 1 and 2, Xen. Mem. 3.6; cf. Plut. Alc. 10.2.
80 Ps. Arist. Ath. Pol. 63.3. 
81 See further A. Lanni, “Spectator Sport or Serious Politics? Ὁι Περιεστηκότες and the Athenian 
Lawcourts.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 117 (1997): 183-89.
82 Hom. Il. 3.107-110; Eur. Supp. 230-7; Arist. NE 1128b15-20; Hyp. 5, col. 21. 
83 Plut. Nic. 11.2; Thuc. 6.12-13; Lycurg. fr. 1. 
84 Thuc. 6.28.
85 Thuc. 8.65. 
Thirty Tyrants.86 By contrast, middle-aged and old men were regarded as level-headed87 
and especially staunch guardians of democracy.88 Hence, it thus might well have seemed 
to a majority of Athenians that the rule of the dēmos would be better protected by keeping 
young men out of relatively small bodies such as the council and courts, where they could 
wield a destabilizing influence. 
	
 Finally, members of judicial panels, unlike assembly-goers, were bound by oath to 
vote conscientiously.89 Oaths were regarded as a significant form of protection against 
corruption; taking them lightly was portrayed as a vice in Theophrastos’s Characters,90  
and they had prominent political role: the reconciliation of Athens after the 404 civil war 
was founded on an oath, as was the accession of eighteen-year-olds to the citizen body 
and their reciprocal commitment to the polis.91 In the courts, the fact that the dikastai had 
sworn to judge in accordance with the laws and their own best judgment was regularly 
brought to their attention, as was the perceived alignment between their interests, the 
laws, their oath, and democracy itself.92 By contrast, the integrity of voters in the 
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86 Xen. Hell. 2.3.23. 
87 Aeschin. 1.24; Aeschin. 3.2; Hyp. fr. 14.
88 Ar. Vesp. 223-8; Ar. Ach. 376. 
89 A possible version of the oath appears at Dem. 24.149. The standard reconstruction runs as follows: “I 
shall vote according to the laws and decrees of the Athenian dēmos and council, but concerning things 
about which there are no laws, I shall decide to the best of my judgment, neither with favor nor enmity.” 
See Lanni, Law and Justice, 72, with citations. See also Chapter 4, p. 193. 
90 Theophr. Char. 6.2, 13.11; cf. Thuc. 5.21; Eur. Supp. 1229; Lycurg. 1.20; Aeschin. 3.208. 
91 Andoc. 1.9, 1.36, and 1.90-1; Xen. Hell. 2.4.42; Lycurg. 1.74 and 76; Ps. Arist. Ath. Pol. 42.1-2. 
92 Aeschin. 3.8; Aeschin. 3.233; Dem. 20.118; Dem. 18.217; Hyp. Eux. 40; Lys. 10.32.
assembly rested only on sacrifice and prayer. Demosthenes took it to be obvious that the 
public advantage was better served by sworn citizens than by those who were unsworn; 
hence, oath-taking was identified not as a way to restrict democracy but rather to 
strengthen it.93
The Assembly vs. the Courts II: Speaking
The second reason that the Athenian assembly is generally accounted highly democratic 
is that anyone who wished to could speak.94 Once the customary sacrifice and prayers had 
been made, a herald announced the first item on the agenda and invited speakers to come 
forward.95 Those willing made their way to the bēma, the speakers’ platform at the front 
of the stage, and the speeches ran until nobody else wished to be heard, at which point 
any necessary vote would be taken.96 
	
 Like the assembly’s openness to all, however, this seemingly democratic process 
had certain drawbacks. Just as the assembly could not include all citizens at any one time, 
the fact that anyone could step down to the bēma and address an audience of thousands 
did not mean that everyone could. Given the restrictions of time, temperament, rhetorical 
skill, and simply having something to say, only a tiny minority of citizens actually made 
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94 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 62; Finley, Democracy Ancient and Modern, 19; I. Sluiter and R. M. 
Rosen eds, Free Speech in Classical Antiquity (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004). 
95 Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 141-2. 
96 Ar. Ach. 45; Aeschin. 1.22-24; Dem. 18.169-73.
use of their right to speak.97 Hansen estimates that only around twenty to forty speakers 
were active at any one time.98 A great deal of power to influence the votes of the citizen 
body was thus concentrated in the hands of very few individuals, with no way for their 
hearers to tell in advance if they were basically honest, predominantly self-serving, or 
absolutely treacherous, as the leaders in the 411 coup turned out to be, though they had 
long been regarded as committed democrats.99 The fact that speakers were self-selected 
also raised problems. Some came forward because they had been appointed to a specific 
role, such as general, ambassador, treasurer, or architect;100 but many did so because they 
sought honor on the public stage, or because they were pushing a private agenda, just as 
politicians do today--and this did not necessarily guarantee the best advice.
	
 Some efforts were made to control the negative effects of unrestricted speech in 
the assembly. In 410, after the first oligarchical coup, a law was passed prohibiting those 
who had remained in the city under the Four Hundred from speaking in the assembly or 
Most Democratic Branch?
157
97 Cf. Plut. Dem. 6-8; Isoc. 12.10; Plut. Alc. 10.2. 
98 This is a contentious claim. It used to be accepted that very few people spoke, but recently it has been 
argued that the epigraphical evidence points in the other direction: see Osborne, Athens and Athenian 
Democracy, 5-7, with M. H. Hansen, “The Athenian ‘Politicians,’ 403-322,” Greek, Roman and Byzantine 
Studies 24 (1983): 33-55. However, the addition of seventeen new names from the epigraphical evidence to 
the list of those who suggested motions strikes me as insignificant in the light of the size of the assembly 
and the time frame involved. It must also be remembered that Hansen defined rhētores to include many 
who did not actually speak in the assembly, but simply sponsored motions in the council, whereas for 
present purposes we must restrict ourselves solely to those who spoke in the assembly. Cf. Aeschin. 3.125, 
Ps. Arist. Ath. Pol. 29.1, and Dem. 22.36. 
99 Thuc. 8.68; cf. Andoc. 1.36. 
100 Pl. Prt. 319d.
council.101 Moreover, by at least the later fourth century, it was possible to prevent some 
dubious characters from taking the stage through the process of dokimasia, a judicial 
screening designed to establish basic moral probity. Every citizen had to pass a test of this 
sort before taking up any responsible position (including sitting on the council), though 
the version applied (not consistently, it is true) to speakers was more extensive: it 
included questions about prostitution and corruption as well as citizenship and care for 
one’s parents and the gods.102 Some restrictions also applied to the content of speeches: 
for example, speakers were not allowed to speak off-topic, or on multiple topics at once, 
or on the same topic more than once per day. They were also prohibited from heckling or 
shouting down other speakers.103 Evidently, the Athenians were concerned about the 
dangers of unscrupulous or abusive speakers, and with reason. Thucydides described 
Perikles’s rhetorical gifts as a major factor in the Peloponnesian War, which turned out 
catastrophically for Athens.104 Kleon’s powers of persuasion almost led to the execution 
of hundreds of Mytilenaians.105 Alkibiades restarted the war against the Peloponnesians 
by lying to the assembly.106 Most of the leaders of both the 411 and 404 coups originally 
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101 Aeschin. 1.75. Note, however, that this law was apparently left out of the reconstituted law code in 
403/2, presumably because it conflicted with the post-revolutionary amnesty and reconciliation process. 
102 Aeschin. 1.19-20, 28; see also Dem. 22.30-33. 
103 Aeschin. 1.35; cf. Dem. 24.13.
104 Thuc. 1.29.1, 1.29.5, 1.31.1, 1.30.2, 1.127, 1.145, 2.59, and 2.65; cf. Ar. Pax 603-80 and Plut. Per. 8.4 
and 15.4.
105 Thuc. 3.49. 
106 Thuc. 5.43-5; Plut. Alc. 14; Diod. 13.69. 
came to prominence through speech-making,107  and the main speaker in favor of 
executing the generals after Arginousai turned out to have been bribed.108 All in all, 
though equality of speech in the assembly was an improvement over allowing no one but 
the elite to speak, the assembly was far from a secure vehicle of popular rule, and the 
Athenians knew it.109
	
 By contrast, though the courts could not avoid these problems altogether, it was 
possible to do more to limit their effects. First, those who were allowed to speak before 
judicial bodies had to be specified in advance. Usually, they included the prosecutor, 
defendant, and any witnesses; co-pleaders were also allowed, presumably to make up for 
the fact that not all citizens were equally able to speak well; indeed, Hypereides 
suggested that there was no custom in Athens more democratic than allowing citizens 
who were capable of public speaking to help those who were not.110 Similarly, cases 
heard by the nomothetai included as speakers only the proposer of each new law or 
amendment and five people, elected beforehand, to speak against it. No one else could 
come forward, and this restricted the opportunity for ad hoc manipulation.111 
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not a public man himself; he was, however, notorious as a writer of speeches for others. See Ant. fr. B1. 
108 Xen. Hell. 1.7.8.
109 See further Eur. Med. 580-5; Eur. Supp. 410; Ar. Ach. 376, 625-37; Aeschin. 3.220; Dem.5.12; Thuc. 
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110 Hyp. 1.10 and 4.11.
111 Dem. 24.23.
	
 Second, each side in each case received an equal amount of time, controlled by 
water clocks.112 Thus no speaker could monopolize the listeners’ attention, and hearing 
speeches of equal length side by side will have helped the judges to compare them. No 
attempt was made to restrict the content of speeches; that would have derogated from the 
judges’ authority to decide for themselves which arguments or items of evidence seemed 
most relevant.113 This led to some complaints,114  but the fact that the dikastai were under 
oath to judge the whole issue conscientiously was evidently deemed a sufficient form of 
protection.115
	
 Finally, and most significant, the judges did not confer among themselves prior to 
reaching a verdict.116 Once both sides of the case had been heard, they simply voted. This 
was no accident or oversight but standard practice across ancient Greek poleis: Aristotle 
reported that most legislators specifically prohibited joint discussion (koinologountes) 
among judges.117 To do otherwise would have turned the judge into an “arbitrator,” 
whereas dikastai were not meant to forge compromises or triangulate among competing 
views of each case but rather to reach their own personal decisions, uninfluenced by 
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112 Ar. Ach. 692; Ar. Vesp. 857. See further D. S. Allen, “A Schedule of Boundaries: An Exploration, 
Launched from the Water-Clock, of Athenian Time,” Greece & Rome 43: 157-68.
113 Different rules applied in the Court of the Areopagos and the maritime courts; see Lanni, Law and 
Courts, 75-115, 149-74.  
114 Lycurg. 1.11-12, Lys. 3.46, Arist. Rhet. 1354a.
115 Though see also Dem. 23.95. 
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analysis of the lengths of a variety of cases, see MacDowell, Law in Classical Athens, 249-50. 
117 Pol. 1268b5-10. 
anything other than the speeches that they had all just heard. Thus the possibility that 
some judges would be able to shape the votes of others through speech was eliminated, 
and this was a crucial feature of the classical Athenian political system. Undoubtedly it 
contrasts strongly with modern judicial practice, according to which each body of jurors--
or at least a large majority--is supposed to reach a consensus decision following reasoned 
debate. It also poses a difficult problem for those who would make free speech the 
centerpiece of classical Athenian democracy. Nonetheless, judicial discussion was 
avoided in Athens as it was elsewhere. 
	
 This is not to suggest, of course, that judges in the Athenian courts were 
completely silent. What we might call “audience participation” during the presentation of 
cases was widespread.118 However, such participation generally took the form of heckling 
or collective responses to brief questions posed by the speakers: it did not resemble 
modern judicial deliberation, and it is difficult to attribute this to anything other than a 
desire that the untrammeled, authentic voice of each judge should be equally represented 
in the final verdict.
The Assembly vs. the Courts III: Voting
The third reason that the Athenian assembly is generally deemed highly democratic is 
that all attendees could vote on every motion, simply by raising a hand; the majority 
Most Democratic Branch?
161
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Cartledge and F. D. Harvey (London: Duckworth, 1985), 1-15. 
opinion was then ascertained by “tellers” positioned throughout the group.119 Very 
occasionally, votes were cast by secret ballot, but this was too time-consuming to be used 
regularly.120 If the views of all present were to be taken into account, voting by hand was 
inevitable; yet this, too, caused problems.121
	
 Some of these problems were logistical. When votes were close, it could be 
difficult to identify which side had a majority, thus raising the risk that a decision might 
be passed without proper approval: this was the case after the debate between Kleon and 
Diodotos on the future of Mytilene.122 Sometimes it became too dark to see the voters, 
leading decisions to be postponed and providing an opportunity for canvassing and 
conspiracy in the interim: this occurred in relation to the case of the generals after the 
battle of Arginousai.123 But the most significant issue was that public voting opened a 
path to intimidation and corruption on a massive scale. 
	
 The major problem here was clear. Especially in times of crisis, the fear of 
reprisals for voting the “wrong” way could easily encourage individuals to self-suppress 
and vote against their real wishes. One such example concerns the lack of support offered 
to Nikias when he opposed the invasion of Sicily in 415. According to Thucydides, since 
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120 The major example is citizenship votes, but these were very rare.
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See Staveley, Voting and Elections, 73-4.  
122 Thuc. 3.49.
123 Xen. Hell. 7.6-7. 
the elderly were sanguine, the young excited, and the great multitude excited by the 
prospect of profit and dominion, those who opposed the war held their peace, fearing that 
a contrary vote would seem disloyal to the state.124 Plutarch added that the well-to-do 
were worried that they would be suspected of trying to avoid contributing to the war 
effort if they voted against it, so they held back.125
	
 These instances of self-censorship from the Athenian elite may be regrettable, but 
they are minor compared with those which arose on the part of the dēmos out of fear of 
the elite. In 411, following the murder of several leading democratic politicians, no one 
voted against the proposal to establish the government of the Four Hundred. According to 
Thucydides, writing with unusual emotional energy, the audience at Kolonos was simply 
too terrified.126 As Thucydides also emphasized, the fact that each individual among the 
dēmos was too afraid to come out openly against the proposals was a major factor in the 
oligarchs’ success, since it led them all to overestimate the extent of the conspiracy 
against the democratic system.127 As this suggests, a deep problem with open voting in 
Athens was that while the elite had many advantages--most important, access to weapons, 
supporters abroad, and money--the only advantage possessed by the lower classes was 
their numbers, and if they lacked a good sense of one another’s views this advantage was 
lost. This phenomenon stymied opposition to the oligarchs right down to the final days of 
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127 Thuc. 8.66; cf. Andoc. 2.8. 
the regime. Those who wished for a return to dēmokratia were too afraid to state it openly 
but instead suggested discreetly that they would prefer the rule of the “Five Thousand.” 128 
By contrast, a secret ballot earlier in the proceedings would have instructed all Athenians 
that opposition to oligarchy was actually widespread and boosted the will to fight against 
it. The situation in 404 was similar. Again the dēmos, “terrified” by the oligarchs’ show of 
strength, were “compelled to dissolve the democracy through a show of hands”.129 Lysias 
described the choice faced by the voters as either to vote in favor of the oligarchs, or to 
take themselves off, “conscious at least of this, that they had voted no harm to the 
city.” 130 After this, non-secret voting remained characteristic of the Thirty’s rule. For 
example, shortly after they had taken power, they brought potential opponents to trial 
before the council rather than the courts and instructed the councillors to deposit their 
ballots on a table in front of the Thirty themselves. As Lysias asked: “What possible 
chance of escape had any of them?” 131 
	
 The link between public voting and oligarchical capture was not unique to Athens. 
In Megara, an extreme oligarchy was established by the expedient of “compelling the 
dēmos to take an open vote” concerning the men who had cooperated with the 
Athenians.132 Similarly, in Korkyra, the leaders of a coup in the council cemented their 
Most Democratic Branch?
164
128 Thuc. 5.92. 
129 Diod. 14.3. 
130 Lys. 12.72-75.
131 Lys. 13.33-37; cf. Xen. Hell. 2.49.
132 Thuc. 4.74.
authority by “compelling” the people to ratify their proposal.133 In Katanaia, during the 
expedition to Sicily, Athenian soldiers were let into the town by their supporters during 
an assembly meeting and wandered around the agora in full view of the voters; 
unsurprisingly, partisans of the Syracusans “slipped away,” leaving the remainder to vote 
for an alliance with Athens.134 Conversely, it was obvious that a secret vote was more 
suitable when there was a genuine desire to ascertain each citizen’s uncoerced will: the 
Akanthians, for example, took a secret vote in order to decide whether to revolt from 
Athenian rule.135 
	
 The huge democratic advantage possessed by the courts was thus the secret ballot. 
As with random sortition, the system was refined over time. During the fifth century each 
juror was allotted one voting token, which he deposited into one of two urns while 
feigning a deposit in the other.136 By the late fourth century, however, each judge was 
given two separate ballots, both bronze discs, but one with a hole in the middle (for the 
plaintiff), the other without (for the defendant). Which disc had the hole was concealed 
when they were held between forefinger and thumb. Whichever reflected his decision on 
the case, the judge dropped into a bronze urn. The one he wished to discard went into a 
wooden one. His vote was thus completely private, and because judicial panels were so 
much smaller than assembly meetings, the process was neither too onerous to set up nor 
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too time-consuming to complete. Every dikastēs could thus offer his genuine opinion in 
accordance with his own sense of the laws and of what was just, and the benefits of this 
were widely recognized. As Demosthenes observed, no suppliant could know the name of 
the judge who had granted his prayer,137  thus protecting the judge from both reprisals and 
the corrupting influence of promised gifts. Additionally, since payment could be linked to 
proof of voting, this system ensured that the opinion of every judge had to be taken into 
account, whereas in the assembly participants could easily “slip out” before the vote if 
they deemed it prudent.138
	
 The lack of retrospective personal accountability produced by secret voting 
caused some anxiety. Lykourgos admonished the judges not to forget that although their 
votes were secret, nothing was secret from the gods,139 while Lysias asked his audience to 
imagine that the dead were observing their actions.140 The fact that, in important political 
cases, fellow-citizens were also likely to enquire of judges how they had voted was also 
brought to their attention.141 Most often, however, the freedom of the judges to vote as 
they pleased was treated in a positive light and contrasted favorably with the constraints 
felt by assemblygoers.142 Making ordinary people fully, finally, and individually 
responsible for the administration of justice tasked them with a tremendous responsibility, 
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to be sure, but it also signified and secured the genuine rule of the Athenian dēmos, and 
this was regarded as the main reason to support it. Moreover, it represented ultimate 
political power, because the courts, in Athens--not only when they were reconsidering 
decisions made by the assembly, though most notably then--were the end of the line, in 
decision-making terms. As Demosthenes emphasized, there could be no appeal against 
the decision of an Athenian court.143
Conclusion
The Athenian assembly had several weaknesses that rendered it vulnerable to oligarchical 
capture. Being open to all but restricted in size, it did not always represent the mass of 
ordinary citizens adequately; the equal right to speech was used by only a few 
individuals, giving them disproportionate power; and open voting could lead to 
intimidation.
	
 Yet despite these weaknesses, the assembly was a socially necessary institution. 
Open meetings were essential for organizing the polis militarily, and they also fulfilled a 
vital informational role. Open speaking was useful for bringing a variety of views to 
public attention and for providing an effective channel through which energetic 
individuals could make themselves useful; and even open voting was often an efficient 
way to gauge public opinion and establish legitimacy for the polis’s actions. Some such 
institution was thus both desirable and necessary, and indeed existed in every Greek 
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polis, democratic or otherwise.144 What was additionally desirable in a democracy, 
however, was to minimize the risks to democracy that this institution presented, if not by 
tightening controls on the assembly itself, then by making it subject to some other 
institution that was better able to represent the specific interests of the dēmos. In Athens, 
this institution was the courts. 
	
 Ever since the time of Solon, the administration of justice in Athens had been 
associated with the lower classes rather than the elite. The practice of using small samples 
of relatively underprivileged citizens as judges was already established and working well 
by the mid-fifth century; the risks associated with powerful rhetoric could be minimized; 
and voting could be made increasingly secure. Finally and most important, the courts 
were the ultimate decision-making body in the system. Every political community 
features an ultimate authority, from whose judgment there can be no appeal, and the 
rejection of whose judgment is rightly regarded as an attack on the political system itself. 
In Athens, this authority was the dikastic courts. They thus served as a powerful weapon 
for the defense of the entire democratic system. 
	
 The potential of this approach was first exemplified early in Athens’ history by the 
practice of euthuna, the ethical and financial “audits,” controlled by the courts, to which 
anyone in a position of power was routinely subjected, and second by establishing the 
right of appeal to the popular courts in every dispute, including those between magistrates 
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and ordinary citizens.145 The introduction of the graphē paranomōn made the Athenians’ 
commitment to the final authority of their courts incontrovertible, and the practical and 
ideological significance of this move in respect of dēmokratia is confirmed by the fact 
that in both 411 and 404, the oligarchs’ first step was to abolish this measure.146 The 
perceived superiority of the procedures used by the courts was then reaffirmed by the 
creation of the nomothetai in 403/2, whose composition and procedures mimicked those 
used in the courts proper. Yet even then, it was deemed most important not to undermine 
the ultimate authority of the dikastai. Though sessions of the nomothetai resembled those 
of a court, the power of these legislators was not allowed to derogate from the authority 
of the actual judges in the Athenian system: this was the meaning and purpose behind the 
introduction of the graphē nomon mē epitēdeion theinai.
	
 To the extent that Mogens Hansen has always insisted on the significance of the 
political powers of the Athenian courts, especially in the fourth century, the evidence 
presented here suggests that he is absolutely right. Where there is room to differ with him 
is in relation to his supposition that these powers presented a limit on the rule of the 
dēmos, that is, on dēmokratia itself. On this point, Finley, Ober, and their supporters are 
on firmer ground. There was no reduction in the level of democracy in Athens in the late 
fifth century, at least according to the Athenians’ conception of democracy. On the 
account given here, however, this argument does not go far enough. Not only was there 
no reduction in the level of democracy in this period, but the rule of the dēmos was 
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actually strengthened by increasing the authority of the institution that was already 
regarded as the most specifically democratic in the polis: the courts. 
	
 This account invites a major reevaluation of Athenian democracy, since it 
suggests the existence of a significant gulf between what modern observers usually take 
to be democratic about the Athenian system and what the Athenians themselves did. This 
raises a great number of important issues; I close by briefly addressing two of the most 
interesting. 
	
 The first question concerns the meaning of “dēmokratia.” We know that it implied 
“the rule of the dēmos,” but how exactly did the dēmos rule? Evidently it was not as 
simple as opening up every instrument of governance to all. To be sure, that was tried 
initially, but as we have seen, it did not succeed in delivering secure popular control. 
Rather, other strategies were considerably more successful. First, random sampling, with 
relatively small sample sizes, proved to be as good or better from a democratic 
perspective than calling on a large number of citizens in an unrestricted way. This 
suggests a significant distinction between modern and ancient democracy: where modern 
democrats seek ideally to have all interested parties, or at least as many as possible, 
participate in decision-making, Athenian democrats came to value wide participation less 
than equal and effective representation. That is, they cared less that every citizen should 
(in theory, at least) participate than that any citizen should have an equal chance of being 
decisive in the political process. Second, adequate representation of the poor proved 
imperative, either in proportion to their numbers or in excess of them, to make up for the 
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fact that the elite possessed advantages that they lacked.147 In Athens, the domination of 
the courts by the lower classes gave them final authority in political decision-making, 
even out of proportion to their numerical weight, and this kept the entire system working 
in their favor. Finally, and most strikingly, the Athenian experience suggests the 
significance for democracy of having ordinary citizens in control of the administration of 
justice. This not only allowed ordinary citizens to rule securely; it may also have 
facilitated the greater freedoms seen elsewhere in the political system. Arguably, with the 
courts as a supremely powerful and fully democratic backstop, ordinary Athenians could 
afford to allow energetic politicians significant leeway to lead in the assembly, without 
fearing that the ultimate authority of the dēmos might be imperiled. 
	
 This suggests a further difference between ancient and modern democratic 
practice. Since the birth of modern democracy, it has often been claimed that the 
seemingly superior “ancient liberty” of the Athenians was predicated on the existence of 
slavery, since this freed the dēmos from necessary labor, enabling them to spend more of 
their time on politics, and hence that the more limited popular participation allowed in 
modern democracy was a concession both necessary and humane.148 This verdict on 
Athenian democracy has been disputed by subsequent studies,149 but the evidence 
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presented here suggests a different enabling factor in the Athenian system: the democratic 
control of the courts. Not only did this allow the equal rights of attendance, speech and 
voting in the assembly (and council) to be exercised while minimizing their possible 
dangers; it also freed ordinary citizens from having to devote too much time to politics, 
without thereby relinquishing overall democratic control.
	
 The second question this account raises concerns the concept of political 
representation. On the evidence presented here, the claim that modern democracies are 
“representative” while ancient democracies were “direct” seems misleading. Athenian 
democracy had numerous “representative” features, if we do not restrict the meaning of 
that term to the delegation of voting power by a constituency to an individual but keep in 
mind its other sense: to give an accurate sample or portrait. The courts were obviously 
representative, in that panels of several hundred citizens judged on behalf of the polis; but 
so, of course, was the assembly, though that fact is easily overlooked. Its six thousand 
attendees were no less “representative” of the polis than the hundreds who sat in the 
courts, though it could often be less accurate in expressing the popular will. The form of 
representation used in Athens, the selection of a representative sample, is perfectly 
familiar to modern political science and proved to be an effective way of creating and 
protecting popular rule in Athens. It would be worth exploring how far it might also be 
used to benefit modern democratic politics.150
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 Finally, the failure of the epithets “direct” and “representative” to capture the 
difference between ancient and modern democracy suggests that an alternative 
characterization may be helpful. This article proposes that the preeminent difference 
between Athenian democracy and its modern counterparts lay in its use of the courts, 
rather than a legislative assembly, as the chief vehicle of popular rule. If a new 
terminological distinction can help us to make sense of this difference, we might do 
worse than to opt for the term “dikastic”--in contradistinction from “ekklesiastic” or 
“assembly-centered”--to describe the Athenian mode of dēmokratia, after the mass of 
dikastai, or citizen-judges, who sat at its apex.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Plato and the Construction of Justice
In the study of Plato two points are so obvious as to seem hardly worth restating. One is 
the special place of justice in the Platonic canon. As Eric Havelock observed in 1978, 
Plato composed several dialogues dedicated to the topic of a single virtue, but only 
justice received the honor of a treatise in ten books: the Republic, or “On Justice” (Peri 
tou dikaiou), as it was subtitled by its perspicacious first editors.1 Justice also features 
prominently in other texts, such as the Euthyphro, where it is paired with (and eventually 
submerges) holiness as the fundamental principle regulating man’s relations with the 
gods, and the Theaetetus, an inquiry into the nature of knowledge trained specifically on 
the question of what is just. Recently, the literal centrality of justice in Plato’s writings 
has been intriguingly demonstrated by Jay Kennedy, who has amassed considerable 
evidence that Plato’s works are structured like a twelve-note musical scale, with 
“positive” concepts appearing at harmonic intervals and “negative” concepts at 
discordant ones. Among the many striking results of this investigation is the discovery 
that the cluster “philosophy, justice and god” recurs at the exact center of many Platonic 
texts.2
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also E. Havelock, “Dikaiosunē,” Phoenix 23 (1969): 49-70. 
2 J. B. Kennedy, “Plato’s Forms, Pythagorean Mathematics, and Stichometry,” Apeiron 43 (2010): 10-13. 
See further J. B. Kennedy, The Musical Structure of Plato’s Dialogues (Durham, UK: Acumen, 2011). 
	
 If justice was in some sense Plato’s lodestar, then Athenian democracy was the 
port from which he was sailing, and this is the other obvious feature of his philosophical 
project. Athens is the target of explicit criticism in the Protagoras and the Laws, but all 
Plato’s writings are shot through with at least implicit resistance to the kind of democratic 
norms and ideals that most contemporary Athenians took for granted.3 The trial and 
eventual execution of Sokrates in 399 provides an obvious occasion for this in the 
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo, but the perils of Athenian-style majoritarianism 
are also clearly in view in the Gorgias, Theaetetus and Republic. Emile Faguet 
characterized this antagonism and its effects in the strongest possible terms: “Sokrates’s 
death inspired all Plato’s hatreds. And his hatreds inspired all his ideas ... The foundation 
of [Plato’s] politics is nothing other than a horror of the Athenians.” 4 Others are charier of 
treating Plato’s writings as “intellectual biography.” 5 Nonetheless, Plato’s alienation from 
the conventions of his native city is an unmistakable force in his work.6
	
 These points--Plato’s preoccupation with justice and his hostility to Athens--are 
obvious and well-recognized, yet they are seldom drawn together. Plato’s theoretical 
engagement with the conception of justice is not normally read as a direct political 
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145. 
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intervention against Athenian democracy.7 Indeed, for most of the last century Plato has 
been regarded as uninterested in practical affairs, although the opposite position was once 
well respected and has recently been revived in a novel form by Danielle Allen.8 More 
commonly, Plato’s engagement with politics “on the ground” has been deemed to be co-
extensive with the institutional proposals put forward in the Republic and Laws (possibly 
to be supplemented by the evidence of the dubiously authored “Seventh Letter”)--which 
is to say not very extensive at all, since those proposals are widely (and surely correctly) 
regarded as flights of more or less utopian fancy designed to serve particular 
philosophical ends rather than as serious recommendations for reform.9
	
 Yet Plato’s concrete institutional proposals may be the wrong place to look for 
evidence of his political activism. The real story lies elsewhere, in his sustained if often 
unremarked attention to democratic judicial activity.10 Assembly and council meetings 
appear frequently in Plato’s works, but these appearances are swamped by the steady 
stream of references to law courts, which in Athens as in many other poleis were staffed 
by vast panels of ordinary citizens who possessed absolute discretion over verdicts with 
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no possibility of appeal.11 Given the iconic significance of Sokrates’ trial in Plato’s 
writings this propensity may seem unsurprising, but his references to judicial practice far 
exceed what one might expect even in the light of that fateful event. Courtrooms, juries, 
forensic oratory, criminal charges, possible penalties and final verdicts appear repeatedly 
throughout Plato’s works, whether the topic is ostensibly judicatory or not.12
	
 Sometimes these references are easy to miss. “Are we to fix the limits of truth by 
the clock?” asks Sokrates in the Theaetetus, which is unlikely to be understood as a nod 
to judicial practice unless the reader knows that speakers in Athens’ courts (and no other 
political bodies) were subject to strict time limits.13 Other allusions may be mistaken for 
more generic complaints. The line “Are we to count names like votes and determine their 
correctness this way?” in the Cratylus might well be interpreted as voicing skepticism 
towards majoritarianism in general, unless it is known that counting votes (as opposed to 
estimating a majority from raised hands) was a distinctively judicial practice.14 But even 
when several political institutions are discussed, the courts typically come first. The 
Gorgias, for example, begins by identifying the province of rhetoric as “the courts, 
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council, assembly and other places,” shortly thereafter abbreviates this to “the courts and 
other places,” and ends with an exclusive focus on judicial activity.15 Another sign of the 
pre-eminence of adjudication in the Platonic world-view appears in the Cleitophon, 
where Sokrates is portrayed as alleging that the art of politics is identical to judging and 
justice.16 This may seem an extreme position, but it finds some support in the Laws, for 
example in the suggestions that a polis “would be no polis if it had no law-courts properly 
established” and that those who lack the right to participate in judging are not wrong to 
feel that they have no share in the polis at all.17 
	
 In the context of ancient Greek politics, such claims are less surprising than they 
may seem today. As Robert Bonner argued, judicial activity played a much more 
significant role in Greek poleis than it does in modern communities. Characteristically, 
when the maker of Achilles’ shield in the Iliad wished to ornament it with “typical scenes 
of Greek public life,” he chose as one of them “not an executive council in session or an 
assembly legislating, but a group of elders administering justice in the marketplace.” 18 At 
the other end of the period, the early Stoic philosopher Kleanthes revealingly defined the 
term “polis” as “a habitation where people seek refuge for the purposes of the 
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administration of justice.” 19 As Bonner noted, “the first concern of Greeks in politics was 
always justice.” 20  Concomitantly, the creation and enactment of legislation played a 
significantly smaller part in political life than it does now.21 
	
 Judicial activity played an especially significant role in the development of 
democracy.22 According to Aristotle, it was through its power in the courts that the 
Athenian dēmos gained control over the entire political system,23 and to the end of the 
democratic period the orators regularly referred to the courts as the bulwark of 
democracy24--even complaining that the Athenians’ dependence on their courts went too 
far and was hamstringing their preparedness for war against Philip of Macedon.25 Most 
crucially, the Athenians regularly used their courts to discipline politicians. As in any 
democracy, there was a certain symbiosis between the personal power of political leaders 
and their capacity to please a majority of voters, but in Athens ordinary voters retained 
final authority over their leaders through their control of the administration of justice. As 
Sokrates observed in the Gorgias, the careers of Kimon, Themistokles and Miltiades all 
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came to an end through judicial punishment at the hands of the dēmos, following trials for 
various forms of corruption.26 The careers of many other politicians from Perikles to 
Demosthenes were likewise damaged.27 In conjunction with the circumstances of 
Sokrates’ death, it seems reasonable that Plato should have focused significant attention 
on judicial activity, not only because the courts were an effective symbol of the political 
power of ordinary citizens but also because they did, in reality, often mark the end of the 
political line.
	
 This essay aims to draw together Plato’s theoretical interest in the concept of 
justice and his aversion to Athenian democracy. It will suggest that Plato’s works can 
fruitfully be read as an attempt to undermine Athenian-style democratic practices by 
intervening against the standard Athenian conception of justice--a conception that Plato 
rightly considered the democracy’s main intellectual foundation and institutional 
support.28 This intervention is most visible in the clash between Thrasymachos and 
Sokrates in Book One of the Republic, but the import of that clash is frequently obscured 
in English because the conceptual work that Plato is doing disappears when (as often 
happens) the Greek terms “to dikaion,” “what is right,” and dikaiosynē, “righteousness,” 
are both translated by the single English word “justice.” Actually, the fact that it is even 
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possible to use one English word to denote these two concepts--the first a judgment made 
by an agent, the second a quality of the agent herself--may well be an effect of Plato’s 
intervention in this field. The consequences for the modern conceptualization of justice in 
relation to politics and democracy have been profound.
From “To Dikaion” to “Dikaiosynē”
The argument between Thrasymachos and Sokrates in Book One of the Republic is one 
of the most familiar scenes in all philosophy.29 After listening for some time to the 
conversation between Sokrates and his companions on the theme of justice, 
Thrasymachos demands that Sokrates say what he himself thinks justice is.30 Sokrates, 
apparently alarmed by Thrasymachos’s vehemence, begs his indulgence if the company 
has erred in their discussion, and likens searching for justice to searching for gold--a 
lengthy and arduous business.31 Thrasymachos is then asked to give his own definition, 
and does so: justice is “nothing other than the advantage of the stronger.” 32 Under 
pressure from Sokrates, he later produces a second definition: justice is “the good of 
another, the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, and harmful to the one who obeys 
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and serves.” 33 In the face of continued challenges, Thrasymachos is eventually brought to 
blush at the perceived inadequacy of these formulations and effectively drops out of the 
dialogue.34 The book closes with Sokrates musing regretfully on his continued ignorance: 
“for when I don’t know what justice is, I’ll hardly know whether it is a kind of virtue or 
not, or whether a person who has it is happy or unhappy.” 35
	
 Sketched in this way, the debate between Thrasymachos and Sokrates seems 
straightforward. The philosophical claims that arise in the course of Sokrates’ 
interrogation of Thrasymachos may be complex, but the subject of the discussion is clear: 
they are talking about the nature of justice. Yet if we inquire after the Greek word that lies 
behind the English translation “justice” here, the picture becomes considerably more 
complicated, for two different terms are actually in play. 
	
 The first, “to dikaion,” is what Thrasymachos originally wants Sokrates to define 
and is the subject of his own two definitions.36 The second, “dikaiosynē,” is what 
Sokrates likens to gold--and what, in Book Two, is established as the object of 
investigation in the rest of the Republic.37 These terms are often treated as though they 
are synonymous (as in the translation of Grube followed above), but there are good 
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reasons to think that they are not. For one thing, Aristotle, in the Rhetoric, includes 
“dikaiosynē” and “to dikaion” as separate entries in his list of human goods (although, 
confusingly, “justice” is often used to translate both terms in that context as well).38 For 
another, Diogenes Laertios tells us that Aristotle wrote separate treatises on both 
“dikaiosynē” and “ta dikaia” (the plural of “to dikaion”).39 
	
 This evidence from one of Plato’s students is enough to recommend caution, and a 
broader examination of the two terms confirms that they denote two distinct concepts. 
The notion expressed by “to dikaion” is as old as extant Greek literature: it appears twice 
in the Odyssey, for instance, counterposed first with violence, and then with the 
maltreatment of guests.40 Another relatively early appearance (c. 500-525) is 
epigraphical: a bronze plaque laying out rights of pasturage for a newly settled Lokrian 
community decrees that in the absence of family members closer than brothers who can 
inherit the right, men may pasture “according to what is just” (ka to dikaion).41 As these 
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38 Arist. Rhet. 1362b. J. H. Freese translates: “To enumerate them one by one, the following things must 
necessarily be good...Justice (dikaiosynē), courage, self-control...for they are virtues of the soul (aretai 
psychēs)...Lastly, justice (to dikaion), since it is expedient in general for the common weal (sympheron gar 
ti koinē estin)” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926). H. Lawson-Tancred translates both 
“dikaiosynē” and “to dikaion” as “justice” in this passage, identifying them as a “virtue of the soul” and “a 
kind of communal expediency” respectively (London: Penguin, 1991, 92-3). Note that Aristotle’s definition 
of “to dikaion,” “a kind of advantage with respect to the community” (my translation) is not all that 
different from Thrasymachos’s, though this is not obvious from either of the above translations.
39 Peri Dikaiosynēs, Diog. Laert. 5.22; Peri Dikaiōn, Diog. Laert. 5.24. R. D. Hicks translates these as “Of 
Justice” and “Of Just Actions” respectively (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).
40 Hom. Od. 20.322-3, 21.311. Cf. E. Pattaro, The Law and the Right (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 293-4. 
41 Trans. C. Fornara, Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1977), §33. Original in R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, A Selection of Greek Historical 
Inscriptions, rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), §13. Cf. F. D. Miller, Jr., “Aristotle’s Philosophy of 
Law,” in F. D. Miller, Jr., and C.-A. Biondi, eds., A History of the Philosophy of Law from the Ancient 
Greeks to the Scholastics (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 103. 
examples suggest, “to dikaion” can denote either an act or an outcome, a form of action 
or state of affairs: either way it is something external to any given individual and is open 
to the observation of the community at large.42 As such, acceptable translations include 
“the just thing” or “what is just,” although as Enrico Pattaro has recently argued, the best 
translation may be “what is right” or “what is as it ought to be,” in line with the 
significance of the root term “dikē” (which he translates “right”).43 Crucially, “to dikaion”  
cannot denote a person: a person can certainly be “dikaios” (or “dikaia” if female), but 
the neuter adjective “dikaion” has to refer to a thing, and the addition of the article “to” 
produces the idea “thing in general”--hence “what is right” in an impersonal sense.44
	
 “Dikaiosynē,” by contrast, is a much younger term, with a significantly different 
meaning, at least prior to its appearance in Plato.45 The first time we encounter it is in the 
work of Herodotos, written in the last half of the fifth century, and its use there indicates 
that like other Greek terms ending “-osynē” (such as “sōphrosynē,” “temperance,” or 
“polupragmosynē,” “busybodiness”), it denotes a personal quality of an agent--that is, an 
internal property, a virtue or a vice, in this case a virtue. Often the agent in question is a 
king: “dikaiosynē” is the attribute that enables him to judge (and hence rule) soundly.46 
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42 “To dikaion” is often discussed as though it denoted an act only: see e.g. G. Hourani, “Thrasymachos’s 
Definition of Justice in the Republic,” Phronesis 7 (1962): 110, where it is glossed as “a loose word for just 
action.” However, as the Lokrian example shows, it can also refer to a particular state of affairs, or 
outcome.
43 Pattaro, Law and the Right, 269-94.
44 H. W. Smyth, Greek Grammar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1984 [1920]), §1023, §1153a.
45 Havelock, “Dikaiosynē,” 49-51. 
46 Hdt. 1.95-8, 2.141-152, 7.163-4.
However, the same term can also be used to describe the quality of fair-mindedness and 
trustworthiness in non-ruling individuals.47 In either case, “righteousness” is the best 
English translation, since that term too signifies an internal, personal quality, rather than a 
form of action or state of affairs.48 Though it is not certain, moreover, it is likely that the 
term was coined not long before we first see it. While other “-osynē” words appear 
regularly during this period, “dikaiosynē” appears just nine times before the end of the 
fifth century and only becomes common currency by the end of the second decade of the 
fourth century. Consequently, Havelock suggests reasonably that it may have originated 
no earlier than 450, “to express a notion that had not hitherto demanded it.” 49
	
 Accordingly, although the English term “justice” can be used to indicate either 
“what is right” or “righteousness,” and “justice” is often used to translate both “to 
dikaion” and “dikaiosynē,” the terms “to dikaion” and “dikaiosynē” are not themselves 
synonymous.50 And this matters a great deal in the Republic, because it suggests that 
Thrasymachos and Sokrates are interested in two distinct questions. Thrasymachos is 
interested in the question of “what is right” (to dikaion), which calls for a description of 
an external, impersonal reality: an act, outcome, or state of affairs. Like this question, 
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47 Hdt. 6.73, 6.85-7, 7.44-52. 
48 On “dikaiosynē” as a personal quality (i.e. “justice” in the sense of a virtue), see e.g. D. Wolfsdorf, 
“Dikaiosynē and Hosiotēs at Prot. 320-1,” Apeiron 35 (2002): 191; J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s 
Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 11-12. As Annas notes, “morality” is also a possible translation; 
however, the correspondence between the root “dik-” in Greek and “right-” in English makes the former 
preferable. See Pattaro, Law and the Right, 274-5, with Havelock, Greek Concept of Justice, 230-1. 
49 Havelock, “Dikaiosynē,” 51.
50 Bloom’s translation is scrupulous in this respect, consistently rendering “to dikaion” as “the just” and 
“dikaiosynē” as “justice.” 
both his proffered definitions, “the advantage (to sympheron) of the stronger” and “the 
good (to agathon) of another,” also feature the substantive use of the neuter adjective and 
thus make sense linguistically as equivalents, whatever their possible philosophical 
demerits. However, the terms “to sympheron” and “to agathon” make much less sense as 
responses to the question “what is righteousness” (dikaiosynē)--which is the question that 
Sokrates wishes to pursue. This second question calls for a description of the internal 
state of an agent, rather than an external “thing in general.” And such a description is 
exactly what we get in the rest of the Republic, as Sokrates investigates the soul of a 
righteous individual. Of course, since the state of an individual’s soul is difficult to 
discern from the outside, Sokrates’s account of “dikaiosynē” includes a description of the 
activity by which a righteous soul may be known: hence at the end of Book Four, Plato 
offers a definition of “dikaiosynē” in this form, as “doing one’s own business.” 51 But 
though “dikaiosynē” can be manifested in action, Sokrates’s righteous man is righteous 
both when acting and not. “Doing one’s own business” on Plato’s account refers first and 
foremost to the activity of the three parts of the soul, not to the activity of the agent 
whose soul it is.52 Righteousness is thus for Plato a permanent psychic state, as opposed, 
for example, to a human practice (as Aristotle would later characterize it).53 “To dikaion,”  
by contrast, necessarily presupposes action, either directly (by itself denoting an act) or 
indirectly (as the origin of an outcome that is dikaion). 
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51 Pl. Resp. 443d. 
52 Pl. Resp. 443d.
53 Pl. Resp. 435c-444e. 
	
 The difference between Thrasymachos’s and Sokrates’s accounts is often 
described as the difference between an act-centered and an agent-centered conception of 
justice. As the foregoing analysis suggests, this formulation certainly gets at something 
valuable.54 Nonetheless, it may be better to avoid it, since it is not at all evident that there 
exists in these pages a single concept “justice” that the objects of Thrasymachos’s and 
Sokrates’s concern can be said to be different conceptions of. At this stage in the 
Republic, all we have is one term denoting “what is right” and another denoting 
“righteousness,” and as yet no very clear account of their relationship. Another fact is 
also plain, and requires elucidation: Plato evidently wishes to turn from discussing the 
first concept to discussing the second. Why?
	
 Two clues in the text may help to answer this question. One is that, as the 
contributions of Glaukon and Adeimantos at the beginning of Book Two are designed to 
suggest (a retelling of myth of Gyges and a sketch of the lives of a righteous man deemed 
unrighteous and an unrighteous man deemed righteous), he who possesses Sokratic 
dikaiosynē will possess it whether or not anyone else recognizes that this is the case.55 In 
this sense, Plato employs “dikaiosynē” as a non-evaluative term: that is, it does not 
express a judgment on the part of any particular agent. It simply denotes an enduring 
personal attribute, like having blue eyes. “To dikaion,” however, both within and outside 
Plato’s works, cannot avoid having evaluative force. Its counterposition to violence, 
maltreatment of guests and wrongful pasturage expresses a judgment on these activities--
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54 See Annas, Introduction to Plato’s Republic, 153-69. 
55 Pl. Resp. 357a-367e. 
and this presupposes the existence of an agent doing the judging. A version of this 
appears in Thrasymachos’s proffered definitions. “What is right,” on his account, is right 
in relation to a particular agent: to the stronger, or to another, or to a ruler, a tyrant, an 
oligarchical elite, or the dēmos. What is important here is not who precisely this agent is 
but that the concept “to dikaion” presumes the existence of an agent in relation to whom a 
given action or state of affairs can be said to be dikaion.56 In the examples from the 
Odyssey, the relevant agent is Penelope and her community; in the Lokrian decree, it is 
the Lokrians. The right of this agent to effect his or her judgment is not questioned, and 
the term “to dikaion” does not itself tell us anything about the agent involved. 
Nonetheless, “to dikaion” does not only denote a given action or state of affairs: it is 
itself a judgment on them, which presupposes the existence of a judge. 
	
 The other clue appears at the beginning of Book One, when the theme of right 
action is canvassed for the first time. The conversation begins with the elderly Kephalos 
worrying, now that he is approaching death, about being required to “pay the 
penalty” (didonai dikēn) in the world below for misdeeds he has committed in this one.57 
The question that he asks is “Have I ever wronged anyone (ēdikēsen)?” 58 This leads him 
to rattle off a list of possible wrongs: cheating another man, “even unintentionally,” or 
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56 The equivalence is not exact, since as emerges in response to Cleitophon, Thrasymachos ultimately 
resists the notion that the ruling agent is himself the final judge of what is right (Pl. Resp. 340b-341a). 
Nonetheless, Thrasymachos’s rulers do function as standards or measures of to dikaion, which is the key 
concept explored in this chapter. 
57 Pl. Resp. 330d-e. 
58 Pl. Resp. 330e.
playing him false, or remaining in debt to a god for a sacrifice or to a man for money.59 
Kephalos is not interested in the question of whether these actions are in fact right or 
wrong, or what the basis for making a judgment of that sort might be: that is, he is not 
interested in investigating the concept of “right” itself. He cares only about whether he 
has performed these actions: that is, whether or not he possesses “dikaiosynē,” 
“righteousness.” Sokrates confirms that this is indeed the object of Kephalos’s anxiety 
with his first comment. “But this very thing, dikaiosynē, is it really truth-telling and 
paying back what one has received?” 60 This is the first time that the term “dikaiosynē” 
has appeared in the dialogue. But Sokrates is correct to identify “righteousness,” not what 
is right, as the thing on Kephalos’s mind.
	
 As the discussion moves away from Kephalos’s personal predicament and 
towards a more general account of dikaiosynē, it is easy to lose sight of its origins in this 
passage. But these origins are highly revealing. As we have seen, Plato is not interested in 
categorizing different kinds of actions: he wants to consider agents in themselves. 
Specifically, the Kephalos episode indicates that Plato’s interest lies in judging these 
agents. Kephalos expects to be held accountable after death for misdeeds that he may not, 
at this stage, even know he has committed, and it is this perspective--that of the 
omniscient, immortal judge--that is developed in the rest of the dialogue. Contrast this 
with Thrasymachos’s approach to defining “to dikaion,” which incorporates the 
perspective of a human agent at its foundation. Thrasymachos is not particularly 
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60 Pl. Resp. 331c.
interested in the identity of this agent: he seeks only to give a general account of to 
dikaion in relation to it. Certainly no judgment is offered as to the suitability of that agent 
to function as a standard of right in the first place.
	
 Accordingly, if Thrasymachos can be taken to represent a standard approach to 
the question of “what is right,” we can say that Plato effectively turns the tables on it. 
Rather than take the relevant human agent for granted and seek to describe only the kinds 
of acts or outcomes that can be said to be dikaion in relation to it, Plato, in effect, turns to 
the ruling agent and asks: “What is this agent’s relationship to what is right?” This not 
only marks a shift from an “act-centered” approach to an “agent-centered” one: it 
specifically opens up a space from which the ruling agent, whose own character and 
habits are not scrutinized under the Thrasymachean approach, can be judged and found 
wanting. And this is a political move because the question “what is right,” that is, “what 
is ‘to dikaion’,” is the question that ordinary Athenian citizens asked themselves every 
day in the popular courts when judging the disputes that came before them; whereas the 
question “what is righteousness,” that is, “what is ‘dikaiosynē’,” is a lever that Plato can 
use to deny their right to sit in the seat of judgment at all. 
Deciding “To Dikaion” in Classical Athens
In Book One, Chapter 3, of the Rhetoric, Aristotle suggests a distinction between two 
political questions that between them more or less carved up the entire field of ancient 
political thought and practice.61 The distinction emerges in the course of his analysis of 
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three kinds of oratory: advisory (symbouleutikon), judicial (dikanikon), and 
“exhibitive” (epideictic). The last of the three involves the assignment of praise and 
blame in any context and has no necessary political connotation. The first two, however, 
correspond to essential political categories. At issue in advisory oratory is what is 
advantageous (to sympheron) versus what is harmful (to blaberon). In judicial oratory, the 
issue is what is just (to dikaion) versus what is unjust (to adikon). On Aristotle’s view, 
moreover, these are not merely two distinct questions: they also fall to two distinct 
institutions to decide. Deciding what is sympheron is the task of the assembly; deciding 
what is dikaion is the task of the courts.62
	
 In classical democratic Athens, what was dikaion was decided democratically, by 
taking the majority view of a large number of ordinary citizens, preselected to act as 
judges, as the authoritative verdict of the polis, following a public trial in which speeches 
were heard from both sides.63 Athens was not alone in choosing to decide disputes this 
way; nor, in all likelihood, was the mode of reasoning about “to dikaion” that appears in 
our Athenian sources unique to Athens.64 Where Athens stands out is in the quality of 
evidence that we have relating to judicial decision-making by its citizens, and in the 
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62 Aristotle does not deny that questions of “right” will sometimes be discussed in the assembly, or of 
“advantage” in court. But he does deny that these considerations are part of the main point. “An advisory 
orator, although he often sacrifices everything else, will never admit that he is recommending what is 
inexpedient or dissuading from what is useful; but often he is quite indifferent about showing that the 
enslavement of neighboring peoples, even if they have done no harm, is not an act of injustice.” Similarly, 
“a man on trial does not always deny that an act has been committed or damage inflicted by him, but he 
will never admit that the act is unjust; for otherwise a trial would be unnecessary” (Arist. Rhet. 1358b). 
63 Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 178-224. Lanni, Law and Justice, 31-40.
64 See E. Robinson, Democracy Beyond Athens (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011); 
Hansen and Nielsen, Inventory. 
significance of this activity for the history of political thought. On both these counts, 
classical Athens punches well above its weight. 
	
 The basic question decided by judges in the popular Athenian courts (dikastēria) 
was whether or not the defendant deserved punishment for a specified act.65 At Athens, as 
often elsewhere, this question was broken down into two parts: first, whether or not some 
form of punishment was deserved (i.e. whether the defendant should be convicted or 
acquitted of the charge), and, second, what this punishment should be. In some cases, 
penalties were fixed by law: for example, the third conviction for proposing an illegal 
measure in the assembly or council led automatically to loss of citizenship.66 More 
commonly, however, once the defendant’s conviction had been announced, the prosecutor 
and defendant in turn proposed what they thought would be a just punishment, and the 
judges had to choose (they were not allowed to split the difference).67 In terms of “to 
dikaion,” then, resolving a dispute in the Athenian popular courts involved making two 
distinct judgments: first, whether the defendant’s actions had been dikaia or adika, right 
or wrong; and second, if wrong, what ought to be done to rectify the situation, that is, 
how best to re-establish to dikaion in the eyes of the community.68
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65 On punishment and its significance in classical Athens, see D. S. Allen, The World of Prometheus: The 
Politics of Punishing in Classical Athens (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
66 Hyp. 4.11-12.
67 Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 202-3. 
68 See e.g. Dem. 20.119: “Is it right (dikaion), Athenians, to honor a benefactor? Yes. Well then, is it right 
(dikaion) to allow a man to keep what has once been given him? Yes. Then act on these principles...” Or 
Dem. 21.21: “Include all offenses in one sweeping penalty: whatever you consider just (dikaion).” Cf. Lys. 
3.46, 13.97, 14.47, 19.67. 
	
 In making these judgments, Athenian judges were subject to two forms of 
guidance. The first was the dikastic oath. This oath was taken annually by every citizen 
who wished to be listed on the judicial roll for the year, and no one who had not taken the 
oath was allowed to act as a judge. There has been some dispute as to the exact content of 
the oath,69  but at a minimum it included the following four pledges: first, to vote in 
accordance with the laws and decrees of the Athenian dēmos;70 second, to vote only about 
matters pertaining to the charge;71 third, to listen to both sides impartially;72 and fourth, to 
judge (dikazein) with one’s “most righteous” judgment (dikaiotatē gnōmē).73 Finally, the 
oath-taker called on Zeus, Apollo and Demeter to witness his oath, and invoked a curse 
on himself (and his household) should he break it.74 
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69 The lengthy version given at Dem. 24.149-51 was inserted by a later editor and is believed to contain 
several extraneous clauses. See Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 182, with citations. 
70 Aeschin. 3.6; Ant. 5.7; Dem. 20.118.
71 Aeschin. 1.154; Dem. 45.50.
72 Aeschin. 2.1; Dem. 18.2; Isoc. 15.21. 
73 Dem. 23.96; 57.93. Adapted from E. Harris, “The Rule of Law in Athenian Democracy. Reflections on 
the Judicial Oath,” Ethics & Politics 9 (2007): 57. The standard reconstruction runs as follows: “I shall vote 
according to the laws and decrees of the Athenian people and the Council of the Five Hundred, but 
concerning the things about which there are no laws, I shall decide to the best of my judgment, neither with 
favor nor enmity. I shall judge concerning those things which are at issue and shall listen impartially to both 
the accusation and defense. I swear these things by Zeus, by Apollo, by Demeter. May there be many 
blessings on me if I keep my oath, but if I break it may there be destruction on me and my 
family” (Fränkel, 1878, trans. J. F. Cronin 1936; quoted in full in A. C. Scafuro, The Forensic Stage: 
Settling Disputes in Greco-Roman New Comedy [Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997], 50, 
and in part in Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 182). An alternative reconstruction may be found in R. J. 
Bonner, Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), 73. 
74 Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 182-3. Cf. R. J. Bonner and G. Smith, The Administration of Justice from 
Homer to Aristotle (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1938), 152-6.
	
 The second form of guidance was the speeches given in court. Since judges were 
not required to have any prior knowledge of cases or of potentially relevant laws or 
decrees, all the material on which their decisions were to be based had to be provided by 
the litigants themselves during the trial.75 And the content of the litigants’ speeches 
depended entirely on what they believed would sway the opinion of the judges: they were 
free to use the time allotted to them in any way they chose.76 Inevitably, this meant that 
speakers presented what Adriaan Lanni has called a “wide-angle” view of the case.77 This 
might include the background to the dispute, including any previous legal actions;78 any 
extenuating circumstances or aggravating factors;79 attacks on the character of the 
opposing party, along with that of his ancestors, family, friends, and associates;80 
discourses on one’s own (and one’s family’s) excellent reputation and history of service 
Plato and the Construction of Justice
194
75 For discussion of the various protagonists in an Athenian trial (litigants, including sycophants, advocates, 
speech-writers and witnesses), see S. C. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), 91-7.
76 However, they might be open to charges of false witness or subornation of perjury if anyone wished to 
press them. See R. Osborne, “Law in Action in Classical Athens,” Journal of Hellenic Studies (105): 40-58, 
esp. 57-8.  
77 Lanni, Law and Justice, 8, citing K. L. Scheppele, “Foreword: Telling Stories,” Michigan Law Review 87 
(1989): 2096. Cf. C. Carey, Trials from Classical Athens (London: Routledge, 1997), 18: “Whereas most 
modern systems surround the lawsuit with artificial rules and barriers designed to treat the individual case 
in isolation, the Athenians viewed the trial within the lives of the parties, the judges, and the community as 
a whole.” 
78 Is. 1.17, 4,19, 6.51; Dem. 53. Cf. the discussion in Lanni, Law and Justice, 46-8. 
79 Ant. 4.1.6, 4.3.2; Dem. 54.10. 
80 Andoc. 1.100; Lys. 14.25-26; Lys. 30.2; Aeschin.1.153, 1.179, 3.170; Is. 5.46, 8.40; Din. 2.8-13. Cf. Hyp. 
4.32. 
to the polis;81 and emotional appeals to the judges to consider the effects of their verdict, 
including bringing weeping children up onto the platform to elicit maximum pity from 
the judges.82 Speakers also commonly quoted laws and decrees that they believed to be 
relevant83 (although not always the law under which the charge had been brought),84 
discussed decisions given in similar cases,85  and quoted lines of poetry that they felt 
provided useful instruction.86 All these elements were presented in the same light as 
“evidence” for the judges to consider.87 But what the judges themselves took to be 
relevant to their decision was left entirely up to them. Once both sides of the case had 
been heard and each side had had the chance to respond to the claims made by the 
opposing party, the judges simply lined up to cast their ballots on the first question before 
them, i.e. for conviction or acquittal. They neither discussed the case among themselves 
nor left any record, apart from the vote itself, of what they had found to be persuasive.
	
 This approach to adjudication has traditionally been viewed with extreme 
skepticism. The evaluation of Henry Maine, first published in 1861, remains 
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81 Dem. 36.54-55; Hyp. 1.14-18. Character evidence is the most common form of “extra-legal” 
argumentation found in our extant popular court speeches. Lanni (Law and Justice, 60) counts that it 
features in seventy out of our eighty-seven surviving examples. 
82 Lys. 20.34. Cf. Ar. Vesp. 562-70. 
83 Aeschin. 1.20-35; Hyp. 3.13-19. 
84 Lys. 30; Hyp. 3; Dem. 54. 
85 Dem. 21.71-6; cf. Lys. 1.34-6, 14.4. 
86 Lyc. 1.100, 103, 107; Aeschin. 1.148-53.
87 On the classification of laws as “evidence,” see Arist. Rhet. 1355b. Cf. Todd, Shape of Athenian Law, 
58-9, with A. R. W. Harrison, The Law of Athens: Procedure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 
134-5.
paradigmatic: “The Greek intellect, with all its mobility and elasticity, was quite unable 
to confine itself within the strait waistcoat of a legal formula...questions of pure law were 
constantly argued on every consideration which could possibly influence the mind of the 
judges. No durable system of jurisprudence could be produced in this way.” 88 Lofberg, in 
1917, agreed that “a startling amount of all kinds of irrelevant matter was brought into 
nearly every case.” 89 Bonner, a decade later, judiciously drew attention to the more 
sympathetic account given by Grote,90  but even he decreed that Grote had gone “too far” 
and pointed approvingly to the vigorous strictures of B. B. Rogers, who in the 
introduction to his translation of Aristophanes’ Wasps had stated, rather downrightly: 
I must record my opinion as an English lawyer, that it would be difficult to 
devise a judicial system less adapted to the due administration of justice. 
A large assembly can rarely if ever form a fit tribunal for ascertaining facts 
or deciding questions of law. Its members lose their sense of individual 
responsibility to a great extent, and it is apt to degenerate into a mere mob, 
open to all the influences and liable to be swayed by all the passions which 
stir and agitate popular meetings.91 
	
 More recent studies, such as those by Danielle Allen and Adriaan Lanni, have 
succeeded in showing that the Athenian approach to adjudication at least made sense in 
its own terms: it was not an anomaly in an otherwise essentially modern legal system.92 
Others, such as Edward Harris, have sought to show that Athenian judges took the 
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88 H. S. Maine, Ancient Law (London: John Murray, 1920), 81.
89 J. O. Lofberg, Sycophancy in Athens (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1917), 12.
90 Grote, History of Greece, vol. 5, 237. 
91 Quoted Bonner, Lawyers and Litigants, 1927, 89-90. 
92 Allen, World of Prometheus, esp. 168-96; Lanni, Law and Justice, 41-74. 
constraints of the rule of law more seriously than has been supposed.93 Yet however we 
evaluate the Athenian system, one point is clear: Athenian dikastai had absolute 
discretion over their verdicts, both as to what the verdict should be (what we might call a 
first-order decision) and how it should be reached (a second-order decision). 
	
 To be sure, the dikastic oath required that judges judge in accordance with the 
laws and decrees of the polis, but since every judge was free to decide for himself how 
the laws and decrees applied to any particular case, this effectively left all options open.94 
Equally, though precedents were sometimes cited, there was no requirement that they be 
followed. Prosecuting Aristokrates on a charge of illegal proposal in 352, Demosthenes 
readily admitted that similar proposals had previously been allowed. The key question, he 
argued, was not whether such things had happened, but whether they ought to have 
happened. “Do not let them tell you that those old decrees were upheld by other juries,” 
he urged his listeners: “ask them to satisfy you that their plea for this decree is fairer than 
ours.” Failing that, he stated, “I do not think that you ought to give greater weight to 
delusions of others than to your own judgment.” 95 And the judges’ power to stick to their 
own judgment was protected by the strongest possible safeguards. In a political system 
notorious for holding its officers to account, only judges and assemblygoers were left 
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94 That is, both potential verdicts remained open, along with any number of ways of arriving at them. See 
further Todd, Shape of Athenian Law, 49-63. 
95 Dem. 23.98.
unaccountable for their decisions.96 Judges were also considerably better protected than 
assemblygoers from pressure to justify themselves informally: the lack of discussion 
among judges, the secret ballot, and the fact that decisions could not be appealed97 meant 
that whatever considerations each judge took to be dispositive remained an entirely 
private matter.
	
 Such judicial discretion provokes an obvious anxiety. What if judges came up 
with the wrong verdict? What if innocent individuals were punished for crimes they had 
not committed, purely on account of the ignorance and prejudices of the judges? In the 
context of classical Athens, this anxiety is often expressed in the form of a specific 
question: What about Sokrates? Even those sympathetic to the Athenian mode of 
adjudication readily describe his execution as an “outrage.” 98 Was not his death a direct 
result of the Athenians’ unlearned, populist, and discretionary approach to judicial 
decision-making? 
	
 An important clarification is necessary here. Athenian judges were surprisingly 
seldom asked to decide the facts of a case: the facts were usually agreed by both sides. 
Their task was interpretative. In effect, they had to decide if the actions of the defendant 
had been dikaia or adika, just or unjust, and this complicates the notion of a “wrong” 
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Accountability in Democratic Athens,” History of Political Thought 33 (2012): 185-208.
97 Though see Osborne, “Law in Action,” 52. 
98 Lanni, Law and Justice, 1. Those less sympathetic describe it as “judicial murder”: e.g. Dunn, 
Democracy: A History, 43, 198; Robertson, “Plato as a Critic,” 149.
verdict considerably.99 For example, when Leokrates was accused of treason by 
Lykourgos in 330, the relevant fact--that Leokrates had left Athens after the battle of 
Chaironeia eight years earlier, when the citizenry had been asked to stay in the polis to 
defend it against any further attack--was not disputed. It was admitted that Leokrates had 
gone abroad with his family and that he had spent the intervening years working overseas 
as a corn merchant.100 What the judges had to decide was whether or not this amounted to 
treason, which was a question of interpretation rather than fact. Or take a case of illegal 
proposal: the fact that a given defendant had made the proposal in question was never at 
issue--that was a matter of public record. The judges’ task was to decide whether the 
proposal had been paranomōn, or “beyond the laws,” which was, again, an interpretative 
task.
	
 Something similar can be said about the charges against Sokrates.101 Sokrates was 
accused of impiety (asēbeia) for not believing in the gods worshipped by the rest of the 
polis and for corrupting the youth (perhaps a separate charge, perhaps part of the same 
charge).102 But not even Plato suggests that Sokrates did not hold heterodox religious 
beliefs. Indeed, his mention of Sokrates’ daimon and the fact that he leaves open the 
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decide...” (trans. Freese). Cf. Pl. Euthphr. 8b-e; Pl. Ap. 18a. 
100 Lyc. 1.55, 59. 
101 R. Bauman, Political Trials in Ancient Greece (London: Routledge, 1990), 107. 
102 Bauman, Political Trials, 106-7. 
possibility that Sokrates was a monotheist rather confirms the case.103 Equally, it was 
common knowledge that Sokrates was happy to impart his views to whichever young 
men cared to listen, and that he did this for free.104 The question for the judges was 
whether or not this behavior was impious. A relatively narrow majority decided that it 
was.105
	
 It is true that not all cases in Athens followed this pattern. Sometimes the facts 
were in dispute, and then the judges’ task was trickier: they had to decide who was 
lying.106 But most of our surviving cases do conform to this model, and in large part this 
is because of another frequently noticed aspect of Athenian laws: their vagueness. In a 
modern legal setting, when faced with a question such as “was this act treason?”, “is this 
proposal illegal?” or “is this teaching impious?”, the obvious first step would be to look 
up the definitions of “treason,” “illegality” and “impiety” given in the laws and see if the 
defendant’s actions fell under any of the relevant categories. If they clearly did (or did 
not), one might want to argue that the verdict was (or should be) a foregone conclusion: 
as a matter of fact, one might be tempted to say, the defendant had (or had not) 
committed exactly the kind of act named in the law and was thus liable to punishment (or 
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“The Impiety of Socrates,” Ancient Philosophy 17 (1997): 4.
104 See also D. Cohen, Law, Violence, and Community in Classical Athens (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 189-90. 
105 According to Plato’s Apology, if only thirty judges had voted the other way, Sokrates would not have 
been convicted. Assuming a panel of five hundred judges, then (the minimum necessary to judge a graphē 
or public charge), the numbers must have been 281 votes against the defendant versus 220 for. Cf. Bauman, 
Political Trials, 170-1.
106 As in e.g. Aeschines’ prosecution of Demosthenes on the embassy (Aeschin. 1, Dem. 19). 
acquittal), regardless of the wider circumstances of the case. But this step was not 
available in Athens. Athenian laws were famously unspecific: to borrow the terminology 
of Robin Osborne, they had an “open texture.” 107 Generally, as Lanni writes, they simply 
stated “the name of the offense, the procedure for bringing the suit under the law, and in 
some cases the prescribed penalty”; they did not “define the crime or describe the 
essential characteristics of behavior governed by the law.” 108 The law of Kannonos is a 
typical example. “If anyone wrongs (adikei) the people (dēmos) of Athens, then that man, 
while chained up, is to be tried before the people, and if he is found guilty, he is to be 
killed by being thrown into a pit and his money confiscated and a tithe given to the 
goddess.” 109  Exactly what “wronging the people” meant in this context was not 
specified: that was left to the judges to decide. And the same was true of almost every 
other wrong prohibited in Athenian law.110 What “treason,” “illegality” or “impiety” 
meant was a question for judges, not law-makers, to answer.111
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Athenian (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 25. 
108 Lanni, Law and Justice, 67-8. 
109 Xen. Hell. 1.7.20. Also quoted Lanni, Law and Justice, 68. 
110 Cf. Arist. Rhet. 1374a8. An exception is laws relating to family and religion, which were often more 
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“show that these agreed with each other” and then “take his seat” (Aeschin. 3.199-200). Of course, this 
merely underscores the point that “to dikaion” was normally assumed to be indeterminate.
	
 On one view, this vagueness was a major weakness in the Athenian legal system. 
In the words of Moses Finley, the judges “had too much latitude, in the sense that they 
could not only decide on a man’s guilt but could also define the crime he had committed.”  
Finley added: “When impiety--and this is only an example--is a catch basin, no man is 
safe.” 112  It may be natural to worry that virtually any act might be defined as criminal on 
this basis. But the possibility that a term such as “impiety” might function as a “catch 
basin” directs us to think harder about the ways that words acquire and hold onto 
meaning--and this in turn raises the possibility that the standard Athenian approach to 
adjudication may not have been quite the recipe for injustice that many have feared.
	
 Arguably, there is a deep analogy between the conventional Athenian conception 
of “what is right” (to dikaion), as revealed in the practices of their popular courts, and an 
account of language that is widely accepted today. The Athenians seem to have assumed 
that “what is right” is intersubjectively constituted, in the same way as the meaning of 
any term. That is, they seem to have imagined that there is no “external” or “objective” 
right answer to the question of whether any given act is dikaion or adikon, beyond the 
answer given by the community itself. The only available measure, or standard, for such 
an answer was thus other members of the same community, and for this reason the 
decision of a sufficiently representative panel of Athenian citizens could not be “wrong.”
	
 To clarify this argument in the linguistic context, consider the word “treason.” It 
would make no sense to claim that “treason” has an objective meaning independent of the 
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Viking, 1968), 72. 
way that it is used by the community of English speakers. If that were the case, languages 
could never evolve, and of course they do. Equally, however, it would make no sense to 
claim that the meaning of “treason” is wholly subjective, that is, that it can mean one 
thing for me--“betraying one’s country,” say--and something else completely for 
you--“bananas”--with no way to decide which is a better definition. If that were the case, 
all communication would be impossible.113 A more plausible account starts and finishes at 
the level of the linguistic community. The meaning of any given term is intersubjectively 
constructed, through its use by members of this group over time: it is produced, defined, 
sustained and changed exclusively in relation to the group itself.114 Accordingly, if one 
wants to know the meaning of the term “treason,” there is nothing for it but to see how it 
is used by members of the linguistic community in question. And one could not take a 
single example of its use as sufficient indication, since there is bound to be some 
disagreement, difference of emphasis, and downright confusion as to possible meanings 
among various group members. But, given a sufficiently large sample, one would expect 
to see convergence on a few particular notions, and these notions would form the only 
right answer available as to what the word actually meant. There is simply no other 
standard by which to ascertain the meaning of any given word.
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 Arguably, the Athenians conceived the question of “what is right” in the popular 
courts in a similar way. The question of whether a defendant deserved punishment for a 
given act was not, for them, one that had an “objectively” right answer, to be deduced 
either from the laws themselves or in some other way. But equally, they did not think that 
“what is right” in any particular case was fully subjective, that is, one thing for one 
citizen and another for another, with no way of choosing sensibly between them. Rather, 
both the actions and the ideas of the ancient Athenians suggest that, in the normal run of 
things, they took “what is right” to be intersubjectively constituted: both diachronically, 
in the sense that the idea of “to dikaion” held by each member of the community was 
tested and refined by his interactions with the rest of the community over time, and 
synchronically, in the sense that every verdict was a snapshot of the views of a random 
sample of the community at a particular moment. 
	
 Importantly, moreover, it was taken for granted that there would be disagreement 
over what was dikaion in any particular case. Indeed, the absence of disagreement was 
treated as a sign of a frivolous lawsuit: in public cases, prosecutors who failed to win at 
least a fifth of the judges’ votes were punished with a heavy fine.115 But this merely 
suggests the significance, on this conception of “to dikaion,” of not taking the view of 
any single citizen or small group as decisive, but rather of canvassing the views of a large 
sample, and the larger the better if a case was particularly important or controversial. And 
this is exactly what the Athenians did. For cases involving large sums of money, or that 
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were especially significant for other reasons, the Athenians doubled (or tripled) the 
number of judges required to hear the case.116 It is difficult to attribute this to any reason 
other than the desire to minimize the chances of getting a freak result. They seem to have 
aimed to represent as closely as they could the view of the whole community on the 
matter, congruent with the limitations of space and expense (since judges were paid for 
their time). There was simply no other way to ascertain what the right verdict should be.
	
 There is an obvious affinity between the conception of “what is right” sketched 
here and the philosophy of Protagoras, represented by the line “Man (ho anthrōpos) is the 
measure (metron) of all things: of those which are, that they are, and of those which are 
not, that they are not.” 117 Moreover, although Plato repeatedly construes this claim as 
though it referred to a single man,118 thus making Protagoras open to charges of both 
subjectivism (“all appearances exist”) and relativism (“what appears to you is true for 
you”)119--and although modern scholars usually follow Plato on the identity of the subject 
in this line, though not necessarily on the inferences120--it is possible that Protagoras’s 
“man” denoted the species or the community rather than a single individual.121 If that is 
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121 See H. Segvic, From Protagoras to Aristotle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 16, 25-6. 
the case, then his teaching will have been very close to Athenian practice as I have 
described it. 
	
 But the idea that human beings could function as “measures” of “what is” and 
“what is not,” in particular what is and is not dikaion, was not unique to Protagoras. It is 
also found in Aristotle. Aristotle’s objection to the emotional manipulation of judges by 
speech-makers rested on precisely this foundation: one ought not to “warp” the 
“rule” (kanōn) that one was going to use.122 He also believed that it was impossible to lay 
down laws about things that were subjects for deliberation (peri hōn bouleuontai), 
apparently including the relationship of law to “particular matters” (hekasta). On such 
questions, he said, “men do not deny that it must be for a human being to judge”; they 
merely dispute how many men ought to perform that task.123 Aristotle also took it for 
granted that provided certain conditions were met, it was better for a large group of 
ordinary citizens to produce these kinds of judgments than a single outstanding man, or 
even a few outstanding ones.124 Protagoras seems to have suggested the same, albeit with 
fewer conditions.125 The Athenian approach to adjudication suggests that, consciously or 
otherwise, the Athenians held similar views. 
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 Yet the Athenians seem not to have reasoned this way in all cases. Homicide was 
traditionally judged very differently, revealing an alternate conception of “to dikaion” and 
its foundation at work. And this is where Plato comes in. 
Plato’s Intervention
Though most legal disputes in Athens were heard in the popular courts in the manner 
described above, cases of homicide were traditionally treated differently.126 To begin 
with, they were normally judged by a restricted category of people. Altogether there were 
five distinct homicide courts, although four of these seem to have been subsets of the 
fifth: the Areopagos, which also gave its name to the homicide courts as a whole.127 In an 
earlier era this council had been the aristocratic governing body of the city, but in the 
classical period it consisted solely of people who had previously been chosen by lot to act 
as one of the nine chief archons, and its function was almost exclusively to judge cases of 
homicide. Provided they passed their outgoing “audit” (euthyna) and a separate incoming 
“scrutiny” (dokimasia), all ex-archons joined the Areopagos on a permanent basis; 
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Hansen estimates that it probably included around 150 people at any one time, around 
two-fifths of whom will have been over sixty.128 The entire council heard cases of 
intentional killing, including wounding, arson, and poisoning resulting in death,129 while 
panels of fifty-one judged cases in the other courts. The Palladion heard cases of 
unintentional homicide and the killings of slaves, metics, and foreigners; the Delphinion 
heard cases in which the defendant admitted having killed but argued that he had acted 
lawfully and therefore did not deserve punishment; the Prytaneion heard cases in which 
an animal, inanimate object, or unknown agent had caused death; and the court “at 
Phreatto” heard cases of homicide against citizens who were already in exile for another 
offense and thus could not re-enter Attika to attend trial. Instead, they were required to 
argue their case from a boat anchored offshore.130 
	
 As well as being judged by a select group of people, the procedures in homicide 
trials differed significantly from those in the popular courts. Three “pre-trials” were held 
before the trial itself;131 defendants were banned from public and sacred spaces before the 
trial;132 trials were held in the open air;133 the most solemn sacrifices were made;134 and 
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130 For further details and full citations of our evidence relating to each of these courts, see Lanni, Law and 
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an elaborate series of oaths was taken. At the start of the trial, the prosecutor swore that 
the defendant had committed the offense, and the defendant swore that he had not. 
During the trial, witnesses swore both as to the truth of their testimony and as to whether 
the defendant had committed the crime. Finally, after the verdict was announced, the 
winner swore that he had told the truth and that the judges had decided correctly.135 
	
 The mode of argumentation in homicide suits was also strikingly different from 
that in other cases. A strict relevancy rule applied: speakers were not allowed to go 
“outside the issue” (exō tou pragmatos),136  which seems to have ruled out discussions of 
character and possibly also emotional appeals to the judges.137 There was also an 
important discursive difference. In the popular courts, as we have seen, the judges were 
asked to decide what was “just” or “right”: that is, what was “dikaion.” But another pair 
of concepts regularly appears in connection with homicide. This is “truth,” “alētheia,” 
and “what is true,” “to alēthes.” 138  Evidently, in these cases, judges had not only to 
decide what was right; they also had to decide what was true. Antiphon emphasized the 
distinction that this suggested. “The laws, the oaths, the sacrifices, the public 
announcements and all the other things that happen in a homicide suit are very different 
from other procedures because the facts themselves (auta ta pragmata), concerning 
Plato and the Construction of Justice
209
135 Aeschin. 2.87; Ant. 5.11. See also D. M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (Cornell, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1978), 119; D. M. MacDowell, Athenian Homicide Law: In the Age of the Orators 
(Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1999), 90-109; R Parker, Polytheism and Society at Athens 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 102-3. 
136 Arist. Rhet. 1354a.  
137 Lanni, Law and Justice, 96-105. See e.g. Lys. 3.44, 3.46. 
138 Aeschin. 2.87; Din. 1.1, 1.6, 1.57, 1.59; Ant. 3.3.3; Ant. 6.18. 
which the stakes are greatest, must be known correctly” (orthōs gignōskesthai).139 
Evidently, something was deemed to be at stake in homicide trials that was not at stake in 
others. 
	
 These differences demand an explanation. A significant factor is no doubt the age 
of the procedures, as Adriaan Lanni has suggested: homicide procedures were the oldest 
still in use in classical Athens and no doubt represented an old-fashioned way of doing 
things.140 Yet the allusions to truth in these cases and the additional note of reverence for 
the Areopagos that appears in many of our sources suggest that something else is also 
involved.141 The severity of the penalties presents a possible solution, since intentional 
homicide led to automatic execution, burial outside Attika, and confiscation of property, 
while unintentional homicide resulted in exile.142 But death and exile were also regularly 
used as penalties in other cases, so this will not do either.143 
	
 A better explanation turns on the religious significance of homicide cases. An 
unnatural or improper death was believed to leave a miasma, a polluting stain, on the 
polis.144 Part of the purpose of homicide trials was thus to attribute responsibility for the 
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death to the right person in the right way, so that the stain would be removed.145 Several 
ancient authors cited pollution as the explanation for the variations in procedure noted 
above, such as holding the trial outside.146 Religious significance also helps to explain 
why these cases remained in the hands of the Areopagites, since the chief archons 
traditionally had significant religious duties.147 It also explains the elaborate oath-taking, 
particularly the final oath sworn by the victorious party: the idea was to transfer any 
miasma resulting from a wrong verdict from the judges to the victorious party himself.148 
	
 Most important, the religious dimension of homicide can explain the discursive 
difference between speeches in homicide trials and those in all other kinds. The “stakes” 
may have been “greatest” in homicide suits because not only other citizens, but also the 
gods, were an interested party. The concern of the gods that their shrines and temples not 
be polluted suggested that there was an external right answer to the question of what was 
dikaion in cases of homicide in a way that there was not in other cases. In a case of 
treason or illegal proposal, the only interested parties were other citizens: there could thus 
be no “right” or “wrong” verdict on these questions beyond what the citizen community 
itself took to be right. In cases of homicide, however, the supposition that the gods also 
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had a view of the matter may have significantly altered the nature of the reasoning 
involved. It meant that in homicide cases (and only homicide cases) Athenian judges 
could be conceived as struggling to reach a decision which in some sense existed 
independently of the judgment of the rest of the community, i.e. that reflected an 
objective truth, a truth beyond their own norms and evaluations. 
	
 It is worth clarifying that, just as in other types of suit, the question before the 
judges in homicide trials was often one of interpretation rather than fact. Again, both 
sides might well agree on the events leading up to the death; what was at issue was who 
or what had ultimately been responsible for it (and hence the subsequent pollution).149 
This was a much murkier issue and raised puzzling issues of causation that the Athenians 
seem to have found fascinating. A famous (though almost certainly fictional) example 
involved the death of a boy from a javelin thrown by a classmate as he ran across a 
gymnasium. Was the thrower responsible, or the victim, or even the javelin itself?150 A 
modern coroner would have the option of recording a verdict of “accidental death” in 
these circumstances, but this was not available in Athens, possibly since the problem of 
miasma would remain. Cases of this sort suggest why the court at the Prytaneion was 
deemed necessary. Even if death had been caused by an inanimate object, it was still 
important to interpret the chain of events correctly, to ascertain the innocence of any 
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associated human agent, and to cast the offending object beyond the boundary of the 
polis.151 
	
 Again, as in the popular courts, not all homicide suits followed this pattern. 
Sometimes the events leading up to the death were uncertain, and then the relevant 
question was “did the defendant do it or didn’t he?”--a factual question of the type 
familiar from any whodunnit.152 In such cases, the truth of the matter clearly rested on 
relevant facts, which existed independently of the views of the judges. In cases such as 
that involving the javelin, however, the truth of the matter was essentially a question of 
interpretation. It raised the same issues as deciding “to dikaion” in analogous cases in the 
popular courts--except that in cases of homicide, “to dikaion” might be conceived as 
having a reality beyond the views of the judges, because the gods could also be supposed 
to care about the result. From the perspective of the judges, the question of what was 
dikaion in a case of homicide could thus be conceived as a question with an objectively 
correct answer, rather than an intersubjectively constructed one. In effect, the interest of 
the gods converted a question of “right” into one of “truth” or “fact.” It was something 
that could be known, or not known, in a way that “to dikaion” in other cases could not be.
	
 Plato’s extraordinary political intervention was to suggest that the 
conceptualization of “to dikaion” as existing independently of the norms and evaluations 
of the political community--the conception that, on the conventional Athenian view, 
applied in only a small subset of religiously significant cases--actually applied across the 
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entire spectrum of human experience. There is always an externally or objectively correct 
right answer to questions of right and wrong on the Platonic view: it is the answer 
accepted by the gods, who are supremely righteous, and it applies in all cases because the 
gods have an interest in everything we do. It can only be known, or discerned; it cannot 
be constructed by any kind of agent, not by a single man, nor by a group, nor even by the 
gods themselves.153 And it can be discerned only by a select group of men: those who 
possess dikaiosynē, which, midway through the Republic, is identified as the state of 
having gazed on and internalized the true “form” of “to dikaion,” “the right” or “the just.”  
This is a state accessed not by ordinary men, but by philosophers alone. And it seems to 
resemble the kind of knowledge that Athenians were conscious of groping after in 
homicide trials, but that they do not seem to have imagine existed in any other context, 
such as cases of treason or proposing a disadvantageous law. 
	
 The contours, foundations, and implications of this set of claims are aired and 
explored in all Plato’s works, in ways both large and small. We may note, for example, 
the transformation, in the Euthyphro, of Meletos’ claim that Sokrates had corrupted 
young men into the claim that Meletos “knows how the youth are corrupted and who are 
those who corrupt them”: a turn from an interpretive question, the answer to which would 
depend on an intersubjectively constituted understanding of what it meant to corrupt, to a 
question of knowledge or fact.154 Or the distinction drawn between “true” and “false” 
judges in the Apology, where Sokrates explicitly strips the title of “judge” (dikastēs) from 
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those who failed to find him innocent: being a true judge evidently required coming up 
with the right answer.155 Or Sokrates’ celebrated acceptance of the laws of Athens in the 
Crito: this is often regarded as a contradiction of his position in the Apology, when he 
defies the Athenian public with the words “Men of Athens, I am grateful and I am your 
friend, but I will obey the god rather than you...” 156  What is less often recognized is that 
when, in the Crito, Sokrates blames his conviction on the interpretation of the laws 
offered by the men of Athens rather than on the laws themselves, he thereby rejects the 
authority of the citizen body to decide for itself what is dikaion, which was the 
foundation of Athenian law.157 Finally, we should note the connection between the effort 
to establish objective meanings for words in the Cratylus and Plato’s consciousness, 
revealed in two dialogues, that there was an analogy between the formation of language 
and the construction of “to dikaion” on the ordinary conception of that term. Alkibiades, 
in the first dialogue of that name, stated explicitly that the people who had taught him “ta 
dikaia” were the same who had taught him Greek.158 The same idea appears in the 
Protagoras.159 This suggests that Plato understood that the intersubjective construction of 
language itself had to be denied if his more significant attack on the intersubjective 
construction of justice was to succeed.
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 A full analysis of Plato’s works in this light would be of the greatest interest, but 
for present purposes we may focus on two specific points. The first is Plato’s enthusiasm 
for the idea that the gods care about every human wrong, not merely some discrete subset 
of wrongs. This thought appears in a variety of places, including the Republic: the divine 
judges (dikastas) who reward and punish human beings after death attend to “all the 
wrongs they had ever done,” not merely to certain kinds of wrong.160 The same 
perspective features in the Gorgias, through the activity of Rhadamanthys, the supremely 
just judge of the afterlife,161 and in the Phaedo.162 But it is presented most fully in Book 
Ten of the Laws. First, the argument “that the gods exist, and that they are good and 
honor justice (to dikaion) more than do men” is identified by Klinias as “the best defense 
of all our laws.” 163  The Athenian Stranger agrees: the non-existence of the gods must be 
disproved as a necessary prelude to obeying the laws. But two further “false notions” 
about the gods must also be removed: “that the gods exist, but pay no heed to human 
affairs,” and “that they do pay heed, but are easily won over by prayers and offerings.” 164 
All three propositions--the non-existence of the gods, their lack of interest in the doings 
of men, and their willingness to transgress justice (to dikaion) when paid off--are then 
comprehensively attacked.165 One point is especially noteworthy: the argument that “God 
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also cares for the World-All” is wrapped into the argument for his existence in a way that 
his unwillingness to be “seduced away from justice with gifts” appears not to be.166 Care 
for all things would, on Plato’s account, appear to be presupposed by God’s very 
existence. The result is that there is no sphere in which human beings may decide what is 
right for themselves. There is always a pre-existing answer, which they may discern 
successfully, or not. 
	
 The second important point is that with which this chapter began: the transition 
from “to dikaion” to “dikaiosynē” as the object of attention in the Republic, its 
significance for Plato, and its implications both for his philosophy and for later 
understandings of justice. From the beginning of Book Two “dikaiosynē” is established as 
the focus of the work,167and from Book Four it is formally defined as the state in which 
the elements of the soul “do their own business.” 168  The question we can now explore is 
what this approach allows Plato to do. 
	
 As we have seen, the question “what is to dikaion,” as raised by Thrasymachos 
and pondered daily by ordinary Athenian citizens in their popular courts, functions in 
effect as an open invitation to all comers to exercise their judgment. The question “what 
is dikaiosynē,” by contrast, turns attention to the nature of the judging agent. Presumably, 
this turn would seem desirable if one wished to argue that only someone with dikaiosynē 
can judge correctly what is dikaion, although Plato nowhere says this explicitly. What is 
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clear, though, is that directing attention to the question of a judge’s personal qualities 
raises the possibility that not everyone will possess the necessary credentials to judge 
well--that is, that not everyone will be found to possess dikaiosynē. This is not a 
necessary inference: Protagoras, for example, suggested that a sense of dikē, right, was 
common to all human beings.169 But asking the question “what is dikaiosynē?” does open 
up a space from which would-be judges can be themselves judged and found wanting. If 
they are discovered to lack this virtue, their responses to the question “what is to 
dikaion?” might be ruled out--and fairly so, on this approach. 
	
 The crucial question then is: who is to be disbarred from judging on this basis? 
Or, put another way: who possesses dikaiosynē and how do they get it? From Book Four, 
we know that dikaiosynē means the possession of a rightly-ordered soul (a condition very 
close to sōphrosynē, a significantly older concept).170 But Plato goes further. In Books 
Five and Six, he posits a new notion of “to dikaion” that precedes and anchors all 
particular manifestations of that concept, and he does this explicitly in order to provide an 
intellectual basis for dikaiosynē. The new concept of “to dikaion” that he provides is an 
eternal “idea” or “form” gazed on by a select few, and this act, or state, of gazing is then 
established as what defines dikaiosynē as a human quality.171 
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 It is important to notice that the existence of “to dikaion” as an ideal form is not 
intrinsically presupposed by the concept of dikaiosynē in its ordinary meaning. As we 
have seen, that concept pre-existed Plato’s employment of it. Rather, the existence of the 
form “to dikaion” is brought in by Plato as a way of demarcating clearly the difference 
between those who possess dikaiosynē and those who do not.172 Yet equally, it is crucial 
to note that Plato arrives at the existence of the form “to dikaion” via his investigation of 
the concept of dikaiosynē rather than as a direct response to Thrasymachos’s original 
question, “what is to dikaion?” This is because, without being channeled through specific 
human agents, the existence of “to dikaion” as an eternal form would be nothing to us. 
Just as the existence of the gods can mean nothing to us without their intervention in 
human affairs, the existence of an eternal form would be irrelevant to human society 
without some mediating channel. If no human being can get to the forms, they might as 
well not exist, or, at least, we would have no option but to act as though they do not. Thus 
the realization of the form “to dikaion” in a human being is a critical step in Plato’s 
account. This is where dikaiosynē comes in. He who has dikaiosynē is the philosopher, 
who gazes on eternal realities, including “to dikaion” in its true, timeless form.173 
	
 This is a critical move in Plato’s argument for two reasons. The first is political. 
As we saw above, judicial activity was of supreme political significance in the ancient 
Greek poleis, and it formed a major theme in Plato’s works. But it is especially important 
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in the Republic. This is presaged in an illuminating way during the search for dikaiosynē 
in Book Four. Sokrates has just “caught sight of something,” though Glaukon has yet to 
see it.174 To help him, Sokrates returns to the theme of “everyone doing one’s own work,”  
and poses the question: “Look at it this way if you want to be convinced. Won’t you order 
your rulers to act as judges in the city’s courts (tas dikas...dikazein)?” “Of course,” 
Glaukon replies.175 Sokrates goes on to establish that the judges will aim for no citizen to 
have what belongs to another or to be deprived of what is his own, which leads directly to 
the discovery of dikaiosynē. But what is arguably most significant about this exchange is 
the apparent naturalness of the assumption that the rulers of a polis and its judges will be 
identical. Later, this equation is confirmed in a considerably showier way with the 
establishment of the philosopher-rulers, but its seeds are already present. Judging has 
already been identified as a constitutive function of a ruler. Hence, in Plato’s ideal polis, 
the rulers must be those who know what is truly just, which is to say the philosophers. 
	
 From the democratic Athenian perspective, what is significant about this result is 
that it mirrors exactly the way that the Athenian dēmos ruled: by virtue of its control of 
the courts. It thus makes transparent the connection between Plato’s preoccupation with 
the theme of justice and his hostility to Athenian democracy with which this chapter 
began. If there is a right answer to questions of justice that only the philosopher can see, 
there is no way that anyone else can legitimately act as a judge, and hence, on the 
standard Greek conception, rule. 
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 The Republic embraces this result directly: the philosophers will both judge and 
rule.176 In the Laws, Plato’s position softens. Taking into consideration the  significance 
of participating in judging for acquiring the feeling that one is a real citizen of a polis, 
which he admits to be beneficial, Plato allows some space for democratic judicial activity 
in the ordinary Athenian way.177 But he radically alters the political consequence of this 
activity by stripping the democratic judges of final judicial authority. All cases will be 
open to appeal to a higher court, composed of men elected for the task, and it is they who 
will hold supreme authority.178 As in the Crito, Plato denies the right of ordinary citizens 
to interpret their laws for themselves. Yet this was not only the foundation of the 
administration of justice in Athens; it was arguably the foundation of the rule of the 
dēmos overall. Plato’s philosophical intervention thus justified a radical reduction in the 
strength and extent of dēmokratia in Athens. 
	
 We may therefore offer another answer to the question recently posed by Danielle 
Allen: “What did Plato do?” 179  What Plato did was to resist Athenian democracy by 
formulating a new conception of justice and its administration that was not open to being 
controlled by ordinary citizens, hence weakening their grip on political rule itself. 
	
 The second reason that the realization of “to dikaion” in a human being proves a 
critical move in Plato’s argument is conceptual. I suggested above that the dikaiosynē of 
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the philosopher functions as a channel through which “to dikaion,” the form, can be made 
active in human society. It would be equally accurate, on Plato’s account, to say that the 
philosopher embodies “to dikaion.” The philosopher not only gazes at the eternal 
realities, he also “endeavors to imitate them,” and “as far as may be, fashions himself in 
their likeness and assimilates himself to them.” 180  Indeed, not only does he attempt to 
fashion himself in their likeness, he is also required to reproduce their likeness in others. 
He must “stamp on the plastic matter of human nature in public and private the patterns 
(paradeigmata) that he visions there.” 181  The philosophers will “glance at” to dikaion, to 
kalon and to sōphron “in the nature of things,” and “alternately at what they are trying to 
reproduce in humankind,” 182  and there will be no “better craftsman” of sōphrosynē or 
dikaiosynē or any other form of virtue.183 
	
 This process of “assimilation” and “reproduction” may sound straightforward, yet 
it has a profoundly important result. In the soul of the philosopher, the distinction 
between “dikaiosynē” and “to dikaion,” the virtue within and the state of affairs without, 
itself collapses. As in the case of the judge-rulers, this collapse is presaged in an 
illuminating way earlier in the Republic, in the analogy that Plato posits between the city 
and the soul. When both “dikaiosynē” and “to dikaion” are translated “justice,” the 
significance of this analogy and of the later collapse of the two concepts into one in the 
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person of the philosopher is entirely lost. But this significance is in fact enormous. We 
ought to feel that it is as strange to seek for “dikaiosynē” in a politeia, a “political 
system” or “structure of a political body,” as it would be to seek for “courage” or 
“moderation” in that structure. That is, the search for such virtues among the members of 
the body would not be strange; what is strange would be the search for them among the 
relations of the members of the body to one another. Similarly, it would not be strange to 
suggest that “to dikaion” can be found among members of a political body. That was an 
entirely standard conceptualization: “to dikaion,” “what is right” was regularly identified 
as a way of marking out the relations between citizens.184 But Plato takes neither of these 
options. Instead, he explicitly sets out to discover “dikaiosynē,” the virtue of 
righteousness, in the relations between individuals in a politeia, rather than in those 
individuals themselves. 
	
 The remarkable significance of this move is that, conjoined in the person of 
Plato’s philosopher, the concepts “to dikaion” and “dikaiosynē”--once so clearly 
demarcated as “what is right” and “righteousness” respectively--become effectively 
interchangeable. This interchangeability surfaces clearly in Book Seven of the Republic, 
in the course of the analogy of the Cave. The philosopher leaves the cave to gaze at the 
forms, including “to dikaion”; when he returns, however, the object of his attention is 
identified not as “to dikaion,” but as “dikaiosynē.” 185  
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 It also presaged at the end of Book One. When, following the failure of his 
discussion with Thrasymachos, Sokrates muses regretfully on his continued ignorance of 
what dikaiosynē is, Plato has him say something that, to a Greek, must have sounded very 
strange indeed. “Now I know nothing,” Sokrates says: “for if I don’t know what to 
dikaion is, I shall hardly know if it is a virtue (aretē) or not.” 186  Most Athenians would 
surely have found it very difficult to understand how “to dikaion,” “what is right” in the 
sense of an outcome, could possibly be construed as a virtue, as if it were equivalent to 
“dikaiosynē,” “doing what is right.” Yet Plato, in the Republic, actually does provide the 
conceptual basis necessary to equate the two.
	
 The dramatic and profoundly influential result of this move is that a concept of 
“justice” that can encompass both “righteousness” and “what is right” becomes thinkable 
for the first time. Yet this new concept of “justice,” connoted by Plato as dikaiosynē / to 
dikaion used interchangeably, is not equally constituted by the prior notions of “what is 
right” and “righteousness.” Rather, “righteousness,” as a form of human activity, 
becomes, in Plato’s account, the handmaiden of an intellectual conception of “what is 
right” as a form of knowledge that exists independently of human agents. 
	
 Strikingly, the most incisive articulation of this thought may in fact precede Plato. 
It is arguably Sokrates’ celebrated dictum, “aretē is epistēmē.” If “virtue” is indeed 
“knowledge,” then the distinction between human activity and outcomes or states of 
affairs may already, at some level, be conceived as dissolved. Moreover, some such 
dissolution may indeed be necessary if “what is right” is to be conceived as having 
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objective reality, rather than being intersubjectively constituted as the Athenians seem to 
have believed. It was left to Plato, however, rather than Sokrates, to show in writing how 
this might be done. And to the extent that we remain in thrall to a conceptualization of 
justice as a form of knowledge, developed by experts, that governs human activity--as 
opposed to a form of human activity, developed by all members of the community, that 
itself constitutes what is known--we may have Plato to thank for getting us here.
Conclusion
While none of Plato’s institutional suggestions--“philosopher-kings,” “nocturnal 
councils” and so on--were to gain long-term ideological traction, his effect on the 
conceptualization of justice has been profound. To be sure, the immediate context was not 
propitious. The one possible foothold of an “objective” conception of “to dikaion” in 
Athens, i.e. the special treatment of homicide cases, began to be eroded in the late fifth 
century. Rather than being heard by the Areopagos in the traditional way, an alternative 
procedure known as apagōgē, previously used for offenses including theft, highway 
robbery, and seizure of persons, began to be used to bring cases of homicide before the 
popular courts.187 There they were tried in the ordinary way, using the ordinary package 
of oaths, procedures and rhetorical strategies.188 
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 The significance of the Areopagos as a vehicle for ascertaining correctly both 
“what was right” and “what was true” thus seems to have begun to wane (though the 
traditional homicide procedures continued to be used). To be sure, from the 340s the 
Areopagos could be said to be gaining political power in another way, through the 
procedure of apophasis.189 This special procedure cast the Areopagos in the role of an 
apparently neutral fact-finding institution: its task was to produce a preliminary report, 
most commonly in charges of treason, corruption and official misconduct, to establish the 
facts of a case before it passed to the popular courts for a final decision.190 Yet if this new 
role can be construed as political, it scarcely helped Plato’s cause. It certainly 
reconfirmed the special relationship of the Areopagos to knowledge;191 yet the fact that 
the popular courts maintained control over the decision of what was dikaion, and were 
perfectly ready to acquit defendants who according to the Areopagos had committed the 
acts of which they were accused, rather serves to underline the role of ordinary citizens as 
the final judges of what was right in the polis than otherwise.192
	
 In the medium term, however, it is possible to see Plato’s innovations, and in 
particular the new emphasis on dikaiosynē, as gaining ground. A useful witness here is 
Diogenes Laertios. As noted in the Introduction, a comparison of the lists of works that 
he recorded shows several treatises on what would later be called “justice” written prior 
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to Plato appearing under the title Peri tou dikaiou, while works written after Plato bear 
the title Peri dikaiosynēs.193 The only exception here is Aristotle, who wrote separate 
works on each.194 It is intriguing to to speculate on what Aristotle’s texts might have 
contained, especially given the possible influence on his thought of that of Protagoras.195 
Evidently Aristotle resisted the collapse of the distinction between the concepts “to 
dikaion” and “dikaiosynē” that Plato had precipitated; quite possibly he advocated a less 
intellectualist picture as well. But as Diogenes Laertius also gives us to understand, 
Aristotle’s school was short-lived. His immediate lineage died with his student 
Theophrastos.196 Not until the middle ages would he be fully resuscitated, and the 
Aristotle of the Thomists was a rather different character. 
	
 The reception of Plato has been very different. This is not the place to trace the 
story connecting Plato to the present day, but something significant may be inferred from 
the simple fact that we actually have all his works. As Diogenes’ catalogs suggest, this 
presents a striking contrast with every other ancient author. The fundamental fact is that 
Platonism was sufficiently congruent with Christianity for Plato’s works to keep on being 
copied and recopied during the last two thousand years, and the importance of this can 
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hardly be overstated. It means that Plato has been able to exert a more continuous 
influence on Western political thought than any other ancient thinker.197
	
 This influence arguably remains visible today. For though the standard approach 
to adjudication in Athens may be not only compatible with democratic politics but also 
philosophically defensible, the dominant conception of justice and its execution today is 
arguably much closer to Plato’s than to that of an Athenian democrat. Of course, we are 
not obliged to subscribe to Plato’s position if we are unconvinced by democratic Athenian 
practices. It is certainly not obvious that Plato was right about the existence of the forms, 
though their elaboration might provide a convenient way of limiting political authority to 
a small number of people. A more plausible but equally “intellectualist” alternative to 
Plato’s approach is that justice is a form of knowledge because the nature of 
transgressions is defined in the laws. This is the core of the dominant modern view: 
judicial decision-making requires expertise in law. Ordinary people lack this expertise, 
hence they cannot act as final judges (though they may sometimes participate in judicial 
activity in a more attenuated way as jurors). This view may look more attractive than 
Plato’s, but it has the same shape and shares some of the same assumptions as the 
Platonic approach. And it is not at all clear that it is right. 
	
 The reason for doubt goes back to the point about language canvassed in this 
chapter. The core supposition of the modern intellectualist position, if we may call it that, 
is that the whole body of law considered together is, or would be, effectively self-
interpreting. If one had access to all the relevant information given in the laws, one would 
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be able to make a perfect judgment. So Montesquieu: judgments ought to be “fixed” by 
being “ever conformable to the letter of the law,” while judges, in their turn, ought to be 
“no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, 
incapable of moderating either its force or its rigor.”An ideally constructed judiciary, on 
this model, would ultimately become “invisible”: all that would remain would be the laws 
themselves.198 More recently, these hopes have been echoed by Ronald Dworkin, whose 
superhero-judge Hercules is able to assume that the laws with which he deals are 
structured by a coherent set of principles about justice and to apply these in the same way 
to each fresh case that comes before him, without distortion.199 Both of these accounts 
reveal a commitment to the idea that there is a right answer to every legal problem “out 
there” in the laws themselves, which could be ascertained if only the judges in each case 
could render themselves sufficiently transparent and disinterested to act as a proper 
vehicle for it. This is the idea behind the very concept of legal doctrine: the underlying 
principles of the laws, deemed from the outset to be non-contradictory and assembled 
piecemeal by attempting to render each particular law compatible with every other.200
	
 But an Athenian democrat, could he be brought to understand this view, would be 
likely to respond that laws are not self-interpreting, in the same way and for exactly the 
same reason that language is not self-interpreting. The need for human agents to take part 
in judicial activity does not arise merely because the laws themselves cannot speak. 
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Human agents--specifically, members of the linguistic community in question--are 
necessary intermediaries because only they are able to decide on the meanings of the 
terms laid down in laws and how the case in question relates to them. 
	
 According to Aristotle, “men do not deny that it must be for a human being to 
judge” such matters; they merely dispute how many men ought to perform that task.201 As 
we know, Plato’s preference was for a very limited number, on the basis of an account of 
justice that rested wholly on the internalization of outside knowledge. Athenian 
democrats preferred many citizens to undertake this task, and this merely on the basis of 
their citizenship--that is, their membership of the political community whose judgments 
were the final measure of what was right for those within it. Looked at in this light, it 
would seem that many modern citizens remain closer to Plato’s position than to that of 
democratic Athenians. 
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CONCLUSION
Democracy Ancient and Modern
In a characteristically spirited essay of 1962 entitled “Athenian Demagogues,” Moses 
Finley laid down four key points concerning Athenian democracy. Each was, he said, 
“obvious in itself,” but he believed that all four taken together seldom received the 
weight that they deserved, and that no account of Athenian democracy that overlooked 
them could have “any validity” at all.1 
	
 The first of these points was that Athens was a “direct democracy,” and however 
much such a system might have in common with representative democracy of the 
familiar modern kind, the two differed in “certain fundamental respects”. One of the most 
fundamental related to the question with which Finley was, in that essay, chiefly 
concerned: the relationship between Athens’ rhetorically talented political leaders, or 
“demagogues,” and their audience. The second major issue was what Victor Ehrenberg 
had called “the narrowness of space” of the Greek city-state: an appreciation of this, 
Finley said, was “crucial to an understanding of Greek political life”. The third point, 
strictly defined, was brief. It was that the Assembly was the “crown” of the Athenian 
political system, “possessing the right and power to make all policy decisions, in actual 
practice with few limitations, whether of precedent or scope.” The fourth point was in a 
sense merely an amplification of the third. The Assembly was “nothing other than an 
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1 M. I. Finley, “Athenian Demagogues,” Past and Present 21 (1962): 3-24. Reprinted in M. I. Finley, 
Democracy Ancient and Modern (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1985) and also in P. J. 
Rhodes ed., Athenian Democracy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004). 
open-air mass meeting on the hill called the Pnyx”; Athenian politics thus gave rise to 
“problems of crowd behavior”. The Assembly’s “psychology, its laws of behavior, could 
not have been identical with those of the small group, or even of the larger kind of body 
of which a modern parliament is an example,” although one could do little more today 
than acknowledge the existence of such problems: exactly how they had affected 
Athenian politics would remain uncertain. 
	
 I said just now that Finley’s third point, strictly defined, was brief, and this is true. 
But it was immediately followed by a much longer parenthetical remark, which is 
significant for two reasons: first, because this remark raised the possibility of an 
alternative way of thinking about Athenian democracy, and second, because by including 
it only as an aside, Finley signaled his unwillingness to pursue it any further. The remark, 
which qualified his claim that the assembly was the “crown” of the democratic system, 
ran as follows:
(Strictly speaking there was an appeal from the Assembly to the popular 
courts with their large lay membership. Nevertheless, I ignore the courts in 
much, though not all, of what follows, because I believe, as the Athenians 
did themselves, that, though they complicated the practical mechanism of 
politics, the courts were an expression, not a reduction, of the absolute 
power of the people functioning directly; and because I believe that the 
operational analysis I am trying to make would not be significantly altered 
and would perhaps be obscured if in this brief compass I did not 
concentrate on the Assembly.)
	
 There is much good sense in this passage. But if the work begun in this 
dissertation is sound, two of Finley’s points are dubious. It is surely right that the 
Athenians regarded their courts as an “expression,” rather than a “reduction,” of the 
“absolute power of the people functioning directly”. It might also be true to say that 
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attending properly to the relationship between the assembly and the courts in the confines 
of this particular essay would have obscured the analysis that Finley was trying to make. 
Where we may doubt Finley’s claim is first in his supposition that the “operational 
analysis” of Athenian democracy would not look significantly different if the courts were 
properly taken into account, and second in his implicit assumption that if the courts had 
not been the “expression” of “the power of the people functioning directly,” they must 
have represented a “reduction” of that power. As we have seen, there is a third possibility: 
the courts might have served to amplify the power of the people functioning directly. 
	
 This third possibility significantly challenges the modern view of Athenian 
democracy. The work begun in this dissertation suggests that the popular courts in 
Athens, rather more than the assembly, were regarded as the chief organ of democracy in 
Athens and the vehicle of the dēmos’s greatest power, certainly in the fourth century and 
to a considerable extent also in the fifth. Indeed, it seems likely that it was principally 
because the Athenian dēmos controlled the courts, and used the courts to control its 
political leaders, that it was able to give those leaders as much latitude as it did to shape 
policy in the assembly. Without the courts as the backstop of democracy in Athens, that is 
to say, there might have been little to prevent the rhetorical power and personal influence 
of its most prominent citizens from betraying the trust placed in them by their hearers, 
and both democratically minded and anti-democratic Athenians recognized this. That they 
did so is not surprising: it was the principal lesson they had learned in the last decade of 
the fifth century, when the Athenian political system had twice proved to be vulnerable to 
oligarchical takeover precisely because those who attended the Assembly could be 
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relatively easily terrorized, manipulated, and abused by those in a position of political 
power. 
	
 If this reading is sound, it invites the reconsideration and revision of many aspects 
of the conventional interpretation of Athenian democracy, including, to begin with, the 
other three points laid down by Finley in 1962. To be sure, as Finley emphasized, Athens 
was certainly a “direct democracy”: there is nothing to be said against that. Nonetheless, 
it would be a mistake to infer from this that the Athenian system lacked representative 
elements. It is true that it lacked constituents of the familiar modern sort; those deputized 
to make decisions on behalf of the rest of the citizenry did not stand for any particular 
subset of that body. But representative sampling, as we have seen, played a crucial part in 
Athenian decision-making processes, and the more significance we ascribe to the courts 
in the management and preservation of the Athenian democratic system, the more striking 
this feature becomes. Indeed, we ought to remember that the assembly itself was never 
more than a sample of citizens representing the full body (and one that possibly over-
represented the views of the elite). With a quorum of six thousand for certain decisions, 
and a probable maximum capacity of not much more than that, those attending any 
particular meeting will have amounted to no more than a fifth of the citizen body at any 
point during the classical era, which was the same as the proportion of citizens that 
featured on the jury-roll.
	
 The political significance of the “narrowness of space” of the Athenian city-state 
also recedes the more we understand and appreciate the role played by the courts. 
However small the classical Athenian polis may seem to us, with three or four hundred 
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thousand residents, around thirty thousand citizens, and a territory of perhaps 2500 square 
kilometers, it was one of very largest city-states of the ancient world: far too large, that is, 
to depend on non-hierarchical modes of political organization or informal methods of 
preserving political accountability.2 In this context, it might well be thought that the 
Athenians had no option but to use the skills of dedicated political leaders (including 
military generals) to get necessary political work done; but these leaders had to be 
controlled if the democracy was not to be undermined. Here, arguably, the courts played 
their most important role--and one that could actually be replicated quite easily in the 
much larger states of the modern world. 
	
 Finally, if it is right to think that the popular courts were in many ways the 
epicenter of the classical Athenian democratic system, we gain a fresh perspective on the 
“problems of crowd behavior” that Finley identified as a factor in Athenian politics. We 
may be no closer to understanding exactly how these problems played out; but we can 
say that the Athenians themselves saw these problems as troubling and sought to limit 
their effect on their political system. For the essential difference between the Assembly 
and the courts was that while in the Assembly the citizenry acted en bloc, with public 
feeling continually manifested through unrestricted speech, freedom of movement, and 
public voting, in the courts the situation was quite the opposite. There, each citizen, as far 
as possible, was required to think and act as an individual: allotted to cases at random, 
prevented from discussing them with others prior to voting, and required to use a secret 
ballot. If, as I have suggested, these features of judicial procedure played a more 
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important part in the Athenian conception of democracy than has been appreciated, the 
political significance of the “problems of crowd behavior” raised by Finley diminishes 
accordingly.
	
 Of course, the views argued against here have been held by many scholars other 
than Finley. His case is especially interesting because the relevant intellectual “blind 
spot” (if that is not too aggressive a way of putting it) appears so clearly in his work. But 
the democratic significance of judicial activity in Athens has been neglected since at least 
the mid-nineteenth century, and this raises an important question. Why has the assembly 
dominated the modern understanding of democracy in Athens for so long? If it is true that 
the democratic significance of the Athenian courts has been insufficiently appreciated, 
what explains this lacuna? 
	
 There are, as we saw in the Introduction, some plausible, or at least 
understandable, intrinsic reasons for this state of affairs. For one thing, the Athenian 
assembly was obviously an exceptionally democratic institution, on any interpretation of 
democracy, especially when its composition, procedures, and powers are compared with 
those of any modern counterpart. For another, the lack of evidence from the ancient 
world (less significant for Athens than most poleis, but still not trivial) no doubt played a 
part, and more so before the archaeological discoveries of the nineteenth century, 
particularly that of the Athēnaiōn Politeia. Yet it is also fair to say that the lack of any 
direct indication that the sheer size of political institutions in Athens was dispositive in 
terms of their importance to dēmokratia should have prompted questions before now. 
Moreover, even the Athēnaiōn Politeia did not deliver radical new evidence so much as a 
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clear framework in which existing but under-appreciated items of evidence became more 
clearly placeable within a dikastic democracy story. 
	
 We turn then to extrinsic reasons, and here three points stand out. First, the fact 
that modern electoral democracies have invariably developed through the 
democratization of legislative assemblies no doubt goes some way towards explaining 
why scholars have focused on Athenian activity in this area. Second, and concomitantly, 
the theorization of judicial activity has for several centuries played a relatively minor role 
in modern Western political thought. Though Montesquieu, for example, identified the 
judiciary alongside the legislature and the executive as one of the three branches of 
government, its strictly political significance was minimized, and later theorists have 
followed the same line.3 Third, and most interesting, is the way in which the view of 
ancient Athens has been pressed, consciously and unconsciously, into service in 
constructing and normalizing the structure of modern politics. 
	
 There have been two especially significant historical junctures in which 
contemporary ideological needs have filtered how ancient Athens was conceived. The 
first was in the nineteenth century, in the run-up to and during the broadening of the 
legislative franchise in Britain in particular. In the context of increasing agitation for 
working-class participation in politics, Athenian democracy proved a handy vehicle for 
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debating democracy in general.4 Those in opposition included William Mitford and 
Benjamin Constant; those in favor, George Grote and John Stuart Mill. 
	
 The interventions of Grote and Mill proved particularly significant.5 Both 
contributed to the reading of Greek history through the lens of British politics: Grote, for 
example, referred to the Athenian assembly as the Athenian “Parliament” and described 
Perikles as Athens’ “Prime Minister,” 6 while Mill identified the Spartans as “those 
hereditary Tories and Conservatives of Greece.” 7 As a pedagogical device, such 
anachronisms can easily be forgiven. But over the long term, the purported equivalence 
between ancient Greek and nineteenth-century British politics could only prove 
misleading. In the case of Grote, the importance of the assembly was balanced in his own 
writings by the equally important place he gave to the courts: indeed, in his view, the 
popular control of the administration of justice in Athens was nothing less than “the 
consummation of the Athenian democracy.” 8  His analysis on this point was, however, 
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4 See further J. T. Roberts, Athens on Trial (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); N. Urbinati, 
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Chicago Press, 2002); E. W. Wood, Peasant-Citizen and Slave (London: Verso, 1996); P. J. Rhodes, 
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Historiography (London: Weiden and Nicholson, 1966), 65. 
6 G. Grote, J. M. Mitchell and M. Cary, A History of Greece (abridged) (New York: Routledge, 2000), 397. 
7 J. S. Mill, “Grote’s History of Greece [I] (1846),” in Essays on Philosophy and the Classics (London: 
Routledge, 1996), 303. 
8 “To strip the magistrates of all their judicial power, except that of imposing a small fine, and the 
Areopagus of all its jurisdiction except in cases of homicide--providing popular, numerous, and salaried 
dikasts to decide all the judicial business of Athens as well as to repeal and enact laws--this was the 
consummation of the Athenian democracy.” Grote, History of Greece, 5:511. 
supported by various chronological assumptions which turned out to be incorrect, thus 
significantly undermining the force of his conclusions.9 Mill’s perceptions have arguably 
lasted better. The importance he placed on freedom of speech, and particularly freedom of 
debate in Parliament, led Mill to emphasize far more than Grote the importance of 
discussion for successful democratic politics, and his epistemic concerns also buttressed 
the interpretation of Athenian politics he offered.10 In both these respects he was an 
important forerunner of epistemic and deliberative democrats today.
	
 The second significant historical juncture is the twentieth-century postwar period, 
which has been marked by an enormous (and, in historical retrospect, unexpected) 
globalization of what had up to then been a minority model of judicial politics--the 
American system of constitutionalism, including a supreme court and system of judicial 
review. This model has spread rapidly, for complex reasons, and criticisms of the 
democratic deficit in this model of judicial governance have been widespread.11 Yet one 
major element of the ideology of this system, accepted by both supporters and skeptics 
alike, is that the natural role of courts in democracies is to act as a “check” on the popular 
will. Those who are skeptical of the democratic character of this role criticize its counter-
majoritarian aspects;12 others seek to defend it by adverting to the necessity of guarding 
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the mid-fifth century. Grote, History of Greece (abridged), 387-411. 
10 See e.g. J. S. Mill, “Grote’s History of Greece [II] (1853),” in Essays on Philosophy and the Classics, 
309-337. 
11 For a critical view, see R. Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2004). 
12 See e.g. A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962).
against “democratic excess,” in particular the “tyranny of the majority,” often in the name 
of some higher democratic law or precommitments.13 But both sides agree that the key 
function of the courts is a “self-limiting” one; they disagree only on its evaluation. 
	
 The same core conviction, as we saw in Chapter 3, has helped to shape modern 
scholars’ understandings of classical Athens. Perhaps the most explicit reading of 
classical Athens in the light of this constitutional conception is that of Walter Eder, who 
as we saw has argued that constitutional self-limitation was embraced in fourth-century 
Athens as part of the ideology of dēmokratia.14 But even those who, like Finley, have 
strenuously resisted this notion assume that if the Athenian courts could be shown to have  
been pulling in a significantly different direction from the assembly, it would have been 
in the direction of less democracy, not more. 
	
 Both accounts misconceive the real relationship of the courts to democracy in the 
Athenian setting. At the same time, the sketch of Athenian democracy to which they give 
rise serves, if only unwittingly, to bolster the ideological power of the current 
constitutional moment. 
	
 In between these two historical junctures, the Athēnaiōn Politeia was discovered, 
but its significance was not fully appreciated. Nor was its capacity to revise our 
understanding of numerous other texts that had remained in circulation fully understood. 
This is regrettable but unsurprising. Indeed, paradoxically, it may underline the relevance 
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J. Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
14 W. Eder, “Aristocracy and the Coming of Athenian Democracy,” in I. Morriss and K. Raaflaub eds., 
Democracy 2500? Questions and Challenges (Dubuque, IO, 1998), 105-40.
of Athenian democracy today. The fact that the Athēnaiōn Politeia failed to spark an 
immediate reevaluation of the respective roles of the assembly and courts in Athenian 
democracy may itself testify to the powerful role that Athenian democracy still plays in 
the modern political imagination. The enduring commitment of modern scholars to the 
traditional view of Athenian democracy, centered on the assembly, in the face of 
important evidence to the contrary may reflect above all Athens’ continued significance as 
an ideological anchor against which modern democratic ideas and practices can be tested. 
The hope of this dissertation is that a renewed understanding of Athenian democracy may 
yet have the power to change some of those ideas and practices for the better. 
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